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Political parties are inevitable in a democracy. No free large country has been 
without them. They link the sovereign people to the legislature and executive. They are 
the most significant mechanisms in a democratic government. Infact, the working of any 
system of representative government is determined by nature of the political parties 
which operates it. Political parties and the party system in India have been greatly 
influenced by cultural diversity, social, ethnic, caste, community and religious pluralism, 
traditions of the nationalist movement and clashing ideological perspectives. As the 
framers of the Indian Constitution were aware about the pluralistic nature of Indian 
society, they preferred multi-party parliamentary democracy in India. Therefore, the 
framers of the Indian Constitution were aware of the plural nature of Indian society 
hence, preferred a multi-party parliamentary democracy. Although multi-party system 
was prevalent from the very beginning in Indian Republic but presence of the Congress 
as dominant party overshadowed the importance of other political parties both at the 
centre and in the states. Before the independence, the Congress spearheaded the national 
movement under which the people of different beliefs and backgrounds came together. 
The Sawraj Party, the Socialist Party and for a long time, even the Communist Party were 
within the Congress.' In short, the Congress Party acted as the umbrella party which was 
characterized by its consensual and coalitional nature. Therefore, this led scholars like 
Rajni Kothari and Morris Jones to characterize the party system of post-independence era 
as one-party dominance. Rajni Kothari says, "The Indian system can be described as a 
system of one party dominance, which it may be noted, is very different from what is 
generally known as a one party system. It is a competitive party system but one in which 
the competing parts play rather dissimilar roles."^The all embracing character of the 
Congress Party anchored the Indian party system and maintained stability of the political 
system. The domineering character of the Congress Party started to decline after the 1967 
general election and the other political parties begin to assert themselves, and started to 
play a role in the formation of coalition governments at state level. The multi-party 
system got manifested particularly at state level but it had affected the behavior of 
political parties at central level as well. 
In a multi-party system political parties compete against each other for acquisition 
of power. In such a situation there are two possibilities; either a single party gets absolute 
majority and forms the government or of coalition government in case no party gets 
majority. So the coalition is a process in multi-party parliamentary democracy when no 
single political party secures majority or two more political parties unite to form the 
majority government in parliament or state legislature. Etymologically, speaking the 
word coalition has descended from the Latin word 'Coalitio' which means to go together 
or to grow together. It is a temporary alliance among the various political parties for the 
exercise of political power.^ Coalition is product of politics in parliamentary democracy. 
The term as it is generally used in political science is direct descendant of the exigencies 
of a multi-party system in a democratic set up.'^ Coalition Politics is common phenomenon 
in a multi-party democracy and became unavoidable in the following three situations.^ 
(a). When in a multi-party parliamentary democracy the election verdict is 
fractured and did not mandate any single political party to form government. 
(b). During the national crises when the nation demands unity on the part of 
political parties so as to thwart the national crises. 
(c). When a deadlock exists between two political parties in a bi-party system, i.e., 
an even balance between the two parties, leading one of the two to ally with any 
minor group such as a neutral or defector. 
As for as the above situations are concerned, the first situation have occurred 
frequently in India since 1989 and continued till 2009. Multi-party system in India is a 
reflection of plural nature of Indian society, where electorates are divided on different 
lines such as different ideological orientations, caste preferences, regional and religious 
aspirations etc. However, due to the emergence of coalition governments this plural 
nature of the Indian society got also reflected in the governing structure, which made the 
Indian political system more inclusive and encompassing. Norman D. Palmer remarks: 
Coalition arise out of the structure of Indian society i.e. communalism, regionalism, 
lingualism, casteism. Division between north and south, between regional and linguistic 
groups, between literate and the illiterate, between villagers and towns people, between 
communal and caste groups, have a profound effect on political life and behavior. This vast 
disparity doesn't invite two party systems but a multi-party coalition government. 
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Coalition politics is a phenomenon of a multi-party government were a number of 
distinct political parties came together to form a government. While entering a coalition 
government, coalition partners gave up there rigid stands and agreed upon a Common 
Minimum Programme which set forth the policy priorities of a coalition government by 
accommodating the policy stands of all the coalition partners. Therefore, the political 
parties while entering a coalition government follows the principle of give and take. 
While entering a coalition arrangement a political party doesn't lose its identity rather it 
remained intact. A political party can withdraw from the coalition arrangement when it 
find difficult to continue as a partner and a can join a new group for the new coalition 
arrangement. 
Although the multi-party system was prevalent from the very beginning in Indian 
Republic but systematically saying, it became manifested at the state level in 1967 and at 
the national level since 1989. It's surfacing at the national level since 1989 had 
accelerated and strengthened the federal arrangement of the Indian polity. Despite this, 
two new factors namely, the neo- liberal economic reforms that were introduced since 
199land the pro-state autonomy shift in the judicial behavior particularly since the 
Supreme Court Judgment in S.R. Bommai case (1994), largely resurrected the federal 
spirit of Indian Constitution. Both these developments had occurred in the era of coalition 
governments. Now coalition governments have become a regular feature in India both at 
central level and also in some states. Although India had experienced first coalition 
government on 25*'' October, 1946 under the British Cabinet Mission Plan, when Jawaher 
Lai Nehru headed the Indian National Congress, Muslim League interim government in 
New Delhi which lasted for nine months. After India's independence, the Congress Party 
was the only party which had all Indian presence and commanded popularity and respect 
of the people. The dominance of the Congress Party was largely due its all embracing and 
coalitional character. The Congress Party represented every section of the Indian society, 
thus helped it to dominate the electoral process both at the centre and at the states level. 
Before, the 1967 general election, India witnessed wide spread transformation due 
to change in the socio-economic profile of the country and new political formations 
emerged. These new political formations made the political process more compefitive and 
the Congress Party couldn't accommodate with the new demands and hence lost power at 
state level to various political parties and party coalitions in more than half of the Indian 
states in 1967general elections. However, the Congress Party managed to rule at the 
centre till 1977 when it was defeated by the coalition of opposition political parties 
named as Janta Party.^The Janta government publicly asserted to restore Mahatma 
Gandhi's set principles of austerity, honesty and harmony in the public life.^The slogan 
caught the imagination of the people and raised their hopes which ultimately resulted in 
the comfortable victory for the Janta Party. This was the first experiment of coalition 
government at the centre but this experiment couldn't sustain because of its internal 
contradictions. Although the Janta Party ousted the Congress Party out of the power in 
1977 but it couldn't evolve consensus on how to provide a cohesive and stable 
government to the people and consequently the coalition government devoted most of its 
time in sorting out the internal contradiction. Therefore, the Janta government collapsed 
in 1979 due to the defection of various political parties. Although the Janta experiment 
was short lived, it laid the foundation of coalition government at the center and which 
became evident from 1989 onwards and continued till 2014.The coalition era again got 
visible at the central level when National Front, a minority government was formed in 
1989 under the leadership of V.P Singh. The National Front government was supported 
from outside by the BJP and the Left Front which were naturally antagonistic to each 
other. The National Front government was fragile government from the very beginning. 
Internally, V. P. Singh had to contain Chandra Shekhar, Devi Lai, Ajit Singh and 
H.N.Bahuguna and externally, it had to maintain a balance between the BJP and the Left 
Parties. Furthermore, the major deficiency of the National Front government was the lack 
of Common Minimum Programme and it also didn't lay down the formal mechanisms to 
sort out the internal contradictions of the coalition government. Naturally, the coalition 
government didn't last too long and the delicate triangular balance upon which the 
viability of the National Front government rested was finally upset by the BJP when it 
pressed its view points on Ramjanmbhoomi-Babri Masjid controversy beyond the 
tolerance limits of the National Front and the Left Front.^ So the novel experiment failed 
to complete even one year of its term. However, the experiment helped the BJP to emerge 
as the alternative to the Congress Party to constitute a responsible opposition as well as to 
form government at the centre. 
Despite the failures of these coalition governments to sustain and to provide an 
effective government as an alternative to the Congress led governments, the subsequent 
election verdicts were fractured and didn't mandated any single party to rule. The choice 
of the people was clear for the coalition government. However, an important political 
change took place during that time was the mushrooming of the regional parties, and their 
impact on Indian politics became visible when they participated in the formation of the 
United Front government in 1996. The United Front government took the lesson from the 
failures of its preceding coalition governments and laid down the Common Minimum 
Programme by reconciling the policy priorities of the coalition partners. However, the 
United Front government did not brought the main outside supporting party i.e. the 
Congress into the coordination committee which resulted in lack of coordination between 
the Congress and the United Front, and it became the main cause for the down fall of the 
United Front government. 
The Congress Party remained indifferent towards the alliance formation and 
considered the coalition politics an aberration and played the role of spoilers in the 
coalition governments, hence reduced it already declining social support. On the other 
hand the BJP understood the changing pattern of Indian society and its limited social 
support base, thereby entered into alliance with the regional parties. The BJP led NDA 
was the product of this understanding which was formed with the help of 24 political 
parties and which ruled the centre from 1999-2004. The experiment was novel in the 
sense that the communal party i.e. BJP had to soften its stand on issues like Ram Temple, 
Uniform Civil Code and on Article 370.This helped the BJP to attract the regional parties 
to be the part of the NDA coalition government which over the years was not possible 
due to its exclusive nature of politics. Besides this the Congress's inability to attract the 
regional forces for the alliances helped the BJP because the Congress Party was the main 
rival of the regional forces which had thrived due the decline of the Congress Party. This 
gave the BJP opportunity to build alliances with regional forces because the regional 
forces considered the BJP as viable partner then the Congress Party, due to the weak 
position of the former in those states. The BJP anchored the NDA coalition government 
by laying down the National Agenda for Governance (NAG) which was the compromise 
document which gave framework for the governance to the new coalition government 
and more importantly, soften the non-saffron parties. Furthermore, the new coalition 
government led by the BJP laid down mechanisms to sort out the differences in the 
coalition government. Besides the NAG it established coordination committee to see the 
implementation of NAG and resolve the conflicts. In addition to this BJP understood the 
nature of the NDA coalition government, thereby laid down the mechanisms like Group 
of Ministers which worked as a coordination mechanism to resolve the differences of 
opinion and conflict in the cabinet. Despite this there were internal contradictions within 
the NDA at the national level and also at state level. However, it managed to complete its 
tenure and discarded the notion that coalition phase in Indian politics are aberration and 
coalition governments are by nature unstable. The NDA experiment set norms of 
coalition government which were called coalition dharma, which means following 
whatever had been agreed by the coalition partners in the Common Minimum 
Programme. 
Since 1998, party system in India had entered into a new phase of loosely bipolar 
party system. In contemporary Indian politics elections are contested in alliances. In 
1999, Lok Sabha election the BJP entered into right kind of alliances and successfully 
formed the government. The same pattern of alliance building also got visible in the 
2004, Lok Sabha election, however, a significant development during this election was 
the Congress's preference for alliance building. The Congress Party realized its weak 
organizational strength and declining mode, thereby build alliance with regional forces in 
Bihar, Maharashtra, Jammu and Kashmir, and Jharkhand. On the other hand BJP failed to 
adjust with some old allies and prefer to contest election in some states likes Assam, 
Haryana, and Jharkhand on its own, which proved to be disaster for it. The election 
results in 2004 didn't depict anything new rather it was the clear mandate for the 
coalition government. The Congress Party emerged as the single largest party with 145 
and its pre-poll alliance climbed up to 217 seats. Therefore, the NDA government was 
replaced by the Congress led UPA-I government which consists of fourteen parties, some 
of them were DMK,MDMK, PMK, TRS, RJD, PDP, lUML, NCP etc.The government 
also got outside support of CPI (M) led Left Front, which emerged as the third force in 
the election with 62 seats. The new coalition government framed the National Common 
Minimum Programme (NCMP) after studying the election manifestos of the coalition 
partners. The main aim of setting the NCMP was to evolve consensus on the policies to 
be pursued by the new government. The NCMP, acted as the road map for the new 
government and more importantly, the very outside support of the Left Front to the UPA-
I government was based on this document. The very defeat of BJP led NDA largely 
helped in giving shape to the NCMP document. The UPA-I government took lessons 
from its predecessors and set-up mechanism for the implementation of NCMP. National 
Advisory Council was set-up which acted as a watch dog for the implementation of 
NCMP and also provides input to the government in policy formulation. In addition to 
this the government also established United Progressive Alliance Coordination 
Committee (UPACC) for the consultation and discussion and more importantly, it 
established UPA-Left Coordination Committee. 
Despite the fact that UPA-I coalition constituents acted as a united front and 
defeated the communal forces in 2004 Lok Sabha election but they couldn't sustain the 
alliance in the subsequent assembly elections largely because of their regional interests. 
The Congress Party which had anchored the UPA-I coalition government was trying to 
revive its traditional support base. The contradiction in the party building and coalition 
government was the main cause which brought the UPA-I constituents in confrontation 
mode and helped the NDA to gain in the state assembly elections. The UPA-I failed to 
promote the social harmony and permitted the assembly elections to be fought by its 
allies on the basis of caste distinctions. It failed to uphold the rule of law when it misused 
the office of the governor in favour of its chances of forming governments in the states. 
Opposition to the BJP and other obscurantist element was lost sight of when the objective 
of major political parties of the alliance became the defeat of their own partners, thereby, 
helping their common opponent to win more seats.'" Therefore, the UPA-I governments 
constituents at the seat of power in Delhi remained united, progressive and allied but in 
the states the parties were disunited and unfriendly. 
Inspite of unanimity on the NCMP among the constituents of UPA-I there were 
challenges in terms of influence of the Left Fronts on economic policies and foreign 
policy of the government. The contradiction between the UPA-I government and the Left 
Front got reflected on wide range of economic policies particularly on disinvestment, 
liberalization and on foreign policy issues particularly on Indo-US nuclear deal. 
However, the National Advisory Council played a dominant role in sorting out the 
differences between the Left Front and the UPA-I government. But on Nuclear deal both 
the Left Front and UPA-I government couldn't evolve a consensus and it was on 8* 
July 2008 that UPA-I government was reduced to minority when the Left Front withdrew 
its support, ending four years of often uneasy alliance with the government. However, in 
2009 general election, again UPA made a landslide victory and formed a consensual 
based coalition government at the centre. 
Objectives of the Study 
The study aims at attainment of the following objectives. 
1. To look into the evolution of coalition government in India and to identify the reasons 
and circumstances in which coalition governments has become the virtual norm. 
2. To examine the causes responsible for the coalition instability at the national level 
and how stability was ensured in the BJP led NDA coalition government and 
Congress led UPA-I. 
3. To examine the causes of a fractured verdict in 2004 general election and consequent 
formation of the UPA-I coalition government. 
4. To look into the reasons of conflict and contradiction among the constituents of the 
UPA-I coalition government. 
5. To examine the domestic policies of the UPA-I government with special reference to 
minority development policies, employment guarantee act, reservation for the OBCs 
in higher education. 
6. To examine the foreign policy of UPA-I government with special reference to 
relation with the USA, China and Pakistan. 
In order to achieve the above cited objectives the following research questions have been 
framed. 
1. How the Congress Party was able to maintain its dominance in the Indian 
electoral process at state level till 1967 and at national level up to 1989. 
2. Why the coalition governments at the central level couldn't survive or maintain its 
stability when they unite against a common enemy during the Lok Sabha 
elections. 
3. Why the BJP became more successful in forging alJiance with the regionaJ parties 
or state parties why Congress Party failed till 2004. 
4. Whether 2004 Lok Sabha elections was different from the previous elections. 
5. Whether Congress led UPA-I government was opportunistic alliance or office 
seeking. 
6. How Congress led UPA-I government maintain its stability. 
7. Why the Left Front withdrew its support to the UPA-I government on nuclear 
deal when it could have withdrawn, its support when UPA-I concluded the Indo-
US defence deal. 
8. Whether UPA-I government's foreign policy was different from the BJP led 
NDAs foreign policy. 
Chapterisation 
The whole work has been divided into the 6 chapters. Chapter I is an introductory part of 
this work. 
Chapter II, entitled as, "Evolution of Coalition Politics in India", deals with the 
evolution of coalition politics in India. It traces out the origin of coalition politics from 
the very nature of the Congress Party and studies how the Congress Party through its 
coalitional character maintained its dominance in the electoral process till 1967 at state 
level and at national level till 1989.After analyzing the Congress's dominance period and 
its erosion at state level, the chapter proceeds to analyze how the nature of Congress 
Party under the leadership of Indira Gandhi underwent a change. The last section of the 
chapter analyzes how the coalition governments were formed from 1989 and what were 
the rational for their formation and why they couldn't sustain. Furthermore, it also studies 
how stability was achieved in the coalition government under the BJP led NDA. 
Chapter III, entitled as, "2004 Lok Sabha Election and Formation of the UPA-I 
Government," begins with the analysis of the verdicts of 2004 general election and 
subsequent formation of the UPA-I government under the leadership of Dr. Manmohan 
Singh. It analyze the changing attitude of the Congress Party towards the coalition 
governance under the leadership of Sonia Gandhi and how it adjusted to the the realities 
of coalition politics. The chapter proceeds and analyse what were the major 
contradictions within the UPA-I coalition government and how the government co-
existed with the Left Front whose very outside support was important for the survival of 
the government. The interesting aspect of the UPA-I government was the very nature of 
its existence because its constituents were the principle adversaries to each other at the 
state level. However, the co-existence became possible because the constituents of UPA-I 
were committed to keep the communal forces out of the power. Although they got united 
at national level, but they couldn't sustain this unity at the state level and remained in 
opposite camps in some states during the subsequent assembly election, hence gave the 
BJP led NDA chance to form government in some states. 
Chapter IV, entitled as, "Domestic Policies of the UPA-I Government," examines 
the domestic policies of the UPA-I government. The chapter begins with a brief summary 
of the domestic policies mentioned in the National Common Minimum Programme 
(NCMP) and then limits the scope of the study by examining the UPA-I government's 
Minority Development Policies, Employment Guarantee Act and the Reservation for the 
OBCs in Higher Education. 
Chapter V, entitled as, "Foreign policy of the UPA-I Government," examines 
the foreign policy of UPA-I government. The chapter in the introduction examines the 
changes that took place in the foreign policy of India after the end of cold war. Then a 
brief summary of the foreign policy priorities of the UPA-I government in NCMP is 
given. The chapter limits its scope by studying foreign policy of the government with 
special reference to relations with USA, with China and with Pakistan during its tenure. 
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Chapter VI entitled as "Conclusion", deals with the brief summary and analysis of 
the previous chapters and will summarize the findings of the study. 
Methodology 
In this study, the descriptive and analytical methods have been adopted. Both the 
primary and secondary data have been utilized. Primary data consists of government 
reports, parliamentary debates and other related government documents. The secondary 
data consists of, books, journals, news papers, magazines and other relevant materials 
Limitations of the study 
No research on any topic can be considered complete in itself, as every research 
has its own limitations. It is difficult to cover every aspect of the present study in limited 
time and with limited resources and other related limitations. It was due to these 
constraints and limitations that only limited aspects of coalition politics in India: an 
evaluation of United Progressive Alliance government had been taken. The Study briefly 
examines the Evolufion of Coalition Politics in India, and then in next chapter examines 
the 2004 Lok Sabha elections and formation of UPA-I government. The next two 
chapters will examine the policies of UPA-I government both domestic policies and 
foreign policy and in these limited policies have been examined. The other aspects of the 
study may be examined in future studies. I hope that the present study would make a 
substantial contribution in the relevant field. 
11 
References 
1. Jha, N. K. (2004). Coalition Government and India's Foreign Policy. In Mahindra P.S 
and Mishra, A. (Ed.), Coalition Politics in India: Problems and Prospects, (p.279). New 
Delhi: Manhohar Publishers. 
2. Kothari, R. (Ed). (1967). Party System and Election Studies. Bombay: Allied 
Publication,/?. 2. 
3. Sahni, N.C. (1971). Coalition Politics in India. Jullundur: New Academic Publishing 
Company, p.l8. 
4.1bid.p.l7 
5. Ibid.p.23 
6. Johan, P. J. (1983). Coalition government in ^era/a.Tiruvalla, Kerala: Chitra Press, 
p.29. 
7. Janta Party was formed by the merger of the Congress (O), the Jana Sangh, the 
Bharatiya Lok Dal and the Socialist Party 
8. Singh S.D. (1999). The Fragmental Party System: A study of the viability of Indian 
Political Parties. Ranch: Catholic, p. 18 
9. Swain, P. C. (2001). Bharatiya Janta Party: Profile and Performance. New Delhi. 
A.P.H Public Corporation,/?. 179 
10. Sezhiyan, Era. (2005, March 12). A democracy in disarray. Frontline, 11 
(07),75.Retrieved from http://www.frontline .in/static/html/fl2207 /stories/ 2005040 
8002302000.htm 
12 
Chapter - II 
Evolution of Coalition Politics 
in India 
Coalition politics is not a new phenomenon in Indian politics. India is a 
country of diverse identity groups and these identity groups had remained in 
coalition with each other since centuries. This social coalition is one of the 
significant features of Indian society. The All Indian National Congress spearheaded 
the national movement and reinforced this social coalition. India experienced its first 
coalition though at electoral level in 1937 between the Muslim League and the All 
India National Congress during the Provincial legislature elections, which were held 
under the 1935 Act. In this election Congress forged a tacit electoral understanding 
with the Muslim League when it (the Congress) was not sure about the decisive 
majority in United Province legislatures.' However, this pre-poll alliance couldn't 
sustain after the elections as the Congress Party refused to form coalition with the 
Muslim League. Before the independence Jawaharlal Nehru headed the first coalition 
government in 1946. It was coalition between the All Indian National Congress, the 
Hindu Mahasabha and the Muslim League.^ However, the departure of Muslim 
League from the Indian electoral process after independence reinforced the 
dominance of the Congress Party. After the independence the Congress Party 
dominated Indian electoral process both at the centre and at the state level for two 
decades through its coalitional character. The emergence of multi-party coalition 
politics in Indian today has its roots in the coalitional character of Congress Party. 
The Congress Party was an example of coalition politics par excellence. In order to 
understand the evolution of coalition politics at the centre in India it is desirable to 
divide it into following stage. 
Politics of the Congress Dominance (1947-1967) 
The Congress Party of India was unchallenged political force in first two decades 
after independence. This dominance was largely ensured by the all encompassing 
character of the Congress Party, Rajini Kothari said: 
The Congress was a characteristic catch all party, trying to encompass all the more 
relevant segments of political reality, including great many oppositional segments. It was like a 
Hindu society in miniature, accommodative and agglomerative, given less to specificity and 
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differentiation and more to consensus and Catholicism. The Congress was a "grand coahtion" 
with a great historic antecedents and itself representing the Indian-nation in most of its essential.^ '' 
This diverse nature of the Congress Party was supplemented with internal 
competition. The unique feature of Indian political system in first two decades after 
independence was a party system characterized by "dominance co-existing with 
competition but without a trace of alteration."^ This prevents opposition parties not to be 
much decisive factor in alteration of power. The role of opposition in the first two decade 
after Independence was unique in the sense that instead of providing alternative to the 
Congress government it influences the factional groups within the Congress Party. The 
groups within the ruling party played the role of opposition.^ Therefore, opposition to the 
Congress government were at two levels, one at intra-party level that was inside the 
margin and second at inter-party level that was outside the margin. 
The Congress Party penetrated deep in Indian society, through its organisational 
wing. The organisational wing of the Congress Party which had its legacy during freedom 
movement largely helped the Congress Party to maintain its dominance. As the Congress 
Party operated at two levels, at the governmental level it had command over resources 
and it was the organisation of the party which efficiently distributes these resources 
among existing and potential clients in exchange for their political support. This gives the 
Congress Party upper hand in bargaining and it was able to influence political decisions 
in the states and at district level.^ Despite the all embracing character and, organisational 
strength of the Congress Party the role played by political leadership in general and by 
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru in particular was appreciable. Nehru hold the country together to 
arrest disruptive forces and take the road for reaching social change and modernisation 
and he deeply worked for this end.* Under Nehru's leadership the country stabilise itself 
by giving enough time to its institutions to strike roots, and he inculcate and strengthened 
the democratic values of equality, freedom and value of vote.^ 
The change in role of Congress from freedom movement to a political party 
developed internal contradiction between the governmental and organisational wing of 
the Congress Party. It was soon after independence that tussles for ascendance between 
the two wings of the Congress Party got surfaced on the issue of selecting the Presidential 
candidate for Republic of India. Nehru proposed name of Rajagopalachari, the 
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organisational wing led by Patel supported name of Dr Rajandar Prasad; ultimately the 
will of organisational wing prevails. The issue of electing the President for the Congress 
Party polarised the Congress Party again, Purshottam Das Tandon became the President 
of the Congress Party despite Nehru's opposition. A rift started to begin between Nehru 
and Tandon, when Nehru asked for the reconstitution of working group to Tandon but he 
refused. This led to the resignation of Nehru along with Maulana Azad. Therefore, 
Tandon had no option but to resign on AICC, special session in Nagpur held on 8-9 
September 1951.^ ° This resignation consolidated the position of Nehru, both in the party 
organisation and in the government. Despite these internal contradictions the Nehru's 
leadership was never threatened because "....his challengers were comrades-in arm 
during freedom movement," says C P Bhambhri." 
The Congress Party had dominated both the Parliament and the state legislatures 
by means of its large numerical strength in first two decades after independence. In 
reality it never won majority of votes in the Parliamentary election of 1952, 1957 and 
1962, and its vote share hovered between 45, 48 percent of the total.'^The absence of 
unified opposition and thanks to first- past- the- post electoral system, the Congress was 
able to maintain its dominance. But it will be wrong to hold that the Congress has ruled 
the whole country in the first two decades after independence. In the first state assembly 
elections of 1952, the Congress won clear majority in all states except Madras, 
Travancore-cochin, PEPSU, and Orissa and managed a bare majority in Rajasthan. Its 
opposition in Madras was saved by the separation of new state of Andhra where, 
however, the Communists Party of India (CPI), brought down the Congress government 
in November, 1954 and the Presidents rule had to be imposed.'^ In 1954 state assembly 
election was held in Travancore-Cochin were coalition government were formed by PSP 
with the support of the Congress. The Coalition government was also formed in Orissa 
between congress and Gantantra Parishad in 1957 which lasted till 1967. In Kerala from 
1960-1964, coalition government ruled. It was the coalifion between PSP, Muslim league 
and the Congress.''* Despite the Congress dominance coalition politics at state level was 
prevalent from the very beginning. 
Prior to fourth general elections (1967) the Congress Party was beset with 
numerous problems like the death of two towering leaders, Nehru and Shastri; two 
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successive wars which drained the resources of the country; two severe droughts that put 
the common man in hardership.'^ The big jolt for the Congress was split of the party 
which became rampant at state level in 1966. Splits took place in Orissa, where the 
Orissa Jana Congress was formed, the Janta Party was formed in Rajasthan, the 
Janakranti Dal was formed in Bihar, in the Madhya Pradesh, Jana Congress was formed 
and in Punjab Janta Party was formed.'^ All these new formations came from the 
Congress and they either contest election in alliance with opposition or contested on their 
own, but in both respects it gave the Congress a setback. The fourth general election 
assumes great importance in the Indian history because two trends emerged the erosion of 
the Congress dominance at state level and the formation of coalition governments by 
non-Congress parties. The single dominant party system was replaced by the multi-party 
system in which no particular party claimed absolute majority and the result was that the 
model of intra-party coalition was replaced by the inter-party coalition system.'^ The 
Congress hegemony was reduced in the nine states — Punjab, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, 
Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal, Orissa, Tamil Nadu and Kerala, where the non-
Congress governments were formed.'* The anti-Congress sentiment unite different non-
Congress political parties, having different ideological orientations at the state level. Thus 
in Bihar the Samyukta Vidhayak Dal was formed by SSP, PSP, Jana Sangh, Janakranti 
Dal and CPI. In Punjab the Popular United Front was formed which consists of Alkali 
Dal (Sant- group), Alkali Dal (Master group), CPI, SSP, Republican Party and CPI (M). 
In West Bengal, the United Front government was formed which consists of CPI (M), the 
BangIa Congress, and fourteen other parties. In Kerala United Front ministry consists of 
CPI (M), CPI, SSP, RSP, KTP, KSP and Muslim League. In Orissa, Swantra Party with 
help of the Jana Congress formed government.'^ Though these experiments of coalition 
governments at state level did not lost long but these experiments brought together the 
non-Congress political parties on a common platform which over the years never 
happened, and gave the Congress Party opportunity to take advantage of that fragmented 
opposition. 
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The Congress Split and First Coalition at the Centre (1967-1979) 
The Congress debacle in the fourth general election developed internal 
contradiction in the Congress Party. The organisational group of the Congress dominated 
by syndicates became decisive in the Congress Party decision making. The Bangalore 
session of AICC held on July 1969, marked the Mrs. Gandhi's move towards the 
Congress split as mean to assert her.^° In the session she eloquently spoke about radical 
economic policies that annoyed the conservative group in the Congress. But the 
immediate causes of contradiction between Mrs. Indira Gandhi and syndicates became 
the nomination of the President of India. The Syndicates preferred Sanjeev Ready, as 
against Indira who preferred V.V. Giri but later preferred Jagjivan Ram, before the issues 
could have settled Indira ousted Morarji Desai of his finance portfolio because of his 
indifference towards her economic policies. The Second step was nationalisation of 
fourteen commercial banks.^' The result was the split in the Congress Party in 1969 
between the ruling Congress headed by Indira and Congress (O) headed by Dr Ram 
Subhag Singh. After the Congress split in 1969, the party had to enter into an implicit 
coalition even at the Centre with the Communists and the Dravida Munnetra Kazagam 
(DMK) Party. No doubt it was the Congress government but it was a minority 
government and it had a legislative understanding with these supporting parties. The 
shift of Indira Gandhi towards left policies was politically motivated to discredit her 
conservative opponents and it was as an electoral strategy to win over the electorate. This 
shift ensured her to directly appeal the electorate by ignoring the factional bossism.^ ^ 
The fifth general election assumed great importance in the Indian electoral 
politics, because in this election the opposition political parties along with defected group 
of the Congress formed an electoral alliance to give the Congress (R) a united front in the 
election. The Jana Sangh, the Congress (O), the Swatantra Party, and the SSP formed 
National Democratic Front. This experiment of electoral alliance did not bear fruit for the 
opposition political parties because the Congress won the election in comprehensive way 
by attracting the electorates through radical slogan of Garibi Hatao. Thus Congress (R) 
under the leadership of Indira Gandhi formed the government at the centre. This was the 
beginning of new Congress dominance period which differs from the earlier Congress 
dominance period under Nehru and Shastri .Under Indira Gandhi the nature of the 
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Congress Party got changed. The new Congress Party under Indira Gandhi was 
characterised by absence of internal factional competition, which led to monopolistic 
dominance and erosion of openness in the Congress system. It was characterised by 
decline of institutionalised politics and growth of populist style. The consensus was 
broken down by preferring ideological coherence.^ "* The Party building was ignored and 
was replaced by populist, charismatic, pyramid, power structure where political decisions 
were mad at the apex not at the bottom. The impact of all these developments was 
growing intolerance towards dissenting forces in the party which resulted in the 
emergency syndrome. 
Though Indira Gandhi had defused the challenges to her authority by causing split 
in the Congress Party but during the latter years of her rule she was beset with numerous 
political economic challenges which threatened her government. The financial drain 
caused due to the Bangladesh war, decline in the food production due to failure of 
monsoons brought two successive droughts and the Arab Israel war of oct.1973 brought 
international energy and fertilizer crises which resulted in the high inflation, widespread 
food shortage and unemployment.^^ The impact of all these conditions and problems was 
profound, as the people rise against these conditions particularly in Gujarat were the 
students movement, soon joined by opposition political parties protested against the steep 
rise of food prices, cooking oil and other essential commodities. Morarji Desai also joins 
the chorus, by undertaking fast unto death. The same situation prevailed in Bihar where 
students demand the same.^ ^ The big jolt for the Congress was Allahabad High Court's 
Judgement which convicted indira Gandhi for having indulged in corrupt campaign 
practices and declared her election invalid.^' Jaya Prakash Narain who over the years had 
endeavoured to unite the anti-Congress forces take advantage of this surcharged 
envoirment by converting the discontent into political movement.^ ^ These forces were 
challenge to Indira's government who responded by promulgating emergency. 
The proclamation of emergency proved very costly for the Indira's Congress. The 
immediate result was defeat of the Congress Party in the sixth Lok Sabha election. The 
opposition political parties under the leadership of Jaya Prakash Narain decided to give a 
united front to the Congress in the election. The opposition political parties like the 
Congress (0), the Jana Sangh, the Bharatiya Lok Dal and the Socialist Party merged into 
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one party named as the Janta Party.'^ ^ The biggest blow for the Congress was sudden split 
in the party in which prominent leaders like Jagjivan Ram, H. N. Bahuguna, and Nandini 
Satpathy deserted the party and formed the Congress for Democracy. The Janta formation 
also came into electoral understanding with CPI (M) and regional forces like Alkali Dal, 
DMK to give the Congress a united front in the elections.^^ The opposition political 
parties under a common flag highlighted the emergency and its excess especially, forced 
sterilisation and restrictions on civil liberties in their election campaign.^' They asked the 
people to vote for democracy against the authoritarian rule of the Indira Gandhi. The 
election results gave the Congress a great blow as the Janta Party emerged as majority 
party with 330 seats and the Congress Party managed to won only 154 seats, and its 
allies, 7 seats won by CPI and 21 by AIADMK. The Congress lost heavily in the northern 
India were it managed to win only two seats out of 234 it contested but the Congress 
strengthened its position in the southern states of India by winning 92 seats as relatively 
higher than the 1971 Lok Sabha election .^ ^ 
The significant feature of sixth Lok Sabha election was the emergence of two 
party systems. The Congress dominance got eroded by the emergence of the Janta Party 
and the electoral competition started to become more polarised. The merger of the 
opposition political parties into the Janta Party and its alliance with regional forces like 
Alkali Dal, DMK and with the CPI (M) created highly the two party competitions.^^ This 
alliance both at the centre and at the state level proved very costly for the Congress Party. 
The Congress Party which over the years got benefit of the vote-seat distortion due to 
absence of united opposition, did not get benefit in 1977 election and even the vote-
seat distortion went against the Congress Party and benefited the Janta Party. '^' 
The cause of defeating the Congress Party united the opposition political parties 
having different ideological orientations and social base, these political parties range 
from the left to right and from the secular to communal forces. After defeating the 
Congress Party, the Janta Party could not evolve consensus on policy issues and engaged 
into internal fighting. Before the coalition government was made the conflict arose on 
choosing the Prime Minster. The conflict was resolved under the leadership of Jaya 
Prakash Narain, who evolve consensus in favour of Morarji Desai. Later the factional 
fighting became acute when the Socialists raised the issue of dual membership of the Jana 
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Sangh members in the party who retained the RSS membership.^^ Before this issues 
could have settled strong corruption charges were raised against Kanti Desai, son of 
Morarji Desai.^ ^ This further intensified internal feud in the government. The biggest 
blow for the Janta government came when Raj Narain deserted the party and formed the 
Janta Secular. The Congress Party in the opposition ponder upon the opportunity and 
brought non-confidence motion against the government and got passed it and it was on 
15* July, 1979 that Morarji Desai submitted his resignation to the President.^^This was 
followed by further defection of Janta Party important leaders like Charan Singh, 
Bahuguna, S. N. Misra and others also deserted from it.^ ^ Charan Singh tried to provide 
an alternative government with the help of Congress, but before he could have proved his 
majority Congress pulled out its support and the government fell down. 
Though the Janta Party became successful in ousting the Congress out of power 
but it failed to remain a cohesive unit which resulted in the policy paralysis and 
inefficiency of the government. Arshi Khan rightly says, "The major cause of collapse of 
the Janta government was its very base of its existence. The formation of Janta Party was 
based on the strategy to weaken and defeat the Congress. But their leadership failed to 
decide on crucial point that is how to provide a cohesive and stable government to the 
people."^" 
The Janta experiment, though short lived assumes great importance in the post 
independent political development in India. It laid the foundation of coalition politics in 
India and which became evident after 1989 general election and continued till this date. 
The trend which started in the 1967 at state level became visible at the centre in 1977. 
The notion of the Congress being a natural party to governance got great set back and an 
idea emerged that alternative government can emerge if the opposition political parties 
unite and maintain its cohesiveness and laid constructive policy for governance. 
Revival of the Congress Domination (1980-1989) 
The prospect of two party system collapsed soon as the Janta Party faced 
defection and paved way for the revival of Congress rule under Indira Gandhi and Rajiv 
Gandhi for ten years. In the Lok Sabha election of 1980 the Congress Party won 351 
seats and emerged as the majority party in the Lok Sabha and the Lok Dal emerged as the 
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second largest party with 41 seats. The Left Front had a strength of 53 seats, it comprised 
of CPI (M)-(35), Forward Block-(3), RSP-(4), and Kerala Congress (Mani group)-(l).'" 
When Indira Gandhi came again to power in 1980, she revived her old way of relying on 
a small coterie ignoring organisation apparatus of the party. Indira Gandhi did not pay 
heed to restructure the party organisation and the same was followed by her son Rajiv 
Gandhi, which led to the erosion of party's social base. After the assassination of Indira 
Gandhi on 31 Oct. 1984 the Congress leadership unanimously choose Rajiv Gandhi as her 
successor."*^ In the Lok Sabha election of 1984, the Congress got benefited by the 
sympathy wave, generated by the assassination of Indira Gandhi. The Congress Party in 
its election campaign portrayed the nation in danger. The Congress got benefited of this 
and result was over whelming majority to the Congress Party which recorded 401 seats 
which was largest in relation to its previous victories.'*'' 
Rajiv Gandhi in his Presidential address at Bombay, on centenary session of the 
Congress Party in 1985, laid emphasis on leading India towards twenty first century by 
accelerating India's industrial growth, liberalising the imports and providing incentives 
for exports; this appealed the youth and the middle class. His major thrust in speech was 
on restructuring the party, and he had dig on power brokers, and put emphasis on 
resurrecting the old glory of party by reaching out to people. But he couldn't restructure 
the party as it would have proved very costly for his leadership. On the issue of 
modernising the economy of the country he has to phase sever criticism from within the 
party. It was in this context when he laid down a resolution of economic policy in which 
word socialism was eliminated by his advisor to which the Congress Party was 
committed over the years, he has to phase sever criticism from his party men both at 
middle level workers and some senior leaders of the Congress Working Committee. Rajiv 
Gandhi gave up and restored the word socialism. Though he pursued further liberal 
economic policy but was not able to put it in more concerted form.'*'* According to C. P. 
Bhambhri, "Rajiv Gandhi tried to accelerate the process of modernisation but he couldn't 
evolve an appropriate political response to meet the challenges of politics during 1984 to 
Rajiv Gandhi tried to revive Congress's old social support base of the Muslims 
and the Hindus. For this he played two cards, the Muslim card by nullifying the Shah 
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Banoo Judgement and the Hindu card by permitting the Shilanayas at Ayodha which was 
the disputed site.'*^ But both proved very costly for the Congress party, "... as it became 
the major cause for the Congress debacle in thel989 Lok Sabha election." writes C. P 
Bhambhri. The major blow to the Congress government came when the charges of wrong 
doings related to the Bofor scandal got surfaced. The government was severely disfigured 
and this led to the resignation of V.P. Singh. After resigning from the cabinet V. P Singh 
formed the Jana Morcha by organising the dissident Congress members against Rajiv 
Gandhi. After this he united the opposition political parties on the issue of Bofor scandal. 
By highlighting the corruption scandals of the Congress V.P Singh, took away the middle 
class support which Rajiv Gandhi had enjoyed earlier. The opposition unitedly, resigned 
from the Lok Sabha when Comptroller and Auditor General of India in its report indicted 
the government on irregularities related to the Bofor. The Congress severely lost its 
morale when its bill on giving Constitutional status to the Panhayat Raj was defeated in 
the Rajya Sabha after being passed in the Lok Sabha.'*^ Before the election the 
envoirment was surcharged with emotions aroused by anti-corruption campaign, anti-
Babrii Masjid movement of the BJP and the Jana Sangh and the terrorist's threat to 
national unity."^The people faced lot of difficulties particularly, as the prices of essential 
commodities were rising which were not kept in check by the government. By taking the 
advantage of the weak condition of the Congress Party and the growing anti-incumbency 
sentiments, the opposition parties decided to give the Congress a united fi-ont. The 
National Front, the BJP and the Left Front formed an alliance in some four hundred 
constituencies to face the Congress, so that the opposition vote didn't split.'*' Therefore, 
the Congress was really in bad shape as the opposition parties were committed to defeat 
it. 
From the Coalition Instability to Stability (1989-2004) 
The general election of 1989, were held under surcharged environment of two 
popular waves, the 'Hindu wave 'and the 'anti-Congress wave'. The Janta Dal got benefit 
of the later and the BJP got advantage of both. The 80 seat victory of BJP in the 1989 
Lok Sabha election was product of 'Hindu wave' and the opposition unity.^° It increased 
its percentage of votes from 7.73 percent tol 1 percent as compared to the Congress Party 
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and the Janta Dal.^' In this election two trends became evident the emergence of BJP as 
an alternative to the Congress and the decline of the Congress Party. 
Table 1.1: Seats won by various political parties in the 1989 lok sabha elections 
Congress (I) 
Janta Dal 
Bharatatiya Janta Party 
Janta Party 
Lok Kranti Dal 
Communist Party of India 
Communist Party of India (Marxist) 
ICSSR 
Telugu Desam Party 
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagum 
Other major state parties 
Others 
Independents 
Total 
197 
143 
85 
0 
0 
12 
33 
1 
2 
0 
22 
22 
12 
529 
Source: N. Jose Chander. Coalition Politics: the Indian experience. 
In the Lok Sabha election of 1989, the choice of electorate was somewhat 
different from the previous elections as they have elected a Parliament in which no single 
party had a majority. " It was an ambiguous verdict m which the Congress was the single 
largest party but not in a position to form the government of its own. The Congress 
declined to form the government and the onus to form the government fell on the 
shoulders of National Front which was the second largest party after the Congress. The 
other political parties which decided to support the National Front from outside were the 
BJP and the Left Front which were naturally antagonistic to each other and that prevents 
them to be the part of the government. This very outside support by the BJP and the Left 
Front to minority coalition government was calculated, as it ensured them to keep the 
Congress Party away from power and secondly, it ensured them to use the minority 
government without the responsibility.^^ The National Front government had to maintain 
this triangular balance which was very difficult and which ultimately became its cause of 
the down fall. 
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Furthermore, the internal contradiction in the main party of the National Front that 
is Janta Dal^ "* remained intact. Though, formally merger took place in the party but 
personal enmity among the leaders like V.P Singh, Chandra Shekhar, Devi Lai, Ajit 
Singh and Bahuguna remained intact/^ This halted the progress of the National Front 
coalition government much. The biggest deficiency for the National Front minority 
government was that it didn't evolve a Common Minimum Programme and didn't lay 
down formal mechanisms to sort out internal contradictions in the coalition government. 
The novel experiment soon found itself in trouble when Devi Lai decided to organise a 
big movement against V. P Singh and the latter in order to counter the former took the 
haste decision to implement the recommendations of the Mandal Commission.^^ The 
sudden decision of implementing the Mandal Commission's recommendation (to give 27 
percent reservation to OBCs) put other national political parties into back foot. The 
nation which over the years had remained a cohesive entity got divide on the issue of 
social justice. The BJP which over the years had garnered the support of the upper castes 
found itself in dilemma. It played the Mandir Card against the Mandal Card, so to 
mobilise the majority.^' The BJP withdrew its support to the National Front Government 
on October 23, 1990 when the Bihar government on the advice of the Prime Minster V.P 
Singh, arrested the BJP leader L.K. Advani during his spectacular Rath Yathra, from 
Somnath in Gujarat to Ayodha in U.P, to mobilise Hindus for building Ram temple in 
place of the Babrii Masjid.^ ^ As the BJP withdrew its support to the National Front 
minority government, a non-confidence motion was passed against V.P Singh led 
National Front minority government on November 7, 1990. The fall of National Front 
led to split of the Janta Dal when Chandrasekhar who along with his 55 members formed 
the Janta Dal (Samajwadi), and staked the claim for forming the government with the 
outside support of the Congress. Some regional parties also like, AIADMK, BSP, Muslim 
League, National Conference, and few independents also gave their support to new 
minority government led by Chandra Shekhar. It was on November 10, 1990 that Chandra 
Shekhar was sworn as the Prime Minster and Devi Lai as his deputy Prime Minster who 
left him in cold at the time of selection of V.P Singh as the first Prime Minster of the 
National Front.^ ^ This novel experiment of minority coalition government did not last too 
long, as the Congress was not satisfied with the government policies related to Punjab, 
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Jammu and Kashmir and Assam; the economy of the country; the rising prices of 
essential commodities, and with the decision of permitting US plane to refuel in 
India.^ '^ However, the immediate cause for withdrawing support from the minority 
coalition government was the issue of surveillance of Rajiv Gandhi by two constables 
from Haryana. The Congress took this issue seriously and ultimately withdrew its support 
to minority coalition government, and Chandra Shekhar submitted his resignation to the 
President on the March 6, 1991 .^ ' 
The issue of the Mandal and Mandir brought chaos in India. The secular fabric 
which over the years was hall mark of India Republic got tarnished when the political 
parties for their electoral benefit played the communal and caste cards. The greater 
beneficiaries of this were BJP and Janta Dal somehow got benefit of it. But the both 
issues of Mandal and Mandir greatly cost the Congress party. On the Mandal issue 
Congress became unable to decide which way to go. The Congress was in dilemma 
because taking stand against the Mandal recommendations would have cause it to lose 
the remaining support of the backward castes nor it could have openly favoured the 
recommendations ,than it would have lost the support of the forward castes, which 
constituted its key supporters and even constituted significant positions of its office 
holders.^^ 
The failure of National Front to sustain as a cohesive force for governance and to 
be an alternative to the Congress Party at the national level gave the Congress Party, a 
chance to convey to the electorate that it is only the Congress Party which can provide 
stable government. Rajiv Gandhi tried to reach out to the people through Sadbhavana 
Yatras.^Hn the general election of 1991, the Mandir-Masjid issue became the focal point 
and the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in between the election gave new turn to election. 
The Lok Sabha election of 1991 again brought a hung parliament. In this election 
the Congress emerged as the largest party, with not too much strength to form the 
government on its own. Narasimha Rao was chosen as the party leader and elected as the 
President of the Congress Party in the organisational polls which were held after a gap of 
twenty years. He was the first leader outside the Nehru-Gandhi, dynasty who centralise 
the power by becoming both the Prime Minster and the President of the party.^ '* The 
organisational elections were held in the context that Narasimha Rao greatly faced the 
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challenge within the party particularly from the faction which was loyal to Nehru-Gandhi 
dynasty. In order to diffuse this challenge he went for poUs.^ ^ The Narasimha Rao 
government started as a single party minority government but during later half it 
strengthened itself when Ajit Singh's group merged with the Congress with JMM 
support. During Rao's tenure the economy of the country was in shamble. Therefore, 
Rao's government took the bold initiative to open the India economy for liberalisation.^^ 
Narasimha Rao also tried to revive the Congress's secular image by introducing two bills 
on July 29, 1994 so that to delink the politics from religion. The bills empower the 
Election Commission to debar the political parties from contesting elections with religion 
name. But he had to face severe criticism from the media and the opposition, though it 
somehow revive Congress's stand on secularism but still the Muslim community under 
the Ayodha syndrome remained very much alienated from the Congress and the 
Congress did not secure her position in the eleventh Lok Sabha election.^^ 
The 1996 Lok Sabha election again produced a fractured mandate and hung-
Parliament. No political party was in a position to form government of its own. 
Moreover, the Congress once the dominant party in Indian political system was reduced 
to second position for the first time with 141 seats. The BJP with its pre-election allies 
came first with 187 seats but also failed to get the requisite numbers for government 
formation. The significant development of 1996 election was the formation of not only 
the anti-Congress alliance but also the anti-BJP alliance.^^The United Front was an 
alliance of secular forces with having regional bases. The election had brought the 
regional forces into the centre stage of Indian politics.^^ The rise of regional forces had 
been mainly because of the substantial failure of the high command system in Congress, 
BJP or Janta Dal. Many of the regional forces were off shoot of the Congress.^" As a 
largest party in the Parliament, the onus to form the government fell on the shoulders of 
BJP which under the leadership of Atal Bihari Vajpayee took the charge of forming the 
government in May 16, 1996. The BJP leaders tried hard to look far and wide to 
muster some additional support to strengthen their position in the Parliament. 
However, they couldn't succeed and finally, the Prime Minster A.B Vajpayee on May 27, 
1996 submitted his resignation.'' Therefore, the 13 day government led by the Vajpayee 
fell down. Thereafter, the President called upon H. D. Deve Gowda, to from the 
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government as the leader of the United Front— a combination of the National Front and 
the Left Front, a coalition of 13 parties and the outside support of the Congress. 
Table 1.2: Seats won by various political parties in 
BJP and allies 
BJP 
Shivsena 
Samata 
Haryana Vikas Party 
Total 
Source: N. Jose Chander. 
Seats 
160 
15 
8 
3 
186 
Coalition Po 
Congress(I) & 
allies 
Congress (I) 
TOTAL 
itics: the Indian exp 
1996 in 
Seats 
139 
139 
erience 
Lok Sabha Elections 
NF-LF and 
others 
Janta Dal 
CPI(M) 
CPI 
FB 
RSP 
SP 
BSP 
DMK 
IMC 
TDP 
AKALIDAL 
AJP 
AICC(T) 
Others 
TOTAL 
Seats 
45 
32 
12 
3 
5 
17 
11 
17 
20 
16 
8 
5 
5 
19 
215 
The very outside support of the Congress Party to the United Front government 
was politically calculated to halt the progress of the BJP which was becoming a major 
political force since 1989^^ Taking lesson from the failure of the National Front coalition 
government the United Front government for the first time evolved Common Minimum 
Programme. In order to ensure the smooth working of coalition government and 
implementation of Common Minimum Programme, a Steering Committee was also 
devised. 
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A significant development related with the emergence of the United Front 
coalition government was the revival of the federal spirit of Indian political system. 
Within the United Front the regional actors like DMK, TMC, TDP and AGP formed the 
Federal Front. While deliberating on the basic principles of governance of United Front 
government Prime Minster H.D Deve Gowda said, 
.. .we regard this United Front as the people's power to be used for realising your hopes 
and aspirations. It is also the beginning of new way of governance - governance based on 
federalism, decentralisation, equality and justice. Secular outlook and democratic spirit are the 
foundations of this coalition.^ ^ 
The United Front coalition government headed by the H.D. Deve Gowda, from 
the very beginning had to maintain a balance between the Left Front who were against 
the economic liberalisation, the regional forces so as to maintain the federal balance and 
lastly, to contain the Congress which was favouring economic liberalisation and looking 
for more leverages.^ "* It was lack of coordination between the Congress and the United 
Front government that resulted in creating mutual distrust between these two and more 
importantly, the assertive role of the United Front government, largely antagonise the 
Congress.^ ^The conflict became acute between the two when the United Front 
government decided to reopen the investigation in the Tanwar murder case in which 
Sitaram Kesari was allegedly involved.'^ The Congress Party was put to surprise when 
the CBI team questioned the Party President on his allegedly disproportionate assets and 
consequently, the Congress Party withdrew its support to the govemment.^^ It was on 
April 11,1997 that the fate of the United Front government was sealed as the government 
could not win the vote of confidence. 
In order to avert the dissolution of the house The Congress Party came into an 
understanding with the United Front and accepted the change in the leadership. The 
Congress again agreed to support the United Front coalition government under I. K 
Gujral. He (I.K Gujral) was elected as the leader of the United Front on April 16, 1997 
and sworn as the Prime Minster on April 21, 1997.But the experiment also did not last 
too long and the fate of Gujral led coalition government was sealed by the Congress Party 
when the Jain Commission probing the Rajiv Gandhi assassination exposed the 
involvement of DMK into the act. The Congress Party demanded the removal of DMK 
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from the coalition but the United Front did not pay heed to this demand and ultimately 
the Congress withdrew its support on 28 November, 1997 and the government fell down. 
The fall of the United Front coalition government was more due to the Congress Party 
than to its internal contradictions/* The Congress Party acted as spoiler and hence 
contributed it growing unpopularity. The Third Front or United Front failed to remain a 
cohesive force and an attempt to provide unified political alternative to the BJP and the 
Congress also failed. However, the Third Front brought the regional forces on centre the 
stage of Indian politics and made them important partners in the coalition governance. 
• 7Q 
This is the only major contribution emerging out of the formation of the Fronts. 
The election held in 1998 also produced a truncated Lok Sabha, and 18 party 
coalition led by BJP's Atal Bihari Vajpayee came into power on 19* March, 1996.*° The 
failure of BJP to muster support for their government in 1996 made them realised that in 
order to form alliances and form government it had to moderate its stand on issues like 
the Uniform Civil Code, Article 370 and the Ram Janmbhoomi and it did the same in 
1998 election which resulted in attracting more partners for their government. The 
fractured verdict and the subsequent emergence of coalition politics reflect the 
divergence in India along caste, religion, disparity of economics and so many 
divergences. The BJP was quick to ponder upon this and build alliances to control the 
political power.*' The mid-term election of 1998 took place in the back drop of 
governmental instability and fragmented party system. The BJP with its old allies and 
new partners emerged as the largest vote puller in the country, securing 31 percent of 
votes and captured 180 seats; more than 25 percent on the slogan of stable government 
and able leadership.*^ On the one side BJP was building alliances, the Congress Party was 
facing internal problem of splits. The Manipur State Congress (Manipur), the Loktantrik 
Congress (UP), the Trinamul Congress (West Bengal), the Himachal Vikas Congress 
(Sukhram) and later the Nationalist Congress Party of Shared Pawar splited from the 
Congress Party. Furthermore, the Third Front which was combination of thirteen parties 
lost its cohesion. 
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Table 1.3 Seats won by various political parties in 1998 Lok Sabha Elections 
BJP and its Allies 
United Front 
Congress and its Allies 
Others 
Total 
BJP and its Allies 
BJP 
AIADMK 
Samata Party 
BJD 
SAD 
Trinamul 
Shivsena 
Lok Shakti 
PMK 
MDMK 
TRC 
JP 
HVP 
TOTAL 
251 
96 
166 
22 
535 
178 
18 
12 
9 
8 
7 
6 
3 
4 
3 
1 
1 
1 
251 
Source: N. Jose Chander. Coalition Politics: The Indian Experience. 
The message of 1998 Lok Sabha election was clearly, peoples verdict for two party 
system to dominate the country's political scenario.*^ Again the BJP formed the coalition 
government, and it ruled India for thirteen months. But from the beginning the AIADMK 
supremo Jayalalitha remained a headache for A. B. Vajpayee led government. The 
AIADMK group (including the PMK, the MDMK and the Tamizhaga Rajiv Gandhi led 
by Rama Murthy and the Janta Party) commanded support of 27 MPs at that time kept 
BJP on tenterhooks, because in the beginning Jayalalitha delayed her letter of support to 
the President.^ '* She largely decided the fate of Vajpayee led coalition government. The 
Jayalalitha decision to join the coalition government was largely motivated to secure her 
demands of ousting the DMK from power in Tamil Nadu and getting the key portfolios. 
The situation became sever when the Jayalalitha demanded the reinstatement of the Chief 
of Naval staff Admiral Bhagwat, and the constitution of a joint political committee to 
probe into his sacking as also the expulsion of Fernandez.*^ The BJP led coalition 
government rejected her demands and the result was Jayalalitha decided to withdraw her 
30 
support from the government. The President, K.R Narayanan, meanwhile asked the BJP 
led National D Democratic Alliance (NDA) government to seek a vote of confidence 
from the Lok Sabha. After hectic drama in the capital of India, the motion of confidence 
in his government was moved by A. B. Vajpayee but, it was rejected by the Lok Sabha by 
the narrowest margin of one vote, the final tally was 269 in favour and 270 against the 
motion. 
Despite the fact that, BJP led coalition government of 1998 took lesson from the 
previous coalition governments and laid down a co-ordination committee but it never 
take it seriously as it was without secretariat or spokesperson. The meetings of the co-
ordination committee were rarely held.*^ No sincere efforts were made by the BJP and its 
allies to make the coordination committee an effective body. That is why different 
conflicts among the allies got crop up at different movements which led to its downfall. 
Before the Lok Sabha elections of 1999, the BJP was largely in advantage as because the 
manner of its defeat in the Lok Sabha by ditching was presented as institutional hurt, 
secondly, as a caretaker government it confronts itself with Kargil War and its victory 
gave it chance to present itself as the saver of the nation. And thirdly, the United Front 
disintegration and the Janta Dal split added strength to it as there was no other strong 
force to challenge it.*^ Therefore, in 13th Lok Sabha election of September-October 1999 
the BJP led NDA emerged as the largest alliance which can stake the claim for the 
formation of government. As the election results were declared the NDA secured 299 
seats. The choice of people to bring back the NDA in power was the positive 
endorsement of the coalition system.*^ The BJP led NDA government consists of 24 
political parties as some political parties like National Conference, Mizo National Front, 
Sikkim Democratic Front and other smaller parties were post election allies. The NDA 
coalition government completed its full term and ends the decade long instability of the 
coalition government. The notion of coalition phase being an aberration was discarded 
and the message was clear that coalition politics will stay. But more importantly, the BJP 
tried to sustain the coalition government. Taking lessons from the past coalition 
governments the NDA coalition government put forward the National Agenda for 
Governance (NAG) in order to ensure the smooth working of the coalition government. 
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Table 1.4: Table Seats won by various political parties in 1999 in Lok Sabba 
Elections 
BJP and allies 
BJP 
BJD 
DMK 
HVC 
INLD 
JD(U) 
LOKTANTRIK 
MDMK 
MGRADMK 
MSCP 
PMK 
SAD 
SS 
TRINAMUL 
TDP 
IND.(Maneka) • 
Total 
Seats 
182 
10 
12 
1 
5 
21 
2 
4 
1 
1 
5 
2 
15 
8 
29 
1 
299 
Congress(I) 
& allies 
Congress (I) 
AIADMK 
KC(M) 
ML 
RJD 
RLD 
TOTAL 
Seats 
114 
10 
1 
2 
7 
2 
136 
Left 
parties 
CPI 
CPI(M) 
FB 
KC(J) 
RSP 
TOTAL 
Seats 
4 
33 
2 
1 
3 
43 
Other 
parties 
BSP 
SP 
NC 
Indep. and 
others 
Total 
Seats 
14 
26 
4 
21 
65 
Source: N. Jose Chander. Coalition Politics: The Indian experience 
The NAG was based on the principle of synchronise the policy stands of the allies 
through consensus. At second level, there was a coordination committee which was 
established to see the policy implementation and resolve conflicts. Besides these, inter-
ministerial groups called as Group of Minsters (GOM), worked as coordination 
mechanism to minimise the differences of opinion and conflict within the cabmet. 
Therefore, in order to ensure the stability of the coalition government the institutionalised 
mechanismisms for conflict management cannot be for granted. The other factors which 
were responsible for the stability of the NDA coalition government according to Alistair 
Macmillan were, 
The structure of party competition at the state coalition remained stable, and the national 
coalition between the BJP and regional parties was sustained by its foundation in state-wise 
electoral alliance. Secondly, the BJP, right up to the 2004 general election, was widely perceived 
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to be electorally successful - an asset as a partner in national and state-wise alliances - and this 
90 
served to maintain existing coalition tie against a common enemy (the INC). 
Conclusion 
India is multi-diverse country and the coalition politics reflects this diversity. 
After independence the all embracing character of the Congress Party had represented all 
shades of Indian society. But with the passage of time due the change in the socio-
economic profile of the country new social groups emerged and looked for space in the 
political process. The Congress Party could not accommodate and reconcile with the new 
groups hence new political formations came into existence around these social groups 
and made the political process more competitive. These new political formations were 
limited within a particular region or territorial area. The BJP after 1990 through its 
Hindutva ideology emerged as the alternative to Congress Party at the national level but 
not strong enough to stake claim for government because of limited social bas. Therefore, 
BJP moderated its stand on contentious issue which helped it to reach out to other social 
groups of the society through alliance formation. And ultimately it lead a stable coalition 
government from 1999-2004. On the other hand the Congress Party did not opt for 
alliance and worked as spoiler in some coalition governments by it outside support. The 
Congress Party too realised the fragmentation of Indian party system and forge an 
alliance in 2004 under the banner of United Progressive Alliance. Now both the BJP and 
the Congress contest national elections and even state election in alliance with state 
parties or regional forces and formed coalition governments which reflects a collective 
approach to governance. 
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Chapter - III 
Lok Sabha Election 2004 and 
the Formation of United 
Progressive Alliance 
Government (UPA-I) 
the notion that coalition politics is a transitional phase in Indian politics. The same 
trend which started in 1989 at central level also got reflected in the 2004 election 
verdict. At individual level no national political party was in a position to stake claim 
for the formation of govenmient. It was a clear verdict for the coalition government, 
thus discarding the long held notion that coalition governance is an aberration and 
unstable by the very nature. The BJP led NDA was the manifestation of BJP's 
understanding about the changing pattern of Indian party system which had became 
polarised due to change in the socio-economic profile in the country and resulted in 
the emergence of new social groups. The rise of these new social groups in the 
political process was also supplemented by the decline of the Congress Party which 
had represented all the section of Indian society. The Congress Party lost its 
hegemony due the departure of nationalist generation, the demise of internal 
democracy and emergence of the personalised mass appeal of the top leadership. The 
Congress Party could not accommodate with the new social groups and hence paved 
the way for the new social groups to lay down foundation of new political parties to 
articulate their demand. This led to more competitive electoral process. 
The 2004 Lok Sabha election was not different from the earlier elections. 
However, what differentiated this election was the loose bipolar contest was 
witnessed in which the two big national parties forge alliances with the different 
regional forces. The Congress Party over the years had remained indifferent towards 
coalition governance, because it considered itself as natural party to govern. The 
Congress Party's reluctant attitude towards forging alliance and becoming a part of 
the coalition goveniment became evident in Pachmarhi session, in October, 1998 in 
which Sonia Gandhi, eloquently said: 
.... Friends, there has been much talk about the Congress's attitude towards coalition 
government. The fact that we are going through coalition phase at national level politics, 
reflects in many ways the decline of the Congress, this is a phase and we will come back 
again with full force and on our own steam. But in the interim coalition may well be 
needed .... In the last few months, I get the feeling that the country, fed up with over two 
years of non governance, is waiting to give us another chance. I get the feeling that more 
and more people who moved away from us are once again coming around the point of 
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view that only the Congress has experience, the expertise, the energy and the enthusiasm 
to provide an effective government that will revive the stagnant economy, arrest the price 
rise, get the new investment flow once again and improve our standing in the world. We 
should, however, not be complacent. But we must recognise that the tide seems to be 
turning.^  
This reluctant attitude of the Congress Party towards coalition government 
kept it out of power for eight years. On the contrary its political opponent, that is, BJP 
realised its limited social base and polarised political competition, forged alliance 
with regional forces by moderating its ideology, so to accommodate and sustain 
coalition government. 
The Congress Party under the leadership of Sonia Gandhi understood the 
constraints of the party and it was in Shimla and Srinagar meeting in 2003, where the 
message came out clear for preference to forge coalition v^th secular minded 
parties.^ In the December, 2003 state assembly elections the Congress Party lost 
heavily in Rajasthan, Gujarat, Madya Pardesh, and Chhattisgarh while retaining 
Delhi. This further confirmed to the Congress Party that if it had to form government 
at the centre, it will have to forge alliances with other political parties particularly, the 
regional forces. The same fact was ascertained by the Pranab Mukerjee committee 
which was appointed by the Congress high command to ascertain the causes of the 
Congress debacle in these states.'*Thereafter, the Congress Party under the leadership 
of Sonia Gandhi struck pre-poU alliance in Tamil Nadu with DMK, which broke away 
from the BJP led NDA because of latter's preference for AIADMK which had shown 
good electoral show in the assembly election. This helped the Congress Party to 
approach the DMK. Sonia Gandhi also made pre-poU alliance in Maharashtra mth 
NCP, and also with some minor parties like RPI and JD(S).The Congress Party also 
formed electoral alliance with TRS of Andhra Pradesh, JMM of Jharkhand and most 
significantly it came into electoral understanding in Bihar with RJD, LJP and with 
PDP in Jammu and Kashmir. In the states like Tamil Nadu and Bihar the Congress 
Party had been reduced over the years to the status of third or fourth party and hence 
not a threat to the other parties in these states. In some states like Andhra Pradesh, 
Jharkhand and Jammu and Kashmir the Congress Party attracted the other parties for 
alliance because it faced a direct contest with BJP led NDA and presence of third and 
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fourth minor party help it to build alliance with them.^  Thus the weak position of the 
Congress Party in these states and the presence and formation of new political parties 
helped the Congress to build alliance, which over the years was not possible because 
the Congress was main political opponent to these parties in these states. This pre-poll 
alliance largely proved to be game changer and immensely helped the Congress Party 
in the 14"^  Lok Sabha election. 
Lok Sabha Election 2004 verdict 
The election results defied all the opinion polls which had predicted the NDA 
comeback. The euphoria developed due to NDA victory in December 200.3 assembly 
elections led the BJP to go for the Lok Sabha election earlier than its due date. The 
BJP led NDA highlighted the achievements of the government through its India 
shining and feel good slogans which proved disastrous for it, as it made the economy 
central issue of the election. On the other hand the Congress Party put forth the slogan 
of Aam Admi Ko Kya Mila and thereby highlighted impact of NDA policy on the 
poor.^  As the election results were announced the Congress Party emerged as the 
single largest part with 145 seats relatively higher than its 1999 tally when it had 114 
seats. However, it's (Congress) vote share showed a negative trend of 1.77 percent (in 
1999 the Congress Party had a vote share of 28.3 and in 2004 it was 26.4 percent) it 
may be because of the fact that the party surrendered some seats to its allies (in 1999 
Congress Party contested 453 and in 2004 it contested only 414).^  The pre-poll allies 
of the Congress Party scored 74 seats and 9.1 percent of votes. The total number of 
seats and percentage of votes of the Congress Party and its allies was 219, and 35.82 
percent. It was more than BJP led NDA which won 189 seats with a vote share of 
35.9 percent. BJP's vote share in 1999 was 23.3 but it showed this time a negative 
trend of 1.3 percent.^  The difference in the vote share between the Congress led 
alliance and BJP led alliance (NDA) was not so much but in the first-past-the-post 
electoral system, a little difference in vote share result in a lot of difference in seats. 
The pre-poll alliances were critical for the Congress victory in states like Tamil Nadu, 
where the Congress with DMK scored 35 seats, in Andhra Pradesh where Congress 
with TRS won 34 seats, in Maharashtra where Congress along NCP won 23 seats, in 
Bihar where Congress with RJD and UP won 27 seats and in the state of Jammu and 
Kashmir where Congress in combination with PDP won 4 seats.^ The presence of 
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strong regional forces and lack of alliance in states like U.P. and West Bengal proved 
cost for the Congress and its allies, as in U.P it managed to win only 9 seats and in 
West Bengal it got only 3 seats. The Left Font emerged as a third strong force in the 
2004 election and it got 61 seats with a vote share of 8.34 percent. The other political 
parties particularly SP got 36 seats with vote share of 4.3 percent, and BSP got 19 
seats with the vote share of 5.33.'° 
Table.1.4: Seats won by various political parties in the 2004 Lok Sabha elections 
Parties 
Congress 
+allies 
Congress 
RJD 
DMK 
NCP 
PMK 
JMM 
THS 
LJNP 
MDMK 
PDP 
MUL 
RPI(A) 
IND(INC 
) 
Seats 
219 
145 
21 
16 
9 
6 
5 
5 
4 
4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Votes 
(%) 
35.82 
26.69 
2.22 
1.82 
1.78 
0.56 
0.48 
0.63 
0.72 
0.43 
0.08 
0.2 
0.09 
0.02 
Parties 
NDA 
BJP 
Shiv Sena 
BJD 
JD(U) 
Akali 
Dal(B) 
TDP 
WBTC 
MNF 
SDF 
lEDP 
NDF 
IND(BJP) 
Seats 
189 
138 
12 
11 
8 
8 
5 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Votes 
(%) 
35.91 
22.16 
1.82 
1.31 
2.29 
0.91 
3.06 
2.08 
0.05 
0.04 
0.07 
0.18 
0.18 
Parties 
Left Front 
CPI(M) 
CPI 
RSP 
FBL 
KEC 
IND(LF) 
Other 
Parties 
SP 
BSP 
RLD 
JD(S) 
AGP 
SJP(R) 
NC 
Other 
Independe 
nts 
NIP 
MIM 
Others 
Seats 
61 
43 
10 
3 
3 
1 
1 
70 
36 
19 
3 
3 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Votes 
(%) 
8.34 
5.69 
1.4 
0.44 
0.35 
0.09 
0.08 
19.93 
4.33 
5.33 
0.64 
1.48 
0.53 
0.09 
0.13 
3.79 
0.09 
0.11 
5.56 
Source: The Hindu- 20* May, 2004. 
However, what was more important about the election verdict of 2004 was 
that it reaffirmed the importance of the regional and state based parties in the national 
politics. The decline of the BJP and the Congress as pan-Indian political parties gave 
regional and state based parties greater weightage in the government formations at 
central level because both the NDA and UPA-I couldn't have been formed without 
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the support of these political parties. Therefore, the regionalisation of Indian politics 
which began in 1996 got also manifested in 2004 election. 
The 2004 Lok Sabha election verdict was interpreted by political pundits in 
many ways. Three theories emerged to explain the BJP-NDA defeat. Some took it as 
vote for secular India, others saw it as a result of anti-incumbency factor which had 
become a password for defining any incomprehensible phenomenon in the outcome of 
Indian election and lastly, some groups related it to economic causes and held that it 
was vote against government's pro-reform policy."While as for as the first view 
which specifies that it was a verdict for the secular India and believed that the 
violence in Gujarat had impacted the NDA fortune. Scholars like Wilkinson, held this 
view, even some of the BJP leaders like Vajpayee also evinced similar feelings 
relating the political debacle to the violence in Gujarat: "... it is difficult to specify 
what reason led to defeat in the election but one impact of the violence was that we 
lost the election".^ ^ But this view does not sound too strong, as the findings of Abhay 
Dattar, who in CSDS exist poll results ascertained that there was wide spread 
communal leaning of the respondents as 65 percent of the respondents demanded a 
ban on religious conversion, 66 percent wanted separate laws to govern marriage and 
property right, and likewise 62 percent of respondents wanted ban on inter-
community marriage.'^ Therefore, the very notion that violence in Gujarat had 
alienated a large number of liberal Hindus is not altogether right. Yogendar Yadav 
said that the large section of Hindus diapporved the Gujarat massacre and supported 
tolerance but there is little evidence to justify the view that these strains may have led 
to a vote against the BJP.'" However, it will be wrong to assume that the Gujarat 
violence had absolutely no impact. It surely had an impact on the minority vote, 
especially the Muslim vote of NDA which had shown a positive trend over the years, 
depicted a negative trend in 2004 Lok Sabha election which proved costiy for the 
NDA. The other perspective which related the verdict to economic reasons asserted 
that it was a vote against pro-reform policy of the government. Scholars like Zoya 
Hassan, share the same view as she observes, "....The election resuhs can plausibly 
see as rejection of reforms."'^ She largely relies on the study of Centre for the of 
Study Developed Societies (CSDS) which showed that, "...there is very little 
approval among ordinary citizens for economic reforms and there is very high degree 
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of popular consensus on this matter that cuts across class and party lines" ^ ^ However, 
same study concludes with an opinion that it would be wrong to assume that NDA 
government lost election due to economic policies. In support of the argument 
Yogendar Yadav remarks "that very few ordinary people have the idea about the 
policy of economic reforms so, they carmot be expected to have clear opinions about 
something they hardly comprehend."'^  However, he also does not entirely discard the 
impact of economic reforms on the voting behaviour, accordingly, he remarks, 
"...The consequences of policies of economic reforms and the anxiety about 
economic conditions, especially employment, played a small but significant role in 
neutralising people's otherwise positive assessment of the NDA regime and may have 
thus contributed to the defeat of the NDA".'" 
The other perspective sees this verdict through the prism of anti-incumbency, 
although this perspective also fails to convince. Observing the anti-incximbency factor 
one finds that on the one hand anti-incumbency hit NDA in Andhra Pradesh, Haryana 
and Jharkhand, on the other hand, it got benefitted from positive effect of incumbency 
in Rajasthan, Chhattisgarh, and Madhya Pradesh.'^  So, it means that state level 
incumbency actually worked for the NDA .Therefore, it v^ U be wrong to see this 
verdict wholly from this perspective. 
Summing up the above perspectives the researcher finds some obvious 
limitations. Firstly, the secular perspective which assume that Gujarat incident led to 
the fall of NDA government is weakened by the CSDS study which does not support 
this argument however, this incidence had impacted the minority vote particularly 
Muslims vote as it showed negative trend of 4 percent for NDA (in 1999 it was 15% 
and in 2004 election it was 11%) and more importantly the BJP allies suffered 
seriously because Muslims resort to tactical voting in the states of Andhra Pradesh, 
Bihar and West Bengal which cost heavily for the BJP and its allies.^" Secondly, when 
we take the economic perspective, in case of Andhra Pradesh it sounds convincing as 
54 per cent of the voters interviewed by the CSDS team considered that employment 
opportunities have gone down during NDA era and two third respondents believe that 
NDA policy benefited only the rich. In states like Bihar, 57 percents of the 
respondents share the same view, in Jharkhand 35 percent people responded that 
employment opportunities have detoriated in during the NDA regime and among 
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them 62 percent voted for the Congress. However, in states like Pxinjab and Orissa 
popular response towards NDA economic policies was positive, in Punjab majority of 
the people held positive opinion about the economic policies of the NDA?' As far as 
the anti-incumbency view is considered, it doesn't convince to explain the fact that if 
anti- incumbency had hit NDA in certain parts it also got benefited from positive 
wave of incumbency in certain states. This leads us to the opinion that all the three 
major interpretative perspectives mentioned above give only a partial explanation and 
much more needs to be explained. After further inquisitive evaluation we find that 
what had made a considerable difference between the Congress and the BJP was that 
the Congress had struck right kind of alliance in Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Jammu 
and Kashmir, Jharkhand, Bihar and Maharashtra. These states contributed more than 
half of the seats to the Congress led alliance latter named as UPA-I. The Congress did 
not face a strong collective opposition because BJP failed to forge an alliance in 
States like Assam, Haryana and Jharkhand; it all resulted in that Congress got a 
chance to build alliance in these states.^ ^ The alliance formation helped the Congress 
led alliance (later named as UP A) to gain from the people's dissent whether it was 
due to economic issues, minority violence or some other cause. For the Congress right 
kind of alliance did the trick as it contributed 74 seats and 9.1 percent of votes to the 
combined tally on the contrary BJPs allies contributed 51 seats and a vote share of 
13.8 percent to the final which was relatively lower than in the previous election. All 
the above quoted factors collectively had resulted in the debacle of the NDA in the 
2004 elections and the fact that Congresses' rational electoral calculation helped it to 
convert the people's dissent into seats by accommodating the regional forces, 
otherwise, the absence of alliance would have splited the vote. 
Formation of United Progressive Alliance Government (UPA-I government) 
Soon after the election results were declared it became evident that the 
Congress Party will lead the new coalition government and it will be headed by the 
none other than the Congress Party President Sonia Gandhi. The emergence of the 
Congress Party as the single largest party in 2004 Lok Saba election had made it clear 
that voters of India had rejected the xenophobic attack of BJP on Sonia Gandhi and 
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gave her the mandate to lead the Congress led coalition government at the centre. 
Sonia Gandhi made it clear that coalition government will be open for all the secular 
political parties who aspire for inclusive India. It was on 16* May, 2004 that a 
meeting was held at the residence of Sonia Gandhi where all the pre-poll allies and 
even some other parties like SP, RLD and Left Parties were present and these parties 
collectively backed Sonia Gandhi's claim for the post of Prime Minster.^ ^ The 
election verdict even softened Sharad Pawar of NCP who had reserved his decision on 
Sonia Gandhi's claim for the post before the election. The BJP did not take lesson 
from its defeat and persisted with its xenophobic attack on Sonia Gandhi, when it 
became inevitable that she will be the next Prime Minster. The senior BJP leaders 
started a campaign that a person of foreign origin cannot hold the coimtries important 
office and it was in this context leader like Sushma Swaraj threatened to shave her 
head if Sonia Gandhi became the Prime Minster. However, Sonia Gandhi's 
penultimate decision to hold back from the post of Prime Minster took the wind out of 
the campaign of BJP and the same was corroborated by the a RSS activist, who said 
that the campaign of the foreign origin could have greatly assisted the BJP and Sangh 
Parivar in putting the Congress and its allies in defence for several months.^ '* Sonia 
Gandhi nominated Dr. Manmohan Singh as the Prime Minster of the fourteen party 
United Progressive AUiance^ ^ coalition government with outside support of the Left 
Front. Some constituents in the Left Front like Forward Block, CPI and some leaders 
of CPI (M) were eager to join the government but leaders of CPI (M) from the West 
Bengal and Kerala opposed the participation in the government for fear of losing their 
base in these states where the Congress Party was their main political rival. Secondly, 
the leaders in the Kerala and West Bengal were concerned about the rise of communal 
forces in these states. In Kerala Congress was faction ridden and could have paved 
way for the BJP ascendency, and in West Bengal the CPI (M) was concerned about 
the rise of Mamta Banarjee's Trinmool Congress (TMC) and BJP that could have 
replaced the Congress in the opposition in 2006 assembly elections.^ ^ Therefore, the 
Left Fronts support was calculated in the sense that by supporting the UPA-I 
government from outside it wanted to contain the communal forces and by keeping 
itself outside the government it wanted to put pressure on the government during 
policy making which would have helped the party to strength the social base in states 
like West Bengal, Kerala, Tripura were the Congress Party was its main opposition. 
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The active participation of the Left Front in the UPA-I government could have proved 
costly for the Left Front in the upcoming elections of West Bengal and Kerala in 
2006. The BJP accused the left Front on the ground that it wanted to wield power 
without responsibility as they did the same during the United Front coalition 
government. 
The Left Front's decision to remain outside the Congress led UPA-I government 
was deliberate because it (Left Front) had ideological difference with the Congress on 
economic issues and its state concerns. However, for the Samajwadi party the fate 
was decided by the Congress denial, for as it was a secular party it was willing to 
support the UPA-I government. Although the Congress Party was leading a coalition 
government, it had an underneath agenda for reviving its social support base in Uttar 
Pradesh were Samajwadi Party (SP) and Rashtrya Lok Dal (RLD) were its main rivals 
and obstacle to its revival. Therefore, the Congress party declined the offer of S.P and 
RLD to be the part of the UPA-I government. Both parties decided to give UPA-I 
government outside support because the Congress was similarly supporting the S.P 
government from outside in Uttar Pradesh. The Congress Party was trying to revive 
its secular image and this could have happened only by marginalizing the SP.^ ^ 
After UPA-I government was formed, Sonia Gandhi was made the chairperson of 
the National Advisory Council that monitors the implementation of National Common 
Minimum Programme (NCMP) and provides inputs to the government in policy 
formation. She was also unanimously elected as to head the UPA and UPA-Left 
Coordination Committee. This new institution vitalized the role of Sonia Gandhi in 
the UPA-I government and gave a new orientation to the policies of UPA-I 
government. The new institution (NAC) consisted of the eminent representatives of 
civil society, apart from the bureaucrats, politicians etc. C.P Bhambhri said: 
Sonia Gandhi through NAC extended and deepened the definition of the rights of man by 
enacting laws particularly for rural employment, for the rights of tribal on their forests 
resources and also by Right to Information Act which acts as guarantor of implementation of 
new programmes for the rural poor and the tribal's. 
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However, BJP criticised the government pointing out that the new institution 
created the dual power centres and undermined the role of Prime Minister Manmohan 
Singh. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh discarded the allegation that he is weak 
Prime Minster and said, "Sonia Gandhi, is a source of strength for me, I will be 
probably less effective in many of the tasks she has to perform as UPA chairperson 
and Congress President".^' The dual power centre worked very well in the UPA-I 
goverrunent because it struck a balance between the Congress' quest for the 
liberalisation and the Left Fronts pro-poor policies. This was because of the fact that 
in the UPA-I government, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was in favour of a more 
open, liberalised economy and on the other hand, Sonia Gandhi supported pro-poor 
policies and committed to social development in the most inclusive sense.'"' This 
helped the Left Front to influence the policy of government and sustained its support 
for the government for four years. However, Sonia Gandhi had to resign from the post 
of chairperson of the NAC when the office of profit controversy broke out. 
The very existence of coalition government and its stability depend upon how the 
power and patronages of government is distributed between the parties supporting the 
government, and upon the government's policy directions. The NDA government 
had allocated the portfolio to its constituents on the basis of their strength in the 
Parliament. The UPA-I government devised new formula for the portfolio distribution 
among its constituents. It was decided that for every three representatives, a party 
would be allocated one ministerial birth; second step of this agreement was the actual 
distribution of offices among the allies. Despite, this new formula for distribution of 
portfolios, conflict arise in the UPA-I on the choice of portfolio and bargaining was so 
intense that it delayed the annoxmcement of portfolio for several days even after 
government assumed office. Lalo Prasad Yadav was demanding to be the Deputy 
Prime Minster and Home portfolio, Sharad Pawar was demanding Defence for 
himself and Civil Aviation for Prafiiel Patel, Ram Vilas Paswan was looking for the 
Railway or the Telecom. The Congress resolved the conflict by giving Railway to 
Lalo Prasad besides awarding some other ministries too to his party colleagues, 
Sharad Pawar was given Ministry of Agriculture and Food and Supplies, Consumer 
Affairs and Public Distribution and Civil Aviation was given to Prafiiel Patel.^ '^ What 
really became troublesome for the Congress was that when its pre-poU ally i.e. DMK 
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openly criticized it of not keeping its promise. The DMK alleged that Congress 
backtracked from its promise of giving portfolios of Shipping, Personnel and Internal 
Security, and Finance with Revenue Department (for Ministry of State) to it.^ ^ The 
Congress understood the importance of DMK's support; hence provide the Shipping 
portfolio to DMK by taking it back from Chandrasekhar Rao of Telengan Rashtra 
Samithi (TRS) and the matter v^ as solved. What really gave importance to this 
compromising attitude of the Congress Party was that the Congress was trying to 
sustain coalition government and co-exist, and work with the other parties. But in 
order to sustain the coalition government the power of the Prime Minster had been 
largely curtailed. The selection of the Council of Ministers had been the prerogative 
of the Prime Minster endowed to him by the Constitution of the India. But due to 
compulsions of coalition government this power of the Prime Minster is largely 
curtailed and the same happened with the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh too. 
"....The Congress allies in the UPA-I nominated their own minsters and bargained for 
their portfolio with Sonia Gandhi and not with Manmohan Singh," says Sanjay 
Baru. More importantly, due to compulsions of coalition politics, UPA-I 
government included in its Council of Ministers some ministers having criminal cases 
pending in different courts of the country. This was the clear indication of 
criminalization of Indian politics. The BJP camp harshly criticized this step of the 
UPA-I government but the Congress did not succumb and instead put a counter blame 
upon the NDA for including Advani, and M.M Joshi in the NDA's Council of 
Minsters during its period of rule. 
National Common Minimum Programme of UPA-1 (NCMP) 
Like its predecessor's (United Front and NDA) the Congress led UPA-I 
government laid down the National Common Minimum Programme (NCMP) which 
gave direction to it. The programme was laid down after reconciling policy priorities 
of all the constituents of government and their election manifestos. The Left Front 
which agreed to support government from outside was largely based on the NCMP. 
The causes of debacle of NDA largely helped the UPA-I in formulating the NCMP 
and same is reflected in the introduction of the text which reads: 
The people of India have voted decisively in the 14* Lok Sabha elections for secular, 
progressive forces, for parties wedded to the welfare of farmers, agricultural labour, 
weavers, workers and weaker sections of society, for parties irrevocably committed to the 
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daily well-being of the common man across the country. 
The guiding principles of the governance were laid dovm which were as following: 
(a) To preserve, protect and promote social harmony and to enforce the law 
without fear or favour to deal with all obscurantist and fundamentalist 
elements who seek to disturb social amity and peace. 
(b) To ensure that the economy grows at least 7-8 percent per year in a 
sustained maimer over a decade and more and in a manner that generates 
employment so that each family is assured of a safe and viable livelihood. 
(c) To enhance the welfare and well-being of fanners, farm labour and 
workers, particularly those in the unorganized sector and assure a secure 
future for their families in every respect. 
(d) To fully empower women politically, educationally, economically and 
legally. 
(e) To provide for full equality of opporttmity, particularly in education and 
employment for scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, OBCs and religious 
minorities. 
(f) To imleash the creative energies of our entrepreneurs, businessmen, 
scientists, engineers and all other professionals and productive forces of 
society. 
After releasing the NCMP Sonia Gandhi, said that NCMP reflected the 
mandate of the people and one that would cater to all sections of society, especially 
the poor.''' The NCMP of the UPA-I government almost takes into consideration the 
views and policy priorities of all the constituents of UPA-I. The Left Fronts 
influenced the draft of the whole text and same could be discerned from the text 
readings. The text gave more emphasis on employment, minimum wages and 
unorganized sector. Furthermore, on agriculture the new text reads that a 
"comprehensive protective legislation will be enacted for agricultural worker". The 
text also emphasize at providing good income to farmers. The demand of the Left 
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Front not to privatise the Public Sector Undertaking was taken into consideration and 
on that text reads that, "general profit making companies will not be privatised and 
the government will retain the existing Navratna companies". But the text did not 
discard the privatisation altogether and reads that "loss making companies will be 
either sold or closed after the workers were given their compensations". The demand 
of the Left Front on foreign policy was also taken into consideration, on which the 
text clearly opposes the unipolarity and stresses that steps would be taken to promote 
the multi-polarity along with close engagement with USA, without compromising the 
independent foreign policy. Despite the Left Fronts concern the demands of some 
small constituent like TRS, DMK, RJD, and PDP were also given place in the text. 
The NCMP of UPA-I government took into consideration the demand of DMK, 
MDMK and PMK by stating that all languages in the Eighth Schedule will be 
declared as official languages and Tamil will be declared as classical language. The 
demand of TRS for separate state was given place in the text of CMP which reads: 
"...the government will take this issue on an appropriate time and after due 
consideration and consensus". For the state of "Bihar Special package of Backward 
States Grant Fund was announced which had been a demand of the RJD for a long 
time. The demand of the POTA abolition was inserted in the text of the NCMP which 
was almost the demand of all the constituents particularly Left Front and PDP of 
Jammu and Kashmir. 
More importantly, the document (NCMP) incorporated some new policies 
which were considerably different from that of the past governments. The government 
pledged to enact the National Employments Guarantee Act which gives legal 
guarantee of at least 100 days work. The NCMP also pledged to enlarge the 
affirmative action including reservation in private sector for SCs and STs. The UPA 
government also pledged to work for the welfare of the socially and educationally 
backward section among religious and linguistic minorities, and even reservation was 
pledged to be given to them in education and employment. 
The NCMP of the UPA-I government was somewhat a mirror image of the 
Common Minimum Programme (CMP) of United Front coalition government. The 
CMP of the both the coalition governments insisted on; providing 1/3 reservation for 
the women in Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabha; reviewing Centre-State relation and 
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reactivating institutions like National Development Council and Inter-State Council; 
working for the weaker sections of the society, reinvestment of revenue generated by 
disinvestment in the social sector and limited foreign direct investment. Therefore, 
we can say that there was more of continuity than change in the NCMP of UPA-I 
coalition government. Moreover, if the anti-NDA sentiment bind the different 
constituents of the UPA-I government, it was NCMP that sustains this relationship. In 
order to ensure smooth working of the coalition government, UPA Coordination 
Committee (UPACC) was set up which acted as a platform of consultation and 
discussion, for not only those who were in the government but also those who 
supported the government from outside. Complementary to it a specific Coordination 
Mechanism, the UPA government-Left Coordination Committee (UPALCC) was also 
set up. In order to ensure that government follows the NCMP, the National Advisory 
Council was established which not only worked as watch dog of the NCMP but also 
advised the government on implementation of NCMP and also provided inputs to the 
government in policy formulation.'*' 
UPA-I and its Constituents at State Level 
The stability of Congress led UPA-I government depended largely on how the 
Congress maintained its working relation with both the internal and external 
constituents of the UPA-I government. There were internal contradictions in the UPA-
I government because the parties that were part of this coalition had in the past 
participated in the anti-Congress coalition governments. These parties were the main 
political opponents of Congress at the state level. Therefore, the stability of UPA-I 
government depended primarily on how Congress established a working relation with 
these political parties through state aligrmients so as to strengthen the UPA-I 
government. But soon after assuming the power at the Centre the Congress Party 
which was leading the UPA-I government tried to destabilise the SP goverrmient in 
Uttar Pradesh which was supporting it from the outside. The Congress Party tried to 
wean away RLD from the SP camp and tried to cut deal with BSP. This new coalition 
strategy though did not bear froiit for the Congress during the by-elections in UP, but 
it created friction within the UPA-I government by antagonising the CPI(M) for its 
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effort to destabilise the SP government and NCP which had alliance with Republican 
Party of India in Maharashtra.'*^ The Congress Party was trying to rebuild its 
traditional support base at states which was occupied by the very political parties 
supporting it at the centre. Therefore, there was contradiction between coalition and 
party building. Maintaing balance between these two extremes was very difficult for 
the Congress Party and same became evident in the subsequent assembly elections in 
Maharashtra where the UPA-I showed unity of purpose. The Congress Party and NCP 
struck an alliance to defeat the BJP and Shiv Sena, however, when the election results 
were announced friction developed between the two as the NCP of Sharad Pawar won 
higher number of seats, though it contested upon a comparatively lesser number of 
seats. The Contradictions surfaced on the issue of who will lead the coalition 
government. Sharad Pawar insisted that Chief Minster should be from the NCP. 
However, the matter was soon solved and NCP was given various ministerial posts of 
their choice, including the Deputy Chief Minister. The Congress Party high conamand 
sensed the growing clout of Sharad Pawar in the state. Therefore, to check the 
growing influence of NCP in the state, it tactically selected Vilasrao Deshmukh as the 
Chief Minister of the Maharashtra who was a rival to Sharad Pawar.'^ ^Thus the 
Congress Party was trying to consolidate the UPA-I at centre by strengthening the 
bond through state level alliance and simultaneously it did not want to leave its 
political space to be occupied by other parties. 
In the subsequent assembly election in Bihar and Jharkhand in February 2005, 
the UPA-I camp was largely divided and the Congress Party which was leading the 
UPA-I could not reconcile the parties which had fought the 2004 Lok Sabha election 
in alliance. In Jharkhand the Congress Party struck a unilateral alliance with JMM and 
ignored the RJD and Left Front. The anti-incumbency factor would have largely 
helped the UPA-I camp in Jharkhand but the division of votes in between the 
constituents resulted in reducing the negative impact of anti- incumbency to NDA. 
When, the election results were announced the BJP led NDA was short of majority 
and it became clear that it will be asked to form the government as no other party had 
more seats than the BJP. The Congress Party on the other had reconciled the other 
constituents whom it had ignored during the election like RJD and Left Front in order 
to form the government by constituents of UPA-I. Inspite of inviting BJP to form 
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government in the state the Governor Syed Sibtey decided that, UPA led by Shibu 
Soren was better placed in the house and invited him to form the govenraient.'*^ The 
Congress Party leaders in the state also justified the decision of the Governor on the 
ground that NDA had failed to get majority, so it had forfeited its moral right to rule.'*^  
So it was clear that the Governor had shown partisan approach because it was the BJP 
led NDA which was better placed to stake the claim of forming government and it had 
approached the Governor first with required numbers to form the government. But the 
Govemor gave first preference to Shibu Soren and he was asked to prove his majority 
on March 15, 2005. The NDA challenged this decision of the Govemor in the 
Supreme Court and it was on the intervention of the Supreme Court that Shibu Soren 
was directed to prove his majority on 11 March, 2005.'*^  But Shibu Soren could not 
prove his majority and it was on the order of Central Cabinet that Shibu Soren 
resigned on the same day. The Supreme Court called the appointment of Shibu Soren 
as total fi-aud on constitution. 
hi the Bihar assembly election the UPA-I camp was largely divided as Ram 
Villas Paswan was openly criticizing the RJD govenmient in the state. The 
antagonistic attitude of LJP towards RJD was largely based on the perception that 
Lalo Prasad Yadav was instrumental in denying the railway portfolio to Ram Villas 
Paswan during the portfolio distribution in the UPA-I government. Despite this there 
were party constrains to the LJP which had substantial number of party members from 
Bhumihar caste which were extremely hostile to Lalo Prasad and any alliance 
between the two could have proved costly for the LJP.''^ Inspite of reconciling the two 
constituents of the UPA-I at the centre, the Congress Party was more concerned about 
its own electoral calculations. Therefore, the Congress didn't enter into formal 
alliance with the RJD and LJP but also did not field its candidates in the seats held by 
the partner parties prior to the election.'*^The Congress's decision was largely based 
on the perception that not aligning with RJD will help it to wean away the upper caste 
vote from NDA camp and get away some part of the Muslim votes firom the RJD.'*^  
However, the election resuh turned out to be a fractured verdict. RJD was the single 
largest party with not sufficient numbers to form the government. NDA camp was 
also short of majority but had numbers than RJD. The LJP was the main player which 
could have changed the fortunes if it had put behind its weight to RJD, Congress 
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combine. The Congress tried to reconcile RJD and LJP in order to form government 
of secular parties but failed. The rest of work was done by the Governor Buta Singh 
who sent a report to the central government and recommended the President's Rule in 
state on the ground that, he was convinced that no government could be formed 
without horse trading.^ ^Buta Singh's decision to recommend President's Rule in the 
state was criticised by the opposition parties, as they alleged that UPA-I government 
has misused the office Governor so that to prevent the NDA from forming 
government in Bihar. In response to this accusation a Congress Party leader asserted 
that the UPA-I government took the decision in response to pressure exerted on it (the 
UPA-I government) at the centre by its constituents particularly RJD, NCP and by the 
Left Front to dissolve the assembly, so as to prevent formation of the NDA 
government in Bihar. ^ ' Elections were held again in Bihar in October, 2005 and the 
UPA-I constituents again failed to stay together consequently allowing the NDA to 
form the government. After the elections were held Supreme Court pronounced that 
the proclamation of emergency in Bihar was unconstitutional. It was a real 
embarrassment for the UPA-I government which had used the office of governor for 
its own political interests. The UPA-I constituents failed to remain a cohesive unit in 
the Bihar and in Jharkhand elections and hence paved way for the NDA revival in 
these states. The Congress inspite of uniting the constituents of UPA-I gave 
preference to real politik of coalition politics as opposed to the principles of coalition 
dharma which it pledged to adhere at the time of framing the NCMP. 
Though in Bihar and Jharkhand the UPA-I constituents remained divided but in 
Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry assembly elections held in May, 2006 they showed unity 
of purpose. The DMK in collaboration with the Congress, PMK, CPI, CPI (M), and 
the Indian Union Muslim League (IMUL) formed Democratic Progressive alliance in 
Tamil Nadu. Only MDMK which was part of the UPA-I government at centre 
switched its alliance towards AIADMK Front led by Jayalatiya.^ ^When the results 
were announced the Congress Party and DMK became more dependent on one 
another. This alliance was ftirthered strengthened in Pondicherry were the Congress 
formed the government with the outside support of DMK, PMK, and the Communists 
Party of India. 
^'uMMsMl 
The UPA-I government remained intact mainly because its constituents had 
built a state level alliance. The first party to leave the alliance was TRS which 
deserted the alliance in August, 2006 because it felt that UPA-I govenmient had 
backtracked from its promise of forming a separate state of Telengan. The UPA-I 
government was unable to evolve consensus on the issue of Telengan because CPI 
(M) was against this formation. The Pradesh Congress Party in Andhra Pradesh was 
also against such formation.^ ^ The Congress high command was also well aware 
about the poor show of TRS in the 2005 Municipal elections and in 2006 Panchayat 
elections so it did not try to bring back the TRS in the UPA-I government. 
UPA-I Government and Left Front Policy Contradictions 
The Left Front had extended its support to the Congress led UPA-I govenmient 
with a view to keep the communal BJP out of the power. However, the Congress and 
the Left Front had the contradictory economic policy stances, though they had tried to 
reconcile and reduce these policy differences through NCMP but the differences 
continued to persist. After releasing the text of the NCMP the Left Front endorsed it 
but, simultaneously indicated its reservation on some economic policies. The Left 
Front's dual approach of support to secularism and its opposition to the economic 
policies of the government was bound to come under strain sooner or later.''' The first 
contradiction between the UPA-I government and the Left Front got surfaced during 
the first budget of the new government, when Finance Minster P. Chidambaram 
proposed some economic policies that were considered more market oriented and 
deviant firom the NCMP by the Left Front. The Finance Minster P. Chidambaram 
proposed the increasing sect-oral caps on FDI in insurance, civil aviation and 
telecommimication. The Left Front argued that such a move will be against the 
national interest as the foreign investments in these sectors could drive out the 
domestic players and hence affect the economy as whole.'^ The Left Front vehemently 
criticised this government proposal on the ground that these proposals did not form 
part of the NCMP and reiterated that their support to the government is based on the 
NCMP. Finally, the consensus was build and the proposal to the increase the ceiling 
on telecom was accepted and the proposal for increasing FDI in insurance and civil 
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the UPA-I government would depend upon how the UPA-I constituents will adhere to 
the NCMP. On another occasion, the Left Front and UPA-I government locked horns 
when the Deputy Chairman of Planning Commission Montek Singh Ahluwalia 
decided to include the representatives of World Bank, Asian Development Bank and 
Mckinsey, a private consultative firm, in the consultative panel of the Planning 
Commission for the midterm appraisal of the Tenth Five Year plan.^ ^ While 
defending his decision Montek Sing Ahluwalia gave the rationale that, there is a 
whole range of expertise available outside the government which should be utilised in 
order to benefit the country. But this argument failed to satisfy the Left Front and the 
Left economists heavily criticised it. In this context, CPI leader Atul Anjan remarks: 
...these institutions have always been opposed to the concept of the planned development, 
would their recommendations strengthen the Planning Commission or weaken it? We all have 
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seen that what they did to ruin the Latin American and South East economies. 
Therefore, this decision was revoked and matter was buried. The 
disinvestment in Bharat Heavy Electrical Limitations (BHEL) created friction again 
between the UPA-I government and the Left Front. The government's decision of 
disinvesting 10 percent of BHEL's share was vehemently criticised by the Left Front. 
The UPA-I government argued that the decisions proposed were consistent with the 
NCMP and there is no issue of diverting from the NCMP and the decision is taken to 
accelerate the competition and consumer welfare. Chidambaram argued that proposed 
policy of disinvestment does not violate the coalition dharma, as enshrined in the 
NCMP, and NCMP had provided for the sale of share to retail investors. Furthermore, 
he added that NCMP provided that government should find the ways to revive the 
ailing PSUs and that money raised from the disinvestment will be utilised for the 
same purpose.^^ However, what gave impetus to the Left Front's demand to revoke 
the decision was that when it got support from a section of Congress Party particularly 
from Mani Shankar Aiyar, who argued that BHELs equity is being sought to be 
disinvested not to enhance competition or for the welfare of the workers but just to 
raise revenue.^^ The Left Front refiited this decision and described this move as a first 
step, towards privatisation and first serious violation of NCMP. This led the Left 
Front to boycott the further meetings of the Coordination Committee. Disinvestment 
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policy was jeopardised when other alHes particularly DMK threatened the UPA-I 
government that it will withdraw its support if the government did not stop the 
proposed disinvestment in the Neyveli Lignite Corporation. The DMK opposed this 
decision because its opponent AIADMK was taking advantage of this situation and 
making inroads into the hitherto DMK-led workers.^ ° The government finally decided 
to postpone all the decisions and proposals on disinvestment till further consultation 
and review because the withdrawal of DMK support could have brought more 
dependence of the government on the Left Front. Despite the pressure from the DMK 
to halt the disinvestment process the Left Front's decision to boycott fiirther meetings 
of the coordination committee also alarmed the government about the stability of the 
coalition government. However, it was due to the intervention of the Sonia Gandhi 
that Left Front was brought back into the coordination committee. 
Despite these contradictions on economic policies another irritant between the 
UPA-I government and the Left Front was the Indo-US relationship. The Left Front 
had criticised the NDA government constantly on the ground that it had made the 
country (India) a junior partner of USA in her imperialist design, and it (NDA) had 
sacrificed the India's conamitment to Non-Alignment and multilateralism. Before 
finalizing the NCMP of UPA-I government the Left Front draw the attention of 
government on this issue and it (government) declared that it will pursue an 
independent foreign policy keeping in mind its past traditions and it will promote 
multi-polarity in world relations and oppose all attempts of unilateralism. Moreover, it 
declared that it will pursue closer relation and engagement with the USA. The Left 
Front had aroused their concern on different issues and even criticised the UPA-I 
government on signing the agreement of New Framework for US-India Defence 
Relationship which enlarged the scope of the Next Step in Strategic Partnership, and 
also India's vote against Iran in IAEA. But it never turned to be dangerous for the 
stability of the government until the government concluded the 122 Agreement. The 
Indo-US nuclear deal all started when Prime Minister Marunohan Singh visited the 
US on July, 2005 and it was on July 18*, 2005 that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh 
and President George W. Bush, in a joint statement, agreed in principle to have a civil 
nuclear cooperation. As per the joint statement the Indian government agreed to 
separate it's civil and nuclear establishment and to put the civil nuclear facilities 
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under the IAEA safeguards and in exchange, USA agreed to give India access to 
nuclear technology and fuel. However, prior to this Joint statements India concluded a 
ten years defence frame work agreement with the United States, which established 
close defence relation between the two nations in terms of defence strategy dialogue, 
strengthening military capabilities to promote security, intelligence exchanges and 
more importantly allowing India to have access to US military hardware.^' The Left 
Front did not press too much on the defence deal and India's vote in IAEA against 
Iran although; it registered its protest without too much pressure on the government. 
Zoya Hassan said: 
... if there was one issue of principle on which Left Front could have withdrawn 
support, it was the defence deal agreement. After not withdrawing support the Left Fronts 
position was considerably weakened when it eventually decided to cut ties with the UFA. 
The success of Left Front in vetoing the disinvestment proposal would have 
encouraged the Left Front to pressure the govermnent through coordination 
committee, short of withdrawing support. The Left Front did not press this issue too 
much because it did not want to withdraw its support to the government which was on 
its initial stage and it could have affected the party in the assembly elections of West 
Bengal and Kerala. Despite this, the Left Front raised the issue of Congress pro-US 
approach during the assembly elections in Kerala and West Bengal, just to attract the 
Muslim voters. The Left Front's criticism and opposition to the nuclear deal became 
more lethal when the US Congress passed the Henry J. Hyde Act in December 2006 
till then the progress on the nuclear deal was slow. The Henry J. Hyde US-India 
peaceful Atomic Energy Act was the enabling act which permits nuclear cooperation 
with India. The UPA-I government from the very beginning argued that the Hyde Act 
was a domestic US law and was binding on US only and the domestic law cannot 
apply to India and India would be only bound by the 123 Agreement. The 
interpretation of the Act became the major issue in the whole process of Indo-US 
nuclear deal. The Left Front strongly criticised this agreement on the ground that it 
was a one sided agreement and would tiim India into a subordinate ally to the imperial 
ambition of the US. This will have adverse impact on independent Indian foreign 
policy and will halt the nuclear programme and particularly its nuclear weapon 
programme. The Left Front's landslide victory in Kerala and West Bengal assembly 
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elections further strengthened their commitment to halt the nuclear deal. Moreover, 
the Congress Party was initially pessimistic about the nuclear deal and the Prime 
Minster Manmohan Singh had to face scathing criticism from Congress Working 
Committee on July 2005 on the nuclear deal.^ '' The Congress concern was that the 
deal would alienate the Party's Muslim vote base and will encourage the Left Front to 
withdraw support to the minority government. The Congress Party could not evolve 
consensus within on the nuclear deal. Prime Minster Manmohan Sing after returning 
from the USA tried to remove the apprehension of the opposition and Left Front on 
the nuclear deal and made a statement in the Parliament in this context, making it 
clear that there was no secret deal behind the public one and denied that India entered 
into a military alliance with the US to counter China. The Left Front did not press the 
issue too much but once the Hyde Act was passed it mounted pressure on the 
government to stop the proceedings of the deal. Their major contention was that many 
provisions of the Hyde Act were not consistent with the joint statement of July 18*, 
2005. The Left Front put press on the government to renegotiate the deal. The Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh didn't succumb to the pressure exerted by the Left Front 
and made his stand clear when he said: 
...i have told them (Left Front) that it is not possible to renegotiate the deal. It is an 
honourable deal, the cabinet has approved it, and we cannot go back on it. I told them to do 
whatever they want to do, if they want to withdraw support so be it.*^  
Therefore, the Left Front decided to mount more pressure on the UPA-I 
government by threatening it of withdraw support. The other allies of UPA-I 
government particularly, RJD, and DMK were not in favour of the deal and they were 
more concerned about the survival of the government because the early elections 
could have proved costly for the allies. More importantly, realising the conflict within 
the Congress Party on the issue and being the chairperson of UPA-Left Coordination 
Committee, Sonia Gandhi did not support the deal at the beginning because she was 
more concerned about the survival of the UPA-I government. Sonia Gandhi made her 
stand clear on the nuclear deal when she eloquently spoke in October 12, 2007 at 
Hindustan Times Summit and argued that that survival of the government was more 
important than the nuclear deal and the Congress would carry on its dialogue with the 
Left Front so as to seek their consent and would do nothing to force the issue and risk 
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the break with the Left Front. Sonia Gandhi's stand on the deal softened Manmohail 
Singh who in his address at the Hindustan Times Summit said, "...the failure of deal 
would not mean end of life nor was the UPA a one issue govemment".^^ It was in this 
context that UPA-I government, in order to diffiise the tension set up a committee in 
September 2007, to examine the implication of the Hyde Act on 123 Agreement, and 
self reliance in the nuclear sector, and above all the ramification of the nuclear deal on 
the foreign policy and security cooperation. The Left Front allowed the UPA-I 
government to go ahead in their talk with the IAEA on Safeguard's Agreement but 
putting condition that such agreement could be accepted only after UPA-Left panel 
clears it for the final agreement. Zoya Hasan remarks: 
... the Congress got the green signal about the end of Left's resistance to the deal. 
The Left Parties offered a window of opportunity which the government quickly grasped. 
This weakened the Left Front's hand in the face off as it lost its triumph card to delay the 
clearance of Indian specific safeguards with the IAEA, which could have scuttled the deal. 
What led the government to fasten its process of operationalisation of deal 
were the concerns that the change in the USA political executive may imperil the 
deal. It was on 20* February 2008 that a delegation fi-om US including John Kerry, 
Joseph Biden and Chuck Hagel visited India. They stressed on the government to 
conclude the deal by the end of July 2008 so that US Congress will approve the deal 
before the US Presidential elections. ^ On the other hand the Congress Party became 
successful in taking Mulayam Singh Yadav into confidence who had earlier 
withdrawn his support to the government on the same issue. The UPA-I government 
went ahead with the deal once the Congress top leadership was convinced that the 
government would not fall. Mulayam Singh was aided in switching his support to 
UPA-I government on nuclear deal by the statement issued by the former President 
A.P.J Abdul Kalam in support of the nuclear deal. Kalam being the Muslims and his 
support for the nuclear deal with US was exactly the kind of political backing 
Mulayam Singh needed to turn away from the United National Progressive Alliance 
(UNPA). Furthermore, the Prime Minster and his close aides played a significant 
role in bringing the Samajwadi party on board.*' Thus the UPA-I government 
concluded the agreement with the IAEA and backtracked from its commitment that 
the resuhs of the talks with the IAEA would be deliberated in the coordination 
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committee. The resulted was that Left Front withdrew its support from the 
government. The Left Font tried until the last moment to convince Sonia Gandhi to 
save the government by dumping Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and replacing him 
with pro-Left Prime Minster but they failed. This was because of the fact that 
Manmohan Singh's credibility as a Prime Minister had risen immensely at that time 
and any antagonistic action against him could have proved disastrous for the Congress 
Party. The Left Front in order to halt the progress of the deal tried to communalise 
the deal and echoed that the deal is anti- Muslim so as to get the support of the secular 
political parties having substantial Muslim support. Moreover, it was held that Left 
Front's stand against the nuclear deal was also a move to woo back its Muslim 
support in West Bengal which had moved away from it following the Nandigram 
Episode. But this plan of the Left Front did not bear fruit and it had to face the wrath 
of the electorate in the subsequent elections. 
The Congress led UPA-I government in order to win the vote of confidence 
approached different political parties in order to ensure their support in to it (UPA). 
The Congress bargained with the leader of Jharkhand Mukti Morcha, Shibu Soren, 
who demanded to be made as the Chief Minister of the Jharkhand and his son to be 
made as the Deputy Chief Minister but he could not get what he desired and the 
Congress offered him to be inducted in the cabinet. '^ The Congress Party also tried to 
woo Ajit Singh and renamed the Lucknow airport after his father, a former Prime 
Minister, Charan Singh, but failed to satisfy him. The Congress also tried to bargain 
with JD (S) which demanded central ministerial berth and support of the Congress to 
topple the incumbent BJP government in Kamataka, but this also failed in this 
bargain.^ ^ The Congress led UPA-I government also tried to woo TRS which 
bargained for the separate Telengan state, but the government did not accept this 
demand.^ '' Although, UPA-I government didn't became successfiil in wooing JD (S), 
RLD, TRS which the Congress considered as its natural allies. It became successfiil in 
wooing SP of Mulayam Singh Yadav, who had withdravm it support from the 
government earlier. The new love of SP for Congress was interpreted in different 
way. The Left Front believed that in return of support to the UPA-I government, the 
government would shield its (SP) leaders against pending corruption cases. But this 
was not only the reason, the political rivalry between SP and BSP was also another 
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factor that led the SP to support the Congress led UPA-I government. '^* On the other 
hand Mayawati, along with Left Front, TDP, and JVM formed the Third Front to 
bring down the government. Mayawati played a master stroke by offering political 
alignment with JD (S), RLD, TRS parties with aim of fighting the next election 
together and these political parties could not deny their support as she had a 
significant support across Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, 
Maharashtra and Rajasthan.^^ On the day, set for the vote of confidence i.e. July 22, 
2008 the Congress led UPA-I government secured the majority with 275 votes in it's 
favour and 256 went against it, in the house of 542, with 10 abstentions. The 
opposition political parties heavily criticised the government for horse trading which 
had became the prominent feature of Indian coalition. The Congress leader Digvijay 
Singh said, ".... what opposition calls horse trading is lobbying in political 
parlance".^^ However, the victory of the UPA-I government was stained by the 
allegations of bribery and manipulated absentees of the MPs. This really was the dark 
movement for Indian parliamentary democracy as the political parties violated all the 
norms of the parliamentary democracy for the electoral gains. 
The Congress led UPA-I government after winning the vote of confidence 
interpreted it as a vote in favour of nuclear deal. Pranab Mukerjee said: 
...It is a legal, constitutional and political victory for the government, the vote of confidence 
has not only cleared the way for the government to go forward with the India-U.S. nuclear 
deal in a rightful manner but has also accorded political sanction to the agreement since a 
majority of legislators of the Indian Parliament have put their stamp of approval on it." 
Different interpretations came forward on the question, why the Congress led 
UPA-I didn't drop the nuclear deal and why it opt to seek vote of confidence? One 
such view suggests that the Congress led UPA government wanted to separate its way 
from the Left Front which had vetoed its most of the policies. The nuclear deal 
became the excuse for the government. The Prime Minster Manmohan Singh, after 
the vote of confidence eloquently said, "The Left Front vetoed in its every step on 
nuclear deal which is unacceptable, they wanted me to behave as their bonded 
slave".''^ Therefore, the statement from the Prime Minster was a clear indication of 
government's intention. 
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The Left Front also used the nuclear deal to mobilize its electoral base which had 
started to move away from it due its pro-liberal policies in states like West Bengal. 
The nuclear deal gave them the opportunity to separate themselves from the UPA-I 
government and depict to its electorate its distinct ideological stance from other 
political parties. After the state assembly election in the West Bengal in 2006 the Left 
Front's support base started to erode. The social coalition of the middle class, several 
groups of civil society, Muslims, SCs and STs turned their back against the Left Front 
due to its contradictory positions — a pragmatic support for the Congress at the centre 
and at the same time giving the electoral challenge to the party in the West Bengal.'^ 
This dual approach proved very costly for the Left Front in the subsequent Panchayat 
election (2008) and the Parliamentary election (2009). Moreover, Sanjay Barn's 
revelations have given another dimension to the UPA-I government and Left Front 
contradiction on Indo-US nuclear deal. He remarks: 
The Left's opposition evolved from being purely ideological into becoming a political 
ploy by which Prakash Karat aimed at marginalizing all the pro-PM elements within his own 
party. Surjeet Singh, Jyoti Basu, Buddhadeb Bhatacharya, and Sitaram Yechury were the 
moderates. Having up staged Surjeet Singh, Prakash Karat used the issue of opposition to 
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nuclear deal as a way of consolidating his own position within the CPI (M). 
Therefore, for both the Left Front and the Congress it was an electoral strategy. 
The Congress Party wanted to contain both sections of the electorate, i.e. middle class 
by nuclear deal and closer engagement in terms of trade with US, and poor by 
implementing the flagship programmes. The Left Front on the other hand wanted to 
resurrect it's support base in the West Bengal and Kerala where TMC of Mamta 
Banarjees and the Congress Party was making inroads to the traditional support base 
of the Left Front. Therefore it will be wrong to conclude that it was a one sided 
strategy. 
Conclusion 
The Lok Sabha election 2004 was not much different from the earlier Lok Sabha 
elections. What differentiates this election from earlier ones was that a loose bipolar 
contest was witnessed and both the national political parties strived to forge 
64 
alliances. When the election results were declared no national political party at 
individual level was in a position to form the government, and they have to rely on 
their pre-poU and post-poll allies to form the govenraient. However, significantly, this 
time the Congress changed its attitude towards the coalition governance. In 1999 Lok 
Sabha election BJP became successful in wooing the regional forces by shedding its 
hardcore ideology and struck the pre-poll alliance with the regional and state based 
parties. On the other hand Congress did not opt for the alliance and went for the poll 
with not much allies that proved to be catastrophic for it, hence denied it a chance to 
form the govenmient at the centre. However, in 2004 Lok Sabha election Congress 
under the leadership of Sonia Gandhi shed its differences with the regional forces and 
struck pre-poll alliance with the important, state and regional forces like RJD, DMK, 
TRS, JMM, LJP etc. The alliance with these forces made the difference in the election 
and uhimately Congress formed the UPA-I government with the outside support of 
the Left Front, SP, BSP etc. The Congress Party in order to sustain the government 
reconciled the election manifestos of the constituents of the UPA-1 government and 
laid down a comprehensive policy document which was called the National Common 
Minimum Programme (NCMP). The NCMP gave direction to the government and 
more importantly, sustained the Left Front support to the govenmient for four years. 
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Chapter - IV 
Domestic Policies of UPA - 1 
Government 
The National Common Minimum Programme (NCMP) of the UPA-I 
government was comprehensive programme which mentioned government's policy 
priorities. As mentioned earlier that the NCMP was product of consensus which was 
developed among constituents of the UPA-I government. The NCMP enlisted 
domestic policies and foreign policies priorities of the UPA-I government which n 
pledged to pursue during its tenure. Following are some of the extracts from the 
NCMP document related to domestic policies.* 
a) The government will enact a National Employment Act that will provide a 
legal guarantee for at least hundred days of employment every year at a 
minimum wages to one able-bodied person in every rural, urban poor and 
lower middle class house hold. 
b) The government will set up a National Commission to study the problems 
facing by enterprises, in the unorganized, informal sector. On the basis of the 
study the Commission will be asked to make recommendations to provide, 
technical, marketing and credit support to these enterprises and government 
will create a National Fund for this purpose. 
c) Adequate protection will be provided to all farmers from imports, particularly 
when international prices fall sharply. 
d) Public spending on education will be raised at least 6 percent of GDP, and at 
least half the amount out of it will be spend on the primary and secondary 
sector. 
e) The government will introduce a cess on all central taxes so as to finance the 
commitment to universal acess to quality basic education. 
f) The government will reverse the trend of communalization of education. Steps 
will be taken to eradicate the communalization of school syllabus and for that 
a review committee of experts will be set-up. 
g) A central government funded national cooked nutritious mid-day meal scheme 
will be introduced at primary and secondary schools. Integrated Child 
Development Scheme will be universalized. 
h) The government will increase the public spending on health to at least 2-3 
percent of the GDP and special emphasis on the primary health care will be 
given. 
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i) Legislation related to providing one third reservations for the women's in 
Vidhan Sabha and in the Lok Sabha will be introduced. Legislation on 
domestic violence and against gender discrimination will be enacted, 
j) Public distribution system (PDS) will be strengthened particularly in the 
poorest and backward blocks of the coimtry and women's and ex-servicemen's 
cooperatives will be involved in its management, 
k) A national dialogue will be started with all political parties, industry and other 
organization to see how best the private sector can full fill the aspirations of 
SCs, STs youth. 
1) A model comprehensive law to deal with the communal violence will be 
enacted and states will be encouraged to adopt that law, so that faith and 
confidence among the minorities will be generated, 
m) The government will set up a National Commission to see how best the 
welfare of socially and economically backward sections among religious and 
linguistic minorities, including reservations in education and employment is 
enhanced, 
n) Special attention will be given to augment and modernize the rural 
infi-astructure consisting roads, irrigation, electrification etc. 
o) The government will redress growing regional imbalances both among states 
as well as within states, through fiscal, administrative, investment and other 
means. The government will create Backward State Grant Fund for states like 
Bihar, Assam and U.P that will create productive assets in these states, 
p) The government will make the National Development Council more effective 
instrument of cooperative federalism and steps will be taken to activate the 
Inter- State Council, 
q) A new Commission will be set up to look at Centre-State relations because 
over the years drastic changes took place in polity and economy of the 
coimtry. 
The National Common Minimum Programme gave the UPA-I government a 
fi-amework for governance which it followed throughout its tenure. However, this 
chapter will examine only UPA-I government's Minority Development Policies, 
Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) and Reservation for the OBCs in Higher 
education. 
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Minority Development Policies under the UPA-I Government 
Minorities constitute an integral part of the India's multi-cultural milieu. A 
society consists of diverse identity groups and these groups can be identified on the 
basis of their affiliation to particular caste, religion, gender, language, culture, etc. 
India is also a land of diverse identities. The Constitution makers had given the plural 
nature of Indian society full reflection in the Constitution. The Indian Constitutions 
has given the cultural rights of minorities space in the Part III of the Constitution 
(Fundamental rights). To be precise, who are the minorities, the National Commission 
for Minorities Act, 1992, identified, five religious Communities which include 
Muslims, Christians, Buddhists, Zoroastrians and Sikhs.^  After India's independence, 
the main stream discourse in India related to affirmatives action remained limited to 
caste and ignored the other groups particularly the minorities. The major argument, in 
support of affirmative action for the lower caste group was that they have suffered 
perpetual injustice from historical times in Indian society. Therefore, affirmative 
action targeted towards the lower caste group was an instrument to compensate the 
past injustices. Thus, the word social justice became synonymy to caste and the other 
religious groups were excluded from this discourse, as no caste system was prevalent 
in religions like Islam and Christianity which are egalitarian in nature. Hence, the 
Constitution makers evolved a consensus on reservation and other preferential 
treatments meant for the lower castes and designed the Constitution in such a way 
which kept the scope for affirmatives action open for lower caste groups which 
ultimately got reflected in the policy formation. In the initial stages of Constitution 
making, the Constitution makers considered and debated on two set of minority rights, 
one related to political and economic rights, and the other to religious, educational 
and cultural rights. However, after the partition the whole discourse underwent a 
dramatic change. The political safeguards for the minorities were thrown out of the 
Constitution debate on the ground that it is dangerous doctrine and endangers the 
secular fabric of the new bom nation. The reservation for the minorities in the jobs 
and services also had to face the scathing criticism from the majority of members in 
the Constituent Assembly. Therefore, the discourse on minority rights was limited to. 
Fundamental Right to freedom of religion, special provision related to the protection 
of scripts and culture, and right of minorities to maintain their educational institutions, 
thereby devoid of any special and preferential treatment. 
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Over the years, due to the reservation policy and preferential treatment a 
significant improvement took place in the social-economic status of SCs, STs, on the 
contrary the position of minorities showed negative trend as there were no measures 
to promote their socio- economic development. Although the issue of minority 
welfare got surfaced on several occasions from time to time but no such concrete 
steps were taken to address this issue. Mrs Indira Gandhi in 1980 took a bold step by 
setting a High Power Panel on Minorities under the Chairmanship of Dr. Gopal Singh, 
to study the conditions of the minorities. The Committee in its report concluded that 
the poor among the Muslims could not avail the opportunities in education, 
employment and economic activities because of isolation and various historical 
factors. In this context Indira Gandhi introduced the Prime Minister's 15 Point 
Programme in 1983 with an objective to provide a sense of security to minority 
communities and ensure their rapid socio-economic development.'' However, the 
announced policies couldn't achieve anything substantial because of the two reasons. 
First, the fact that there has been such a strong partisan elements, with each 
government largely discard the labours of previous governments and introduce new 
policy initiatives as far as minorities were concerned, thereby resulted in discontinuity 
in the minority policy. Second, most of the issues which were important for the 
development of minorities like education, security, employment are much decided by 
the state governments than the national governments. The Central government can 
promote and can give monitory support to the state governments through centrally 
sponsored schemes but in the end it cannot do much without the political will at the 
state level.'* 
However, the 2004 Lok Sabha election witnessed a change in the government at 
the national level. The BJP led NDA coalition government was ousted out of power 
by the new Congress led UPA-I government. The new coalition govermnent was the 
conglomeration of secular parties which fought the election on the backdrop of 
Gujarat incidence and promised to revive the secular and inclusive politics. The 
Congress and its pre-poU allies in their election manifestos and during the election 
campaigning put emphasis on secular issues particular, minority security, and their 
socio-economic upliftment which ultimately proved costly for the NDA. The stand of 
Congress led alliance on these issues showed its effect when the election results were 
announced. The Congress and its allies got 79 percent of Muslim votes in Bihar, 78 
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percent in Tamil Nadu, 66 percent in Assam, 60 percent in Gujarat, 55 percent in 
Kamataka and 47 percent in Maharashtra .^ The minority support to the Congress and 
its allies proved vital for the formation of UPA-I government and thus pushed the new 
government to relook the minority concerns. The mandate to the UPA-I coalition 
government on behalf of the minorities was clear, to go beyond identity politics and 
promote their socio- economic development. In this context the UPA-I coalition 
government formulated the NCMP and incorporated these concerns on priority basis. 
The new government living up to its commitment to the NCMP took the following 
important steps, a National Monitoring Committee for Minorities Education was 
constituted, a National Commission for Religious and Linguistic Minorities under the 
Chairmanship of Justice Ranganath Mishra was constituted to examine the possible 
criteria for reservation among religious and linguistic minorities, a High Level 
Committee under the Chairmanship of Justice Rajinder Sachar to provide a 
comprehensive report on the socio-economic and educational status of Muslims was 
constituted, the Ministry of Minority Affairs was created for the overall minority 
development. Multi-sectoral development schemes for the overall area development 
in 90 minority concentration districts was started, the Prime Misters 15 Point 
Programme was revamped and renamed as Prime Misters New 15 point programme 
which focussed action on issues particularly linked to the social, economic and 
educational upliftment of the minorities.^  
Findings of Sachar Committee related to educational, economic and employment 
status of Muslims 
The formation of the Sachar Committee to examine the socio-economic status of 
the Muslims was a major development as far as the minority development was 
concerned. The Committee in its report highlighted the plight of the Muslims by 
finding out that Muslim community by and large are lagging behind to other 
communities in terms of their access to public and private sector jobs, education, 
infrastructure, and credit and, more importantly, the gap between the Muslims and 
other communities have not filled over the years rather had it increased in some 
dimensions.^  Some of the important findings of the Committee related to the 
Muslims educational status, economic status and representation in the elite civil 
services of Indian are as under.' 
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Education Status 
a) The literacy rate among Muslims in 2001 was 59.1 percent which is far below 
the National average of 65.1 percent and higher than SCs and STs, but lower than the 
remaining category of 'AH others' which had literacy rate of 70.8 percent. 
b) As many as 25 percent of Muslim children in the 6-14 year age group have either 
never attended school or have dropped out. Muslims have the highest dropout rate in 
the country. 
c) The main aim of setting 'Jawahar Navodaya Vidyalaya was the objective of 
excellence, coupled with equity and social justice" (National Policy on 
Education, 1986).The scheme in rural areas was expected to reduce the supply side 
constraints on good quality education, however the Muslim participation in these 
schools too is unsatisfactory. 
d) The disparity in Graduation level education attairmient rates is widening since 
1970's between Muslims and all other categories in both urban and rural areas. 
e) Only one out of the 25 Under-Graduate students and one out of the 50 Post-
Graduate students is a Muslim in premier colleges. The share of Muslims in all 
courses is low, particularly at the PG level and marginal in the science stream. 
f) Un-employment rates among Muslim graduates is the highest as compared to the 
other communities in India both among the poor and the non-poor. 
g) Only 3% of Muslim children among the school going age go to Madrassas. 
Muslim parents are not averse to mainstream education or sending their children to 
affordable government schools. Muslims also preferred regular school education; 
however, the access to government schools for Muslim children is limited. 
Economic and Employments status of Muslims as per the Sachar Committee 
findings^ ** 
a) The participation of Muslim workers in salaried jobs (both in the public and the 
private sectors is quite low as is in the case of SC/ST workers. 
b) The participation of Muslims in regular jobs in urban areas is quite limited 
compared to even the traditionally disadvantaged SCs/STs. 
c) A significantly larger proportion of Muslim workers are engaged in small 
proprietary enterprises and their participa^njft^oraial sector employment is 
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significantly less than the national average. The participation of Muslim workers in 
the informal sector enterprises is much higher. 
d) The Muslim regular workers are the most vulnerable with no written contract and 
social security and benefits. 
e) Muslim regular workers get lower daily earning (salary) in both public and 
private jobs compared to other social-religious categories (SRCs). 
f) The presence of Muslims was found to be only 3 percent in the IAS, 1.8 percent in 
the IFS and 4 percent in the IPS Muslim community 
g) Muslims has a representation of only 4.5% in Indian Railways. Almost all 
(98.7%) of them are positioned at lower levels. 
h) The share of Muslims in security agencies is around 4 percent. Representation of 
Muslims in the Education Department is just 6.5% and 7.3% in the Home department. 
Overall the share of Muslims as police constables is only about 6%.The presence and 
Participation of Muslims in the Judiciary has been a major point of concern. 
Recommendations of Sachar Committee 
The Sachar Committee in its comprehensive report highlighted the 
development deficit among the Muslims as a group in various dimensions of their day 
to day life. The Committee find out that the socio economic status of Muslims in India 
is better than the SC and ST, but worse than the Hindu OBC and other. Furthermore, 
the Sachar Committee finding provide enough evidences to initiate measures for the 
socio- economic development of minorities'. The report brought the minority 
development in the official discourse and will become point of reference for the fixture 
initiatives. In the light of the above findings the Committee made following 
recommendations, so as to address the socio-economic deficit among the Muslims. 
Some of the important among them are as under.'' 
a) To constitute an Equal Opportunity Commission to deal with the concern of 
deprived groups. 
b) The process of evaluating the content of school text books should be initiated 
and institutionalised. 
c) To work out mechanism, so that Madrasas can be liked with the higher 
secondary school boards that will ensure the pass outs from Madrassas to enter 
the mainstream education. 
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d) Madrassa degrees should be recognised for the eligibility in the competitive 
examinations. 
e) To establish legal mechanism which will deal with grievance of discrimination 
against minorities on the issues of employment, housing, schooling and 
obtaining bank loans. 
f) To ensure diversity in the student population at college and university level, 
the UGC should link financial allocation to these institutions with the diversity 
in the student's population. 
g) An alternate admission criterion should be devised so that the admissions to 
the most backward among the all SRCs (socio-religious categories) in the 
universities will be ensured. 
h) To set up delimitation procedure that rules out reserving constituencies with 
high minority population for the SCs. 
i) To set up National Data Bank, which will act as a source and maintain 
relevant data related to various SRCs. 
j) Within the Muslims Arzals should be designated as SCs or Most Backward 
Castes and affirmatives actions should be targeted towards this group. 
UPA-I Government's Policy Initiatives after Sachar Committee 
Recommendations 
In the light of Sachar Committee recommendations, the United Progressive 
AUiance-I (UPA-I) government at the Centre introduced series of ameliorate 
measures, particularly the Multi-Sectoral Development Programmes (MSDP) and the 
Prime Minsters New 15 Point Programme (PM-N15P) to address the development 
deficits faced by religious minorities in general and by the Muslims in particular. 
The MSDP was an area development approach which was launched in 2008. It aimed 
at upgrading the infrastructure in 90 minority concentrated districts by supplementing 
the fiinds of ongoing government schemes and public provisioning rather than those 
that would specifically target specific deprivation of the Muslims.'^ The rationale 
behind the area development approach was that the infrastructural development in 
these minority concentrated districts will automatically benefit minorities in general 
and the Muslims in particular. The UPA-I government did not go beyond area 
development approach due to fear that the community specific programmes could 
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have been legally challenged. The government did propose minority Sub- Plan in the 
11 Five Year Plan but it was vehemently opposed at various levels, particularly by 
the Planning Commission.^^ Furthermore, the government had to face scathing 
criticism from the BJP, the main opposition political party. The BJP criticised the 
government on the Constitutional grounds and argued that special allocations for 
disadvantaged groups based on caste or gender had its roots in the Constitution but 
there is no mention for such a specific allocations to Muslims and other minorities.*'* 
The MSDP was the follow-up programme to the Sachar Committee findings that 
the Muslim community are concentrated in locations with poor infi-astructure and 
needed targeted intervention in order to bring it socially and economically at par with 
the mainstream. However, the MSDP which was launched in 90 minority 
concentrated districts across 20 states cover less than half of the Muslim population. It 
covers only 30 percent of the Muslim population ignoring entirely the Muslims in 
non-minority concentrated districts.'^ A better way might have been to make blocks, 
even villages and hamlets, rather than districts, the unit of plaiming projects.*^ 
Furthermore, there was the poor utilisation of funds meant for the MSDP. In the 11' 
Five Year Plan, the MSDP was allocated 39 percent of the total budget Ministry of 
Minority Affairs (total amount to the Ministry of Minority Affairs was 7000 crores 
out of which the MSDP was allocated 3747 crores).'^ The Ministry of Minority 
Affairs (MMA), had reported in the Parliament that 80 percent of the funds meant 
for the MSDP had been spend, but the most of the money had remained at the state 
level and district level only meagre amount of 34 percent had reached to the targeted 
population. Furthermore, the other problem which was foimd in some districts 
across some states in the proper implementation of the programme was the bias on the 
part of bureaucracy against the minority. In some districts like South 24 Parganas in 
West Bengal, Darbhanga in Bihar, and Mewat in Haryan, Bagpat of Uttar Pradesh and 
Araria of Bihar, Muslims did not got benefitted by this programme.'' The UPA-I 
government in order to ensure the effective monitoring of the minority welfare 
schemes in the country appointed 229 national level monitors and more importantly. 
National Productivity Council of India (an autonomous body under the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry) was endowed with the task to monitor the implementation 
of various schemes under the MMA and its organisation.^" 
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The other initiative took by UPA-I government in context of the Sachar 
Committee report was that it revamped the Prime Minsters 15 Point Proff'amme for 
the minorities. The Prime Minsters New 15 Point Programme covers; enhancing 
opportunities for education, equitable share in economic activities and 
employment, improving the conditions of living of minorities and prevention, and 
control of commimal riots. There had been various government schemes meant for 
the underprivileged sections of the society and the disadvantaged sections of the 
minorities also got benefited. However, to make sure that the benefits of various 
government scheme flows equitably to minorities, the Prim Minsters New 15 Point 
Programme envisages location of a certain proportion of development project in the 
minority concentration areas and also provides that, wherever possible, 15 percent of 
targets and outlays imder various schemes should be earmarked for the minorities. '^ 
The Prime Minsters New 15 Point Programme was the broad programme and 
involves various Ministries. Seven Union government Ministries/Departments were 
involved in implementing the programme. The Ministries /Department and the 
programmes implemented by them under the Prime Minster New 15 Point 
Programme are as under. 
a) Ministry of Rural Development was implementing Indira Awas Yojana (IAY), 
Sampooma Grameen Rozgar Yojana (SGRY), National Rural Drinking Water 
Programme (NRDWP) 
b) The Ministry of Urban Development was implementing Urban Infi-astructure 
Development Scheme for Small and Medium Towns (UIDSSMT) 
c) The Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation implemented 
programmes like Integrated Housing Slum Development Programme (IHSDP), 
Basic Services for Urban Poor (BSUP), Swamajayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana 
(SJSRY) 
d) The Ministry Labour and Employment industrial Training Institutes (ITIs) 
e) The Ministry of School Education and Literacy implemented, Sarva Shiksha 
Abhiyan (SSA), Kasturba Gandhi Balika Vidyalaya (KGBV), and Madrassa 
modernisation programmes 
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f) The Ministry of Women and Child Development implemented Integrated Child 
Development Services (ICDS) and Department of Finance implements the 
Priority Sector Lending (PSL) to Minorities. 
g) The Ministry of Minority Affairs implements five scholarship schemes apart 
from the Maulana Azad Education Foundation. These schemes include, Pre-
matric, Post-matric, Merit-cum-Means scholarships, Free coaching and allied 
scheme for competitive examinations, and Maulana Azad National Fellowship 
for minority students pursuing M.Phil, and Ph.D. 
The Prime Minsters New 15 Point Programme was a comprehensive programme 
and touches all the relevant dimensions of the minority development and upliftment 
and some of the major achievements of the program reported by the Ministry of 
Minority Affairs can be gauged from the following figures.^ ^ 
a) 70,000 Anganwadi Centres were operationalised in minority concentration blocks 
under the Integrated Child Development Scheme. 
b) 33,000 new primary schools/upper primary schools have been opened under Sarva 
Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) in the districts with substantial minority population since 
2006-07 till 2012-13.Similarly,24000,primary/upper primary schools have been 
constructed in such districts under (SSA) in the same period. 555 Kasturba Gandhi 
Balika Vidyalayas (KGBVs) have been sanctioned in these districts under SSA. 
c) Under the scheme of Indira Ayas Yojana (lAY), more than 23.90 lakhs houses 
were constructed for the minorities with the expenditure of 7961 from 2006-07 to 
2012-2013. 
d) The projects of 21.230 crores were sanctioned under the different components of 
JnNURM, in the cities and towns having substantial minority population. 
e) National Minorities Development and Finance Corporation (NMDFC) had 
distributed concessional loans of 320 crore to more than to 73000 minority 
beneficiaries'. Loan for more than 1, 99,000 crores were extended by banks to 
minority commimities under Priority Sector Lending. 
f) A total number of 18539759 against the targeted number of 10927268 Minorities 
students got benefited by various types of scholarships under Minority schemes of the 
Central Government during the three years period 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 
amounting of Rs. 3320.06 crores. It includes four schemes Pre-matric, Post- matric, 
Merit-cum and Maulana Azad Foundation. '^* 
The MMA was made the nodal ministry to monitor the implementation of the 
Sachar Committee recommendations. The function of the MMA was to introduce the 
developmental programmes that will uplift the socio-economic status of minorities, 
coordinating between the central and state agencies to implement minority related 
schemes and programmes, moreover, to monitor and evaluating these. Wajahat 
HabibuUah said: 
.... It (MMA) has failed to effectively address the poverty and exclusion of Muslims, 
a shortcoming arising principally from weak coordination with other central and state 
departments, which are not answerable to MMA for inadequacy in implementation. The 
Prime Minister's New 15 Point Programme suffered the most because of this: no single 
authority actually owns this programme as it only call for earmarking 15 percent of outlay and 
physical targets for minorities in other selected welfare schemes without prescribing any 
mechanism, making h a top-up approach.^ ^ 
Furthermore, The Prime Minsters New 15 point Programme just like the Multi-
Sectoral Development Programme relate the same story pertaining to scheme 
design and operationalisation at the district level. In the programme, some 
schemes have followed an area-based approach for infrastructure development and 
Gram Panchayats were considered as the imit of implementation for infrastructure 
projects and not minority-dominated hamlet or ward.^ ^ Hence, in many places the 
minorities could not avail from the programmes because projects where not situated in 
the minority concentrated areas. Moreover, In order to address the large scale 
deprivation of the Muslim it is needed to set in motion specific policy measures and 
adequate coverage of schemes along with requisite budgetary allocation in the 15 
Point programme. These scheme should have sufficient scope for tailor- made 
intervention that fits specific needs of Muslim community.^^ 
The UPA-1 government accepted almost all the recommendations of the Sachar 
Committee, however at the implementation level it put more emphasis on the 
community targeted programmes rather than on mainstreaming the minority 
development. The Sachar Committee didn't talk about the reservation for the 
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minorities explicitly because the Committee was not mandated for it. The Sachar 
Committee preferred the mainstreaming and hence suggested the equitable allocation 
of available jobs in the public sector amongst the Muslims. Moreover, the Committee 
suggested providing incentives to the private sectors to encourage the diversity in the 
work force.^ ^ It was in this context that the UPA-I government under Prime Minsters 
New 15 Point Programme declare that special considerations would be given to the 
minorities in the recruitment process at Central and State level along with the Public 
Sector Undertaking but did not suggest through what instrument the representation of 
the minorities' will be increased and given fair share in proportion to their population. 
The absence of reservation to minorities' in general and the Muslims in particular had 
great bearing on their representation in the government and non-government sectors. 
It can be gauged from the following data on recruitment. The share of minorities' in 
the total recruitment in Central Ministries/Departments, and Central Public 
Undertakings since 2006 showed steady increase in figure and percentage but in 
relation to the their total population it is not too much. It was mere 6.93 percent in 
2006-07, it reached to a figure of 9.09 percent in 2008-09, in 2009-2010 it showed 
negative trend and slipped to 7.28 percent, and reached 10.18 percent m 2010-11. 
In order to, address the issue of under-representation of minorities in 
government employment. The UPA-I government had constituted a National 
Commission for Religious and Linguistic Minorities under the Chairmanship of 
Ranganath Mishra, to examine the possible criteria for reservation among religious 
and linguistic minorities. The Commission submitted its report during UPA-I 
government but it was during the UPA-II that the report was tabled before the 
Parliament. The Conmiission recommended to reserve 15 percent in the Central 
services for linguistic and religious minorities and state government for the 
minorities' out of which 10 percent was recommended to be reserved for the Muslims 
and 5 percent for other Minorities'. Furthermore, the Commission recommended that 
the Presidential order of 1950 should be amended so that SC status should be given to 
Dalits in all religions.^" The UPA-II tabled the report in the Parliament without any 
action taken report and did not put forward how and when decision on the main 
recommendations related to reservation for the minorities will be taken. The 
government couldn't decide on the issue mainly because of practical and electoral 
constraints. Firstly, the Supreme Court had approved ceiling that quota cannot go 
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beyond 50 percent. If government wants to go beyond this it had to amend the 
Constitution which was going to be difficult for the government. Secondly, the 
government had the alternative which was also recommended by the Ranganath 
Mishra to bring socially and educationally backward Minorities within the OBC 
category with a sub quota, but it cannot evolve consensus on this issue because the 
UPA-II government constituents had substantial support of the Hindu OBCs. The 
Congress Party in December 2011 before the Uttar Pradesh Assembly election 
unilaterally, announced that the government will carve out sub-quota of 4.5 
reservations for the Minorities' from the total OBC quota of 27 percent.'" The 
decision of the Congress Party was based on its electoral calculation to wean away the 
Muslim support from the secular parties in general and SP, RJD and JD (U) in 
particular. However, the UPA-II couldn't proceed further on the issue due to the 
coalition constraints and its decision on minority reservation just remain a rhetoric 
The government also could not evolve consensus on the other recommendation of the 
Ranganath Commission to gave the SC status to Dalits Muslims and Dalits Christians 
by amending the Presidential order of 1950. The constraints were mainly from the 
Hindu Dalit MPs and Upper-caste Hindus who would have blocked any attempt on 
this issue. 
National Employment Guarantee Act (MNERGA, 2005) 
Employment Growth Rate in India 
The Constitution of India has ensured equality for all irrespective of the caste, 
creed, color and sex. Although it has created equality in some areas e.g. right to vote, 
freedom of speech, freedom of religion, equality of opportimity but failed to provide 
right to work and employment which would have ensured minimum standard of 
living to a huge section of population. It was the Congress Party vmder the leadership 
of Narasimha Roy in 1991 that brought drastic reforms in Indian economy and 
adopted neo-liberal economic policies. The new economic strategy resulted in 
unprecedented growth; however, the high economic growth has not been matched by 
the growth of productive employment. Employment growth was high as 2.82 percent 
per annum over the five year period 1972-73 to 1977-78; it showed a negative trend 
and fell to 1.02 percent per annum over the five year period 1993-94 to 1999-2000. 
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The major reason for this decHning trend in the employment growth rate in aggregate 
is due to the fact that the major sector of employment that is agriculture had shown 
the negative trend in the employment growth. While the rate of growth in agriculture 
employment was high as 2.32 percent per annum during the five year periods 1972-
1978, during 1993-94 tol999-2000 it was just 0.06 percent."Therefore, over the 
years the growth in India had been mostly jobless and even sometimes resulted in job 
loss. However, the major decline in the employment growth can be seen at rural 
level, it grew at an annual rate of 0.58 which was meager in comparison to the 
growing rate of rural labor force.^ "* In, absence of viable employment opportunities, 
and distress created by the high debts, led to the mass suicides in various states. 
According to K. Nagaraj (Published in National Crime Record Bureau), "....the rate 
of suicides in farmers is high compared to the general population. The suicide rate 
among the farmers has been increasing since from 2001 while the general rate has 
been more or less stable." Furthermore, he said, "....that states like Maharashtra, 
Kamataka, Andhra Pardesh, Chhattisgarh, Madhya accounted for the two third of the 
total farmers deaths". 
Government's Employment Wage Programmes 
In order to tackle the rural unemployment the government of India over the 
years introduced various schemes and programmes to improve the conditions of rural 
people by providing wage employments. The government of India introduced initially 
wage employment programmes as pilot projects, such as Rural Manpower Programme 
(RMP) in 1960-61, Crash Scheme for Rural employment (CRSE) in 1971-72, 
Drought Prone Area Programme was started as Rural work Programme (RWP) in 
1972, Small Farmers Development Agency (SFDA), Marginal Farmers & 
Agricultural Labour Scheme (MF&AL) to the poorest of the poor. However, these 
pilot projects were then converted into complete wage-employment programmes, in 
1977 in the form of Food for Work Programme (FWP), in 1980's in the form of 
National Rural Employment Programme (NREP) and Rural Landless Employment 
Guarantee Programme (RLEGP), in 1989 Jawahar Rozgar Yojana (JRY), in 2001 
Sampooma Grameen Rozgar Yojana (SRY) were introduced.^ ^ No doubt, these wage 
employment programmes have provided some relief to the rural people but they were 
not enough in view of the high magnitude of the unemployment problem in rural 
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areas. Furthermore, the decline in the employment rate shows that these schemes have 
not succeeded in increasing employment. Moreover, these programs didn't make 
certain that employment will be available to rural households on demand, as all of 
•in 
them were allocation-based programmes. 
Due to the absence of viable employment opportunities and the burden created 
by the heavy debits resulted in mass suicides in the rural areas of India and this 
became alarming. Jeelani points out: 
... from 1997 to 2001 more than 80,000 farmers committed suicide ,the number of 
indebted fanners increased from 26 percent in 1991 (out of 575 million people dependent on 
agriculture) to 48.6percent in 2001 (600 million dependent on agriculture), 8 million quit 
farmmg altogether. 
The alarming farmer's suicides resulted in civil society campaigns to press the 
government to take measures and enact the Employment Guarantee Act. It was in this 
context that a civil society organization in Rajasthan filed Public Interest Litigation at 
the Supreme Court in mid-2001, which requested the Supreme Court to intervene by 
directing the government to provide immediate open-ended employment in the 
draught affected areas of Rajasthan and ultimately the drought relief programmes was 
launched in 2001 and 2003.The Supreme Court's favorable judgment in favor of 
Right to food in 2001 gave further impetus to the national campaign for the 
Employment Guarantee Act. Jean Dreze says, "This was also an opportunity to create 
interest in a national employment guarantee act among the leaders of various political 
parties.^ ^ The Congress Party under the leadership of Sonia Gandhi embraced the idea 
and got convinced that rural unemployment was the national issue and the 
Employment Guarantee Act could be a viable option to tackle it. Therefore, it was in 
Guwhatii session of the All India Congress Committee in May 2002, that Congress 
Party promised to enact Employment Guarantee Act if it returned to power at the 
Centre and incorporated the same in its election manifesto in 2004 Lok Sabha 
election. More importantly, the Congress believed that it would enhance the parties' 
rural appeal and would challenge the NDA's India Shining campaign.'*^ The Congress 
Party cornered the NDA's India Shining campaign with campaign for of secular and 
inclusive India. The 2004 Lok Sabha election witnessed the defeat of the BJP led 
NDA and formation of the Congress led UPA-I government at national level. The 
major sections of Indian society did not agree with the NDA's/ee/ good campaign 
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and, hence led some commentators to interpret it as revolt against urban biased and 
non-equitable economic reforms. However, the CSDS analysis on 2004 Lok Sabha 
elections partially agree with this conclusion and agreed that issues particularly 
employment had played a role in debacle of the NDA. 
Enactment of Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Act 
The Congress led UPA-I government laid down the National Conmion Minimum 
Programme (NCMP) in which employment guarantee act was pledged to be enacted, 
the text on this issues reads as, "The UPA goverrunent will immediately enact a 
National Employment Guarantee Act. This will provide a legal guarantee for at least 
100 days of employment to begin with on asset-creating public works programmes 
every year at minimum wages for at least one able-bodied person in every rural, urban 
poor and lower middle-class household. In the interim, a massive food-for-work 
progranmie will be started"."*' However, when the first draft of Employment 
Guarantee Act was prepared, it faced scathing criticism from the corporate entities, 
institutions like Plarming Commission and Ministry of Finance. The first draft of the 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) was prepared by the National 
Advisory Council (NAC) under the chairmanship of Sonia Gandhi. The draft was 
based on the previous drafts prepared by the civil society groups. The Planning 
Commission criticized the draft's, guaranteed employment clause, on the ground that 
it would make the implementation of the programme too costly; thereby a diluted 
draft was introduced in the Parliament on December 2004.'*^  After, being tabled in the 
Parliament the draft was referred to the Parliament Standing Committee on Rural 
Development. At the Standing Committee level the draft was again vehemently 
criticized particularly from Kalyan Sing of the BJP who headed the Standing 
Committee on Rural Development at that time as a result fiirther meetings on NREGA 
were delayed for the next six months.'^ '^ The civil society groups resorted to broad level 
campaign against the diluted bill and insisted on the government to revamp the 
original draft of the bill. The campaign got fiirther impetus when the NAC, the Left 
Front and some organizations supported the campaign. Ultimately, the Standing 
Committee on Rural Development accepted most of the demands of the campaigners 
and the bill was finally tabled in the Parliament on August 2005 and it was on 23 
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August 2005 that the NREGA was passed in the Lok Sabha. Jean Dreze Says, " the 
major opposition to the NREGA came from the corporate sponsored media and 
related forms and they succeeded in diluting the act in some important respects, 
inspite of its tremendous popular appeal, is a telling symptom of the elitist nature of 
the Indian democracy".'*'* 
MGNKEGA and its Implementation 
The enactment of NREGA was a historic movement in the Republic of India 
because it gave the legal guarantee of employment in rural areas to anyone who is 
willing to do unskilled manual work at statutory minimum wage. Eligible applicant 
who didn't receive work within the fifteen days of requesting it, will get the 
unemployment allowances of one fourth of the minimum wage for the first thirty days 
and one half thereafter and the liability of paying unemployment announces fall on 
the states. The Act guaranteed 100 days of unskilled wage employment to every rural 
house hold per year. The Act states that, one third of the persons whom work had to 
be allocated must be women. The Act came into force on 2 February 2006, when in 
the first phase 200 most backward districts of the country were covered. In the second 
phase, 2007-2008 an additional 130 districts were covered and it was on April 1, 2008 
that it was extended to whole India in phase third and covered the remaining 285 rural 
districts. The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act was renamed in 2 October, 
2009 as the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 
(MGNREGA).The work permissible under this Act were mainly public works in 
nature which consists of, water conservation and water harvesting, drought proofing 
which includes also afforestation and plantation, rural connectivity, flood protection, 
renovation of traditional water bodies, land development. Irrigation infrastructiire etc. 
The main purpose of the Act in permitting the above said work was to create usefiil 
and durable rural assets in rural areas and strengthen the natural base of the economy. 
The permissible works under the Act resulted in the enhancing productivity and 
regeneration of the natural resource base and moreover, strengthening its potential for 
the generating environmental benefits.'*' The Act seeks to address the immediate rural 
problems of mass deprivation and the need for the employment and liveli-hood to 
prevent the endemic hunger. The new act provides a safety net for the poor rural 
households by providing fall back employment sources when other employment 
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alternatives are scarce and not enough.''^  The Act strengthened the process of 
decentralization by giving the local governance bodies like Panchayat, a role in the 
planning, implementation and monitoring of the programme. 
The MGNREGA brought rural revolution in the sense that most of the vulnerable 
sections of Indian society overwhelmingly, participated in it and this resulted in 
enhancement of their capability. Amratya Sena says, "NREGA reaches out to the 
people and gives them income. It is an enhancer of capability. It enhances their self-
respect and participation in life and community".''^  Furthermore, one important 
characteristics of this programme is that it is more socially inclusive in the sense that 
it disproportionately involves women, SCs, and STs workers. The MGNREGA is the 
world's largest wage earning programme and some of the important achievements of 
the programme since its inceptions are as under.'' 
a) During the first years of its implementation (2006-2007, which covered 200 
districts) 2.10 crore households were employed and 90.5 crore person-days of 
employment were generated. In the second phase (2007-2008, which covered 
the additional 135 districts) 3.39 crore were households employed and 143.59 
crore person-days of employment were generated. In the final phase (2008-
2009, covered the whole rural districts of India), 4.51 crore households were 
employed and 216.32 crore person- days of employment were generated. In 
2012-2013, 4.98 crore household were employed and 229.86 person-days of 
employment were generated. 
b) Out of the total expenditure on MGNREGA, major proportion was spent on the 
wages. In 2006-2007 total expenditure under MGNREGA was 8823.35 crore 
and out of which the total wage expenditure was 5842.37 crore (that is 66 
percent out of the total expenditure of MGNREGA), in 2007-2008 total 
expenditure under MGNREGA was 15856.89 crore and out of which 
expenditure on wages was 10738.47 crore (that is 68 percent out of the total 
expenditure on MGNREGA), in 2008-2009 financial year total expenditure 
under MGNREGA was 27250.10 crore out of which 18200.03 crore were total 
expenditure on wages (that is 67 percent were form the wage expenditure out 
of the total expenditure under MGNREGA). In the financial year 2012-2013 
total expenditure on MGNREGA was 39657.04 crore out of which 27128.36 
crore was wage expenditure (that is 72 percent out of the total expenditure 
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under MGNREGA). The main aim of the programme was to provide wage 
employment so that livelihood resources base of the rural poor would be 
strengthened. 
c) Out of the total person-days of employment generated the participation of 
SCs, STs and women's is major. In 2006-2007 SCs and STs participation was 
61percent and women's participation was 40 percent, in 2007-2008 SCs and 
STs participation was 56 percent and women's participation was 43 percent, in 
2008-2009 SCs and STs participation was 54 percent and women's 
participation was 48 percent, and in 2012-2013 the participation of SCs and 
STs was 30 percent and the women's participation was 51 percent. 
d) A lot of public works were taken under this programme and completed, in 
2006-07 total works taken was 8.3 lakhs out of which 3.87 works were 
completed in the same year, in 2007-2008 total works taken was 17.88 lakhs 
and out of which 8.22 lakhs works were completed, in 2008-2009 total works 
taken was 27.75 lakh out of whichl2.14 lakhs was completed, and in 2012-
2013 total works takenl06.51 lakhs and out of which 25.60 was completed. 
The Act had far reaching socio-economic and political significance. The Act 
protects the rural poor households from the poverty and hvmger when other alternative 
work is not available, it slowdowns the migration to urban areas, empowers the 
marginalized sections of the society particularly SCs, STs, and womens. It 
strengthened the rural infrastructure; revitalize the local governing institutions like 
Panchayat by giving them space in the plaiming, implementation and monitoring of 
the programme. Moreover, the programme had strengthened the bargaining power of 
the unorganized workers. Despite the positive impact of the programme in the rural 
areas it also had uneven record of implementation and wide spread irregularities were 
found. The Comptroller and Auditor General of India (C AG) found that (it reported 
the implementation of the programme fi:om 2007-2012) the monitoring of the 
programme by the Centre was not satisfactory. According to its reports, only 30 per 
cent of 129 lakh works worth over Rs 126,000 crores approved in 14 states was 
completed, 95 lakh cases of wrong wage calculations found in 18 States, 1.1 lakh 
cases of wrong bill amounts for the purchased materials imder the scheme were found, 
14,764 duplicate job cards found in Ranchi district of Jharkhand alone, 37229 workers 
not paid unemployment allowance in two districts of Assam, 2016 ghost workers 
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found in two Panchayat of Assam(workers who exist only on paper), in many States 
like Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Haryana had not maintained work inspection 
records, 18 to 54 percent of the Gram Panchayat checked showed irregular NREGA 
records/" 
The MGNREGA had ensured the liveli-hood security to the poor rural households 
but the farm suicides of the farmers during the UPA-I government continued, and in 
order to supplement the rational of the MGNREGA, the Loan Wavier scheme was 
annoimced by the UPA-I government. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh 
acknowledged that besides liveli-hood problem the acute distress of the farmers is due 
to the burden of heavy debts.^' The UPA-I government in 2008 budget announced the 
relief package of 60,000 crores to indebted farmers. It was the UPA-I government 
biggest election soap and it had in fact impacted the rural electorate in particular 
during the 2009 Lok Sabha election. The wavier loans was supposed to benefit 3.50 
crores small and marginal farmers. However, an audit was conducted by CAG from 
April 2011 to March 2012 which covered 25 states. Accounts of 90,576 farmers were 
audited' in 715 branches of banks, in 92 districts. The CAG made shocking 
revelations like, 13.46 percent accounts were of those farmers, who were eligible but 
declared disqualified by the lending institutions, 6 percent of the checked accounts did 
not get their rightful benefits, 8.62 percent accounts checked were not eligible but still 
got either complete waiver of debt relief, more than 34 percent farmers were not 
issued debt waiver certificates, thereby declared them ineligible for fixture loans. 
The pro-poor tilt of the UPA-I government paid large electoral dividends to it 
in general and Congress Party in particular during the 2009 Lok Sabha election. The 
UPA-I government in order to reap benefits of the NREGA renamed it as 
MGNREGA, to stop the states from claiming the scheme as their own.^ ^ It largely 
resurrected the credentials of the Congress as pro-poor Party. A study conducted by 
the Centre for the Study of Developing societies (National Election Study) confirmed 
that the beneficiaries of the schemes were more likely than non-beneficiaries to vote 
for the Congress. The pro-poor policies, such as MGNREGA and Loan Wavier scheme 
gave the Congress a significant electoral advantage, particularly vis-a- vis the BJP.^ "* 
But the study did not specify how many seats the Congress and its allies got because 
of the various poverty initiatives, however, Yogendar Yadav says, "In a close race, 
advantage of three percent among voters in lower and poor categories can be a 
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decisive factor in increasing the proportion of seats and same happened as the 
Congress and its allies increased it seats in 2009 Lok sabha elections".^ ^ The demand 
of Congress General Secretary Rahul Gandhi, to extend the scheme for the whole 
rural districts proved to be game changer because it created a good feeling overall 
and persuaded the rural voters that the UPA-I government is committed to its 
promise of providing them the viable livelihood.'^  
Reservation for the OBCs in Higher Education 
The reservation system as an affirmative policy in Indian context was initiated 
to address the long established social inequalities and social exclusion. Initially, when 
the Constitution was in making reservation was limited to a limited section of Indian 
society. The Constituent Assembly evolved consensus on granting reservation to SCs 
and STs only because these groups in the past had been subjected to extreme 
discrimination and exclusion, and the members of the Constituent Assembly agreed 
that only through instrument of reservation their social advancement can be possible. 
On the contrary there was no unanimous consensus on granting reservation to the 
OBCs. However, in the Constitution an Article was incorporated i.e. Article 340, 
under which state was empowered to set up a commission to investigate the condition 
of socially and educationally backward classes'. It was in this context that first 
Backward Classes Commission was set up in 1953 imder the chairmanship of Kaka 
Kalelkar to investigate the possibility of giving reservation to the OBCs. The 
Commission after a hard-work submitted it report in 1955 and recommended 
reservation for the Backward Classes in the government services. It recommended 25 
percent reservation for the Backward Classes in Class I posts, 33.2 percent in the 
Class II posts, and 40 percent in Class III and IV posts. Moreover, it also 
recommended reserving 70 percent seats in all technical and professional institutions 
for the qualified students fi-om Backward Classes.'^  Despite this the report was fiill 
with dissent voices of the majority of members on different grounds and was even 
strongly opposed by its Chairman, Kaka Kalelkar, who expressed the fear that its 
implementation would encourage casteist tension.'^  Furthermore, the Ministry of 
Home Affairs vehemently criticised the Commission's selection of criteria and 
conclusion.'^ The Central government argued that Commission had given too much 
importance to caste compared to the other socio- economic indicators and this will 
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perpetuate the social division and the reservation will hinder the efficiency in the 
administration. Thus the Central government did not proceed further on the report 
however; the Central government allowed the state government to go ahead to 
develop their own list of the Backward Classes' and fix their own quotas for the 
reservation, still it expressed a preference for reservations on economic status rather 
than caste. But most of the states in determining the backwardness gave emphasis to 
caste criteria. Christopher Jafferlot remarks: 
The argument of merit - and its corollary, that of efficiency that flows from 
competence - reflected the aspirations of independent India's leaders, but also the 
dread of the upper castes (to which these leaders all belonged) of seeing the OBCs 
gain more jobs in the civil service, considered by the educated elites as their private 
reserve.^ ' 
No doubt, the Kaka Kalelkar report was rejected by the Central goverrunent, 
but allowing the state government to go ahead with their schemes and methods to 
address concerns of the OBCs was the major breakthrough which strengthened OBCs 
cause at central level. By allowing reservation to the OBCs at state level by giving 
emphasis to caste criteria set in motion a process of mobilisation by the Backward 
Classes for recognition of caste as criteria for backwardness at the central level. More, 
importantly the demand of Backward Classes to give primacy to caste over the 
economic criteria for the reservation at the central level got political support of the 
Socialist Party of India which devoted itself for this end, and in this context passed a 
resolution in 1959 favouring reservation of 60 percent in civil service jobs for the 
OBCs.The Socialists Party could not promote the idea as long as the Congress Party 
was in power at the Centre, but once it assumed the power at the Centre in 1977 
through Janta Party, they took initiative to extend reservation to the OBCs.^ ^ In this 
context the Janta government constituted Second Backward Classes Commission 
under the Chairmanship of B.P Mandal in 1978 and the Commission submitted it 
report in 1983 during the Congress's rule. The Commission identified 3743 caste 
groups as the OBCs which comprised 52 percent of the population, and recommended 
that 27 percent reservation for the OBCs in public services and scientific, technical 
and professional institutions run by the Central and State governments.^ ^ The 
Commission's report was vehemently criticised on the ground that it gave more 
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importance to caste criteria than to other socio-economic criterias adopted in defining 
backwardness. Zoya Hassan said: 
The Mandal Commission, ftilly embraced caste as defining criteria for backwardness. 
Its report marked a watershed in redefining the official discourse, which had from the time of 
Kalelkar's dissent note sought to emphasize economic backwardness as important factor for 
decision with regard to social and educational backwardness. Disregarding the Kalelker 
Commission's approach, the Mandal Commission chartered its approach on the lines adopted 
by State Commissions which had defined backwardness in caste terms rather than socio-
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economic terms. 
The Congress Party under Indira Gandhi and then under Rajiv Gandhi did not 
take any initiative to implement the report due to its ovm political compulsions. 
Implementation of Mandal Commission Recommendations in Government Jobs 
(Mandal-I) 
No doubt, reservation for the OBCs was delayed for a long time but it never 
died and thanks to electoral competition it again cropped in 1989 election when it 
featured in Janta Dai's election manifesto. The 1989 Lok Sabha election witnessed 
defeat of the Congress Party and formation of National Front govemment.^^National 
Front being a coalition government witnessed from the very beginning personal 
clashes between Deputy Prime Minster Devi Lai and Prime Minster V.P Sing. The 
internal fighting within the Janta Dal reached to its climax when V.P Singh expelled 
Devi. Lai firom Union Cabinet and the later decided to organise the peasants rally to 
show the former its strength. To counter the Devi Lai's threat V.P Singh decided to 
implement the recommendations of Mandal Commission, to grant 27 percent 
reservation to the OBCs in the government Jobs. The decision to implement Mandal 
Commissions' recommendations pitted the caste against the caste in the name of 
social justice. The sudden decision of V.P Sing to implement the recommendations 
put the national political parties particularly the Congress, the BJP and the Left Parties 
in dilemma, neither had they openly supported it nor did they oppose it. They took the 
middle path supporting the reservation with certain modification to the policy 
particularly stressed the importance of the economic factor in reservations. The 
government implemented the decision of giving 27 percent reservation to OBCs in 
Central government jobs and it was done through executive order. However, its 
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implementation was challenged in the in the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney v 
Union of India case, and the Supreme Court in a majority decision uphold the 27 
percent reservation for the OBCs subjected to the exclusion of creamy layer from the 
notified backward classes'. Moreover, the Apex Court rejected the quota proposal for 
the economically backward people.^ * Zoya Hassan remarks: 
By validating caste as criteria by which to identify OBCs, the courts verdict In the 
Indra Sawhney v. Union of India case put an end to thirty years of jurisprudence founded on 
the Balaji v. the State of Mysore case decision. Silencing critics who said that caste could not 
be the basis of for reservation. 
Implementation of Mandal Commission's recommendation Related to Higher 
Education (Mandal II) 
The Mandal Conamission's recommendations were partially implemented and 
the successive governments avoided the issue to extend reservation for the OBCs in 
Central Educational Institutions. It was in 2004 that UPA-I government in NCMP 
mentioned it though indirectly. On reservation in higher education to OBCs, the text 
of NCMP reads as, "to provide for full equality of opportunity, particularly in 
education and employment for scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, OBCs and religious 
minorities". Owing to the constant political lobbying by the OBC groups and United 
Progressive Alliance's own political calculations in general and Congress's in 
particular of regaining backward class constituencies, the issue of reservation in 
higher education institutions was taken up in the Lok Sabha in the form of 93^** 
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Constitution Amendment Act. The Act extended reservation of 27 percent of seats 
in elite educational institutions such as Indian Institute of Technologies and Indian 
Institute of Management for the OBCs. The 93'^ '' Amendment to the Constitution came 
in response to the Supreme Court's judgement in P. A. Inamdar v. State of 
Maharashtra case in which the Supreme Court declared reservation in private unaided, 
educational institutions as unconstitutional. This judgement was followed by a strong 
demand from the political class for a suitable amendment to the Constitution and 
a legislation in order to protect reservation for the SCs, STs, and Backward Classes' 
in the education institutions.*^ The 93*^^ Amendment to the Constitution was important 
as it enabled the government to introduce the Central Educational Institutions 
(Reservation in Admission) Bill, 2006. The Bill covers Central universities, 
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institutions of national importance set by Parliament and institutions directly or 
indirectly aided by the Central government or linked to the Central universities or 
centrally created. It excluded the private unaided institutions and Minority educational 
institutions7°However, this move resulted in an organised agitation which was led by 
legal luminaries and open groups like Youth for the Equality. It was joined by the 
students from the All India institute from Medical science, students from the premier 
medical colleges and from the IITs and IIMs.This agitation was also supported by the 
Industrialists, trader chambers, professional associations, certain intellectual and 
academicians. These groups believed in the merit theory and held that the caste based 
hiring will kill efficiency and weaken the competitiveness and further argued, that 
caste based reservation doesn't work in the today's knowledge economy.'" On the 
other hand the protagonists of reservation refuted the argument put forward by the 
merit theorists and held that upper castes are not bom with merit and intelligence. 
There is nothing like gene theory to support the inborn intelligence argument of upper 
castes. The educational backwardness of the OBCs is mainly because of their social 
and economic conditions. The poor schooling, economic conditions and the social 
surroimding in which they grow up don't promote adequate educational capability 
to compete with the better-educated children of the upper castes.^ ^ Moreover, the 
National Knowledge Commission vehemently criticised the government's policy of 
granting OBCs reservation in higher educations. The real embarrassment for the 
government was that when two members of the National Knowledge Commission, 
Pratap Bahnu Mehta and Andre Beteille resigned from their posts, and protested 
against the quotas in Central Educational Institutions. Pratap Bahnu Mehta said, 
"Every student must be enabled to realise their full potential regardless of financial or 
social circumstances. Achieving this aim requires radical forms of affirmative action. 
But the numerically mandated quotas that government is proposing are deeply 
disappointing".^ ^ 
As mentioned above the Congress Party during Indira Gandhi's era and then 
during Rajiv Gandhi's era had remained indifferent towards the OBC reservation 
which resulted in cultivating distrust in the backward castes towards the Congress 
Party. The backward castes view the Congress Party as the upper caste friendly and 
tumed away from it since 1989 Lok Sabha election. The Congress Party in order to 
remove this distrust played the quota gamble to wean away the OBCs from the 
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regional and state based political parties which over the years had garnered the OBC 
support. However, the Congress top leadership did not support it openly because they 
were aware that such a move if supported openly will result in alienation of the upper 
castes. It could also hardly afford to disown the reservation issue on the other hand.^ '* 
Therefore, the Congress Party which was leading the UPA-I government set up an 
Oversight Committee to suggest ways to accommodate the OBCs students without 
harming the interests of the general category students. The Committee submitted its 
report which was more balancing; it assured the agitating students that the OBC quota 
in the education institutions would not eat into the number of seats available for the 
general categories. It was assured that the number of seats in the higher educational 
institutions would be increased so that OBC quota would be accommodated without 
affecting the others. The report had taken into consideration Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh's concern who said to his colleagues, "not to do anything that will 
destroy the country's knowledge strength". The final decision take related to the OBC 
reservation were as following. ^  
a) There should be no dilution in the existing seats and opportunities available in 
the 'non reserved categories'. 
b) The extension of the 27 percent reservation for the OBCs should be staggered 
to ensure that the requisite infrastructure was in place, and 
c) Certain institutions of national/strategic importance were kept out of the 
reservation regime. 
From the above it was clear that Congress Party struck a right balance between 
competing demands of the OBCs and the upper castes. However, this strategy did not 
satisfy the agitating students. Despite this the Lok Sabha unanimously passed Central 
Educational Institutions (Reservation in Admission) Bill, 2006 on 14* December 
2006 and it received the assent of the President on, 3^^ January 2007. The Act cleared 
the way for the reservation in admission to the SCs, STs and Other Backward 
Classes of citizens, to certain Central Educational Institutions which were set up, 
maintained or aided by the Central Government. However, the provisions of the Act 
could not apply to Central Institutions established in the tribal areas referred in the 
Sixth Scheduled to the Constitution, institutions of excellence, research institutions, 
institutions of national and strategic importance specified in the scheduled of the Act 
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and finally the Minority Educational Institutions^^The bill was supported by the 
entire political class and only the BJP opposed the provision on exclusion of 
Minority Educational Institutions. 
The UPA-I government could not implement the Act as the Supreme Court 
stayed it by an interim order when the petitioners in the Ashoka Thakur v. Union of 
Indian challenged the Central Educational Institutions (Reservation in Admission) 
Act, 2006 on the ground that the Act and the 93"^ ^ Constitution Amendment Act 
violated their fimdamental right to equality7^ It was on April 10, 2008 that a five-
judge Constitution bench headed by Chief Justice K.G Balakrishnan, ruled that the 
Central Educational Institutions (Reservation in Admission) Act, 2006 doesn't 
violate the basic structure of the Constitution, thereby, paving the way for its 
implementation. The bench also ruled that the 93'"'' Constitution Amendment Act 
2005, which enabled the state to provide 27 percent reservation in aided institutions 
didn't violate the basic structure of the Constitution.^ ^The judgement was the victory 
for the UPA-I government, however, the real embrassement for the government was 
that when it was directed by the Apex Court to issue notification excluding creamy 
layer jfrom the OBC beneficiaries'. The Oversight Committee also draws the attention 
of the government before the Apex Court's ruling on exclusion oi creamy layer. But 
the UPA-I government couldn't evolve consensus on the issue as the some of its 
constituents particularly RJD, DMK and PMK opposed the proposal of excluding 
creamy layer from the reservation benefits. The Supreme Court's decision was 
interpreted by the political parties in different ways. Lalu Prasad of RJD argued that 
the implementation of the Supreme Court's suggestions could defeat the very 
purpose of OBC reservation. Sharad Yadav, leader of Janta Dal argued that 
excluding the so-called creamy layer was unwarranted because reservation was 
meant to address social and educational backwardness, not economic 
backwardness.'^  R. Nallakannu, leader of CPI said that creamy layer concept was 
only a ploy to deprive the backward conmiunities.^ '' CPI (M) welcomed the decision 
because the party had consistently argued for the exclusion of creamy layer firom the 
reservation benefits. In short, the supporters of reservation argued that the move to 
exclude creamy layer from the reservation benefits will defeat the very purpose of 
the bill, because the opportunities of higher education are only availed by creamy 
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layer in every group. By disqualifying those most likely to succeed in elite 
institutions, will defeat the very purpose of the proposed law. '^ 
The Supreme Court's decision was welcome step because it ensured that the 
benefits of the reservation will be availed by the least advantaged in the OBCs 
because it was the privileged groups which had benefited from the reservation 
system mostly. The same was corroborated by the Parliamentary Standing 
Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice in its eighth report on 
the SCs, STs and Other Backward Classes' (Reservation in post and services) Bill, 
2004.The Committee pointed out that many castes, races and tribes among the SCs, 
STs and OBCs had been deprived from the benefits of reservation in services or jobs 
and only creamy layer had benefited from it.^ ^ A number of academicians and 
analysts saw the judgement as cautious and conservative and held that the Apex 
Court missed another opportunity to settle the quota controversy. Moreover, they 
held that the judgement of the Apex Court nearly confirms to the Mandal I (Indra 
Sawhney vs. Union of India).They fiirther, argued that the judgement had once again 
repeated the importance of caste in determining the backwardness and once again 
ruled to exclude the creamy layer from the reservation benefits. Therefore, we can 
say that the Apex Court in Ashok Kumar Thakur v. Union of India (Mandal II) case 
repeated the Judgement which the Apex Court had given in the Indra Sawhney vs. 
Union of India case in 1993 (Mandal I). 
Conclusion 
Political parties enter into coalition governments with three principle 
interests: to win office for their members, influence policy agendas that serve 
their constituencies or secure votes in order to achieve the preceding two 
objectives. The UPA-I government was led by the Congress Party which was once a 
dominant party in the Indian electoral process. But with the passage of time the 
Congress Party lost its hegemony and most of its social constituency turned away 
from it and this became more rapid since 1989. After 2004 Lok Sabha elections 
through coalition government the Congress Party got a chance to check its decline by 
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initiating such programmes which satisfy it's once core social support base. The 
policies on Minority Development, Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) and 
the Reservation for OBCs in Higher Education were targeted for the same purpose. 
These policies reflected the Congress's effort to focus progranames on lower sections 
of the society in order to regain the support of these sections which were once the 
Congress's principal constituency. 
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After India's independence, Indian foreign policy was structured in an 
environment of racialism, imperialism, bipolar world and wide spread proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction. The leaders of Indian Republic particularly Jawaharlal 
Nehru, adopted a policy of anti-imperialism, anti-racism, non-alignment, and 
eloquently supported the cause of non proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
Therefore, India adopted a foreign policy, defined by Nehru as Non-aligned was 
based on the five principles of Panchsheel i.e. mutual respect for other nation's 
territorial integrity and sovereignty, non aggression, non-interference in internal 
affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. 
With the breakdown of USSR and collapse of its economic system, and 
emergence of unipolar world dominated by US in 1990 brought drastic changes in the 
inter-state relations and compelled the states to redefine their foreign policy according 
to the new environment. India's foreign policy in 1990 was beset with both internal 
and external problems. Internally, India entered into an era of unstable coalition 
government, and its economy was in the state of crisis. Externally due to break down 
of USSR put India on the back foot because it lost its external source of strength to its 
foreign policy. Both factors resulted in sacrifice of the non-alignment ideology which 
India adhered during the cold war era. Therefore, after the collapse of USSR—one of 
India's largest trading partner and primary security partner—it (India) began to 
reassess its priorities, and opportunities emerged for greater cooperation with USA. 
Therefore, India reformed its foreign policy and put economy in the centre stage of its 
foreign policy. The geo-economic concerns had taken precedence over the geo-
strategic and geo-political concerns of the state. Though India had opened its market 
for the external capitals but its internal security concern due to China- Pakistan axis, 
and playing a role in the world politics remained intact. The foreign policy of India 
witnessed fundamental shift in the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition 
government and the foreign policy became more assertive due to good state of Indian 
economy. During the NDA era the foreign policy of India became more realistic and 
distanced itself from the Non-alignment principle set by the Nehru. But in 2004 Lok 
Sabha elections NDA lost power and Congress formed the coalition government. The 
UPA-I government laid down the National Common Minimum Programme (NCMP) 
in which various issues related to foreign policy were discussed. The NCMP was 
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formulated after discussion with the coaUtion partners even before the formation of 
the coahtion government. The main objective was to evolve consensus on different 
critical issues pertinent to foreign policy. The NCMP set forth the foreign policy 
priorities of the new government. Some of the highlights of NCMP related to foreign 
policy of the UPA-I government were as following;^  
(a) The government would pursue an independent foreign policy keeping in view its 
traditional ethos and strive for the multi-polarity and oppose the unilateralism. 
(b) The government would give priority in building closer political, economic and 
other ties with South Asian neighbours and to strengthen the SAARC. Particular 
emphasis will be paid to regional projects in areas of water, power, and ecology 
conservation. 
(c) The government would pursue dialogue with Pakistan and emphasises to engage 
with it in systematic and in a sustained way. It would also engage with China by 
expanding trade, investment, and for the settlement of the border issues talks would 
be pursued seriously 
(d) The government would also support the peace talks in the Sri-Lanka that fulfil the 
legitimate aspirations of Tamils and religious minorities. 
(e) The government would engage with Bangladesh to resolve issues and talks with 
Nepal on water issue would be initiated. 
(f) The government would intensify relations with East Asia. 
(g) The government would inculcate fresh trust in its relation vdth West Asia and 
continue to support the creation of Palestine homeland. 
(h) The government would pursue closer relation and engagement with USA, but 
maintains India's independence on regional and global issues, and deepen its ties with 
Russia and Europe. 
(i) The government would protect the Indian interests, in respect of farmers, industry 
and intellectual property, and also protect the interests of the developing countries in 
the world institutions like WTO. 
The foreign policy priorities set in the NCMP became the fi-amework for the 
new government and which the new government pledged to uphold while conducting 
its foreign relations. In practice the new government gave more emphasis on relations 
with USA, Pakistan and China. It would be difficult to deal with whole foreign policy 
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of the UPA-I government. Therefore, the focus of this chapter will be to examine 
UPA-I government's relation with the USA, China and Pakistan. 
India's relation with the USA during UPA-I 
The Indo-US strategic partnership had its roots in the rapprochement policy 
adopted by NDA government after conducting nuclear test at Pokhran in Rajasthan in 
1998. Stephen Cohen and C. Raj Mohan argued, that the testing of nuclear weapons 
proved blessing in disguise for India because it resulted in taking India seriously by 
the United States.'* The geo-strategic and geo-economic importance of India was very 
much in tone with the national interests of United States. The nuclear test gave new 
orientation to Indo-US relations and gave pace to build strategic dialogue between the 
two nations. The formal round of dialogue between then External Affairs Minister of 
India Jaswant Singh and then US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot, after the 
nuclear tests resulted in resolving the bilateral differences over India's nuclear 
weapon programme and build up the means to manage those differences that could 
not be resolved.^  Besides the differences over non-proliferation, the attitude of US 
towards the Kashmir dispute was also major irritant between the two nations. But the 
Kargil conflict and the role played by the US in diffiising the tension and its tilt 
towards India resulted in building the new trust. The relations between the two nations 
got fiirther impetus when President Clinton visited India in 2000. Both Bill Clinton 
and A.B. Vajpayee agreed to institutionalise the dialogue process so as to pursue new 
relationships. During his visit both sides agreed that the relationship between the two 
nations could be important factor in shaping international peace, prosperity and 
democratic freedom, and for ensuring strategic stability in Asia and beyond.^ The 
relations between the nations got fiirther strengthened during the George W. Bush era. 
The President George W. Bush paid more attention in building partnership in South 
Asia and enlarging the trade and investment ties with India. What bring both the 
nations close to each other was the convergence of interests like countering the 
Terrorism, managing nuclear proliferation and containing the China. ^  But most 
significantly the 9/11 attack brought both nations close to each other on the issue of 
terrorism and India offered its full support to US against war on terror. All this 
culminated in signing the Next step in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) under which both 
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nations decided to expand cooperation in the fields of civil nuclear technology, space 
exploration, missile defence and high technology trade. 
The change in government in New Delhi in 2004 did not result in any 
fundamental change in the approach towards United States. The UPA-I government in 
the NCMP had in fact pledged to work for the closer relation and engagement with 
the US. For the first time Indian Prime Minster Dr. Marmiohan Singh met US 
President George W. Bush on the side lines of UN General Assembly meeting in 
September 2004. Both leaders praised the implementation of phase-I of the NSSP and 
termed this as beginning of new era of cooperation and trust between the two nations. 
Both leaders shared their global concern and threat to world peace due to terrorism 
and proliferation of Weapon of Mass Destruction and recognised the importance to 
work together on these issues. The major friction in relation between the two 
countries came when India for its growing energy requirements proposed the Iran, 
Pakistan, India gas pipe line project so as to cater its energy requirements. The United 
States was not happy with this decision and same got reflected when US ambassador 
to India David Malford, showed his dissent on the proposed gas pipeline on second 
week of March, 2005.* The major shift in relations between the two coimtries took 
place when the US secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, visited India on March 2005. 
She reiterated the earlier stand of the US on the proposed Iran, Pakistan, and India gas 
pipe line and offered a"broader energy dialogue" with India so as to cater the energy 
demand of Indian economy.^  Therefore, the visit of Condoleezza Rice's was the first 
step to enlarge the scope of the NSSP which also included the civil nuclear 
cooperation. The process to boost the strategic partnership between the United States 
and India got fiirther impetus when Indian Defence Minister Pranab Mukerjee, inked 
an agreement titled as. New Frame work for US- India Defence Relationship for ten 
years on June 28, 2005. Both sides also agreed to constitute a new Defence 
Procurement and Defence Production Group under the US-India Policy Group. Some 
of the highlights of the new defence deal were as following:'" 
(a) To carry out exchanges on defence strategy and defence transformation. 
(b) To augment the flow of intelligence information. 
(c) To intensify security consultations between the two sides. 
(d) To Inflate the defence trade between India and the US. 
I l l 
(e) To raise the prospect for technology transfer, cooperation, co-production, and 
research and development. 
(f) To broaden the missile defence collaboration. 
(g) To carry out joint and mutual exercises and ex-changes. 
(h) To reinforce the military competence so as to ensure security and combat 
terrorism. 
(i) To augment the proficiency to deal with proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. 
(j) To fortify the response of the militaries of the two coimtries to the disaster 
situations. 
(k) To work together in multinational operations when it is in their common interest. 
The New Defence Frame Work was important mile stone in the Indo-US 
relations particularly in defence field because it was based on pragmatism to deal with 
existing political realities and threats. It replaced the mutual distrust that had 
dominated the Indo-US relations and replaced it with active agenda for military 
cooperation." The New Frame work for US-India Defence Relationship, was harshly 
criticised by the Left Front which was supporting the UPA-I government from 
outside. Prakash Karat, said ".. .the agreement ties India to the strategic goal of United 
States in the region. The primary strategic goal is to isolate china". But in order to 
build more confidence in the bilateral relations the Indian Parliament passed the 
legislation related to Weapons of Mass Destruction. It was widely believed to be done 
under the US pressure. These developments paved the way for Indo-US civil nuclear 
cooperation. The major breakthrough in the relations between the two countries came 
when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited the United States in July 2005.It was 
on is'*' July, 2005 in a joint statement both leaders affirm to work together on wide 
range of issues but most important among them was the nuclear energy component. 
According to the joint statement. Bush administrations in this respect pledged to 
undertake following steps so as to facilitate the civil nuclear cooperation between the 
two nations. Some of them were as under.'^ 
(a) It will seek agreement from the Congress to adjust US laws and policies to achieve 
full civil nuclear cooperation. 
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(b) It also pledged to work with friends and allies to adjust the international regime to 
enable full civil nuclear cooperation and trade with India. 
(c) It will also encourage its partners to think about fuel supply to Tarapur 
expeditiously. 
(c) It will also consider India's aspiration to participate in ITER and for this it will 
consult other participants in the generation of IV international forum for India's 
inclusion. 
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh reciprocally accepted the following 
conditions: 
(a) India will separate the civilian and military facilities and programmes in phased 
manner and place its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. 
(b) India also agreed to adhere additional Protocols with respect to civilian nuclear 
facilities. 
(c) India also agreed to continue its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. 
(d) India also agreed to work with US for the conclusion of FMCT. 
(e) India will also refrain from transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies 
to states that don't have them and will support international efforts to limit their 
spread. 
The nuclear deal was the major breakthrough in the Indo-US relations. In the 
joint statement US acknowledged India as defacto nuclear state and should get the 
same benefits as other nuclear weapon state. This was the diplomatic victory for India 
because it was the first step in ending the 34 years of nuclear isolation. The Indo-US 
civil nuclear cooperation gave further impetus to the Indo-US strategic partnership. 
The strategic thinkers around the world defined the joint statement from strategic 
perspective and held that the US wants to counter ascend of China and for that India 
was the best choice. However, the major objective of US in civil nuclear cooperation 
was to get the economic benefit from the deal and same was ascertained by 
Condoleezza Rice, in her statement before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee 
where she said: 
The deal will allow US to participate in the India's nuclear market and will made 
American nuclear industry globally competitive, thereby benefit our domestic nuclear sector. 
The deal will permit US companies to enter the profitable and upward Indian markets. 
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The major criticism to the Indo-US nuclear cooperation came from the proponents of 
non-proliferation in US who were called Ayatollahs of Non-proliferation. The Non-
proliferation proponents condemn the Indo-US nuclear cooperation on the ground that 
it will compromise the US commitment to global nuclear Non-proliferation and will 
give green signal to the states which were engaging in the nuclear weapon building. 
During the NDA era the discourse on strategic autonomy was the major 
concern of the Indian foreign policy establishment, which stresses on the autonomy of 
Indian foreign policy in decision making and the use of the strategic military assets. 
The first test to autonomy of Indian foreign policy came during the September and 
November 2005 when India voted with US against Iran at IAEA. Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh defended the decision of government and said: 
...that Indian stance was clear that Iran should adhere to its commitments as a signatory to 
the NPT. India could not afford another nuclear power in her neighbourhood and the decision 
was in tone with the national interests and not a gesture to US.'* 
This was widely believed at that time that the decision was taken with an 
intention to appease the US and not to imperil the armounced nuclear civil energy 
cooperation and same was ascertained by Sham Saran in an interview to IBN news in 
2009, that UPA-I government took the decision under US pressure. The UPA-I 
government decision to vote against Iran was, a significant move away from the past 
tradhion of India which believed in the non-aligmnent and independent foreign 
policy. 
The dramatic shift in the relation between the two countries came after India 
integrated its economy with the world market. The closer relations with US were 
favoured by the middle class professional, corporate entities, business groups. These 
groups saw greater benefits in closer relations between the two nations and the same 
was found by the Pew Research Foundation. The Foundation conducted a survey in 
16 countries and found that among the 16 countries India ranked first in which 71 
percent of the middle class favoured closer relations US.'^ These groups had lobbied 
and hence influenced the policies of the Indian government. This was not only true 
about India; in the US the Indian lobbies like US-India Political Action Committee, 
US-India Friendship Council and US-India Business Council had lobbied for the 
Indo-US nuclear deal.'^ 
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The bilateral relations between the two nations got further impetus when the 
President of the USA George W. Bush visited India in the first week of March, 2006. 
In his address on S''' March President Bush, pointed out that India and US were the 
natural partners and the partnership between them had the capacity to change the 
world. With respect to the nuclear cooperation both leaders expressed satisfaction on 
the successful conclusion of the discussion on India's plan to separate the civil 
nuclear programme from its military programme. Some of the important highlights of 
the Separation Plan were as following:^ " 
(a) India agreed to identify and put forward 14 of its thermal power reactors for 
safeguards between 2006-2014.This also included the already safeguarded reactors 
like TAPS 1 and 2, RAPS 1 and 2. India also agreed to place the other Pressurised 
Heavy Water Reactors with a capacity of 220 MWe under the safeguards. 
(b) India also agreed to put in future all civilian thermal power reactors and civilian 
breeder reactors and reserved the right to decide such reactors as civilian. 
(c) India did not agree in to place Proto type Fast Breeder Reactors and the Fast 
Breeder Test Reactor situated in Kalpakkam under safeguards. The government 
argued that the Fast Breeder Reactor Programme were at R and D stage and will take 
time to reach advanced stage of the development. 
(d) India agreed to permanently shut down CIRUS reactor, in 2010 and also agreed to 
shift the fuel-core of the APSARA reactor to outside of the Bahaba Atomic Research 
Centre and put that under safeguards in 2010. 
The separation plan also included the following assurances from the US with regard 
to fuel supply to India. 
(a) A clause of assurances with regard to fuel supply was incorporated into the Indo-
US bilateral agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which was to be submitted 
to the US Congress. 
(b) US also agreed to assist India in negotiating India specific fuel supply agreement 
with IAEA. 
(c) US also agreed to assist India to build up its strategic reserves of nuclear fuel. 
(d) US also agreed that if the disruption of fuel supplies occur despite the above 
measures US and India will work with other friendly nuclear supplier groups to 
restore fiiel supply to India. 
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The Separation Plan of the government also had to phase scathing criticism from 
the both opposition and the Left Front which was supporting the government from 
outside. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, in order to satisfy and eradicate the 
apprehension of the Left Front and the opposition party on the Indo-US nuclear deal 
in general and on Separation plan in particular addressed them in its suo-motu 
statement on March 7, 2006. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said: 
...the Separation Plan will not restrict the strategic programme of India and there will be no 
inadequacy of fissile material and other inputs for the strategic programme needs... the 
integrity to India's nuclear doctrine and its ability to sustain Minimum Credible Nuclear 
deterrent is adequately protected. '^ 
However, the criticism of the opposition and the Left Front to the govenmient 
became more lethal when the US Congress passed the Henry J, Hyde Act in 
December 2006. The Hyde Act laid down certain crippling conditions on concluding 
the 123 agreement. Some of them were as foUowing;^ ^ 
(a) In case India went to nuclear test, the cooperation would be ended (of course US 
will consider if the test was done under exceptional circumstances), 
b) The end of cooperation would be followed by measures for getting back the 
equipment, the nuclear ftiels, and other materials supplied by the USA, 
(c) The Act also lays the condition that the US should make sure that India did not 
build fiiel reserves beyond its minimum requirements for its operational use, 
(d) The act also laid down the condition that US should make sure that India did not 
produce Plutonium even from the plants debarred from the IAEA Safeguards 
(inspection.) and 
(e) The act laid down that the President had to certify to the US Congress that India is 
acting in a way "conducive to UN interests." 
The Henry J. Hyde US-India peaceful Atomic Energy Act, was the enabling act 
which permits nuclear cooperation with India. The Act modified the requirements of 
the section of 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act 1954.The UPA-I government fi-om 
the very beginning argued that the Act was the internal matter of US and apply to 
them only and India would be only bound by the 123 Agreement. The interpretation of 
the Act became the major issue in the whole process of Indo-US nuclear deal. The 
opposition party and the Left Front which was supporting the government from the 
outside protested that how the Hyde Act and other domestic laws would apply to the 
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123 Agreement. The Left Front argued that it will have great repercussion on India's 
strategic sovereignty and particularly India's independent nuclear programme. It was 
on August 3, 2007 in Washington that India and US formally released the text of 
agreement for cooperation between the two coimtries related to the peacefiil use of the 
nuclear energy. But for the UPA-I government the matter became critical when it had 
to face sever criticism from the Left Front and the opposition parties. The matter 
became critical when the Condoleezza Rice issued a statement in the House of 
Foreign affairs Panel that "US will support nothing with India in the NSG that is in 
contradiction to the Hyde Act. It will have to be completely consistent with the 
obligations of the Hyde Act".^^ The Left Front mount pressure on UPA-I government 
and asked the government to renegotiate the deal. However, in October, 2007 the Left 
Front allowed the UPA-I government to go ahead in their talk with the IAEA on 
Safeguard Agreement but putting condition that such agreement could be accepted 
only after UPA-Left Panel clears it for the final agreement. The UPA-I government 
concluded the agreement with the IAEA and back tracked from its commitment that 
the results of the talks with the IAEA would be deliberated in the UPA-Left 
Coordination Committee. It resulted in Left Front withdrew its support to the UPA-I 
government. The UPA-I government completely failed to convince the Left Front 
that India is bound by only 123 Agreements and not by the Hyde Act which was the 
domestic law of US. Ultimately, the UPA-I government seek vote of confidence in the 
Parliament which it successfiiUy secured when Samajwadi party supported the 
government. The UPA-I government echoed that the vote of confidence reflected the 
vote for the nuclear deal. After government secured the vote of confidence it formally 
concluded the 123 Agreement which became the legal frame work for the civil nuclear 
cooperation. The final draft of the 123 Agreement had addressed the concerns of the 
Indian government. The concerns of the Indian establishment were taken into 
consideration related to the reprocessing of spent fiiel, the right of the US to terminate 
the deal in case India tested the nuclear deal and US rights to getting back the 
equipment, the nuclear fuels, and other materials supplied by the USA, if India tested 
the nuclear weapon, and related to assurance for fiiel supply. UPA-I government 
secured a commitment from US in principle to permit India to reprocess the U.S-
origm spent fiiel. But for that India had to establish new national reprocessing facility 
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under IAEA safeguards for reprocessing the US origin spent fuel and also of the other 
countries. Besides this both governments had to work out arrangements and 
procedures for the reprocessing of US spent fuel. The UPA-I government became 
successful in securing the commitment from the US as far as fuel assurance was 
concerned. Furthermore, the clause related to termination of deal in case India tested 
the nuclear weapon was somehow addressed. The final text did not mention the word 
test though the termination of the agreement could happen due to any reason but prior 
to that one year notice and both parties vdll consider the relevant circumstances and 
promptly hold consultations to address the reasons cited by the party seeking 
termination. Justine Isola said: 
...the termination of agreement in the event of a test will be determined by many factors: the 
preferences of U.S. leaders, domestic lobbying, and geo-political balance of power 
consideration. This response will be constrained by the strength of the U.S-India relationship. 
Further, due to India's deepening nuclear ties with the rest of the world, any U.S response may 
have only a modest impact on India.^ '' 
The UPA-I government also became successful in getting wavier from NSG 
which was the last step of the whole process of Indo-US nuclear deal. 
The UPA-1 government did not demonstrate any marked departure from the 
policies of Vajpayee government. Though the nature of UPA-I government was 
different from the NDA because it was supported by Left Front from outside which 
some scholars in the beginning believe that it could give new orientation to Indian 
foreign policy but they failed to predict that foreign policy of the country is 
determined by the national interests of country and the national interest of India, today 
demand closer engagement with the US. Both the nations have today converging 
interests related to economy, combating terrorism, concern for democracy and these 
interests lock together both nations. Kanti Bajpai gave the three reasons behind the 
UPA-I governments more emphasis in building relationship v^th the USA and why 
the nuclear deal was vital in anchoring the relationship? He said: 
The first, reason was that Washington was decisive virtually in all global 
issues that affected India — t^rade, high technology, energy, climate and no other 
international alliance or network could have match or compensate for the US. 
However, to get the support of the US in these areas major hurdle was Non-
proliferation. Unless New Delhi could have got a deal with the US that ended India's 
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nuclear isolation it would have been impossible to get US support in the above said 
areas. Second, reason was to contain China and Pakistan. Third, reason was nuclear 
programme; here the shortage of nuclear fuel for the Indian reactors was the key 
factor.^ * 
In the whole foreign policy of UPA-I government, Indo-US nuclear deal was one 
of the major foreign policy achievements of the UPA-I government. Though it was 
the one component of growing strategic partnership between the two nations but for 
India it was more important. Over the years the major concern for Indian foreign 
policy was growing energy demands. The rising oil prices and the adverse impact on 
the environment caused by hydro- carbon fuels had made the nuclear energy more 
viable source of energy. The growing demand of the energy in India had largely 
depleted the domestic energy resources of the country. The Indo-US nuclear deal has 
great potential for generating the energy. According to the estimate from the Planning 
Commission, India will produce 35000 MWS of energy by 2050 that is almost 35 
percent of the country's total energy demands.^ ^ Therefore, we can say that the Indo-
US Nuclear deal opened the door for the nuclear energy commerce, which was halted 
after the Pokhran test in 1974, between the two countries. However, it carmot be 
denied that the civil nuclear energy between the two sides had other dimensions too 
but major concern for India was the long term energy security. 
Indo-China relations during UPA-I Government 
The Congress led UPA-I government in its NCMP affirmed to strengthen the 
relationship with China, which had improved considerable during National 
Democratic Alliance era. The UPA-I government's approach towards China 
demonstrates similar pattern that was followed by the NDA after the Pohkran test. 
The UPA-I government did not depart from the policies pursued by Vajpayee and 
made their China policies as basis for new relations. It was on the sidelines of the 10 
ASEAN summit in Vientiane, Laos, in November, 2004 that Indian Prime Minister 
Dr. Manmohan Singh met Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao. Both leaders showed the 
eagerness to promote further strength to the India - China relations which had largely 
improved during the NDA regime. The two leaders highlighted the importance of 
further increasing the economic and trade relations between the two nations. The 
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momentum of bilateral relations got further pace when Chief of Army Staff from 
India visited China in December, 2004.The visit of Chief of Army Staff was the one 
component of Confidence Building Measure and it resulted in strengthing the military 
to military contact between the two nations. The bilateral relationship between the 
two nation's got further impetus when the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, visited India 
on April 2005. After an extensive interaction with the Indian Prime Minster Dr. 
Manmohan Singh, a joint statement was released in which it was agreed that the 
relationship between the two nations will be elevated to a Strategic, Cooperative 
Partnership for the Peace and Security.'^ ^ The Joint statement also stated to further 
strengthen the economic cooperation, establishment of joint task force which will 
suggest ways to increase the bilateral trade between the two nations. The two major 
developments took place during the visit of the Wien Jiabao. Firstly, China 
recognized Sikkim as part of India and thus Sikkim ceased to be conflicting issue 
between the two nations. Secondly, it was agreed that border issues will not be 
allowed to affect the overall development of bilateral relations which was on path of 
growing bilateral trust. It was in this context that an agreement was inked down on the 
Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of Indo- China 
Boundary Question. With the growing trust in relationship both the leaders also 
jointly declared the year 2006 as the 'Year of China-India Friendship'. 
Both nations have converging interest, particularly in maintaining regional 
stability, fighting terrorism, taking advantages from globalization and maintaining 
access to capital and markets, taking joint stands on climate change, issue of 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, etc. Furthermore, mutual cooperation between India 
and China will be more effective in balancing U.S. influence in the region and also 
increase their negotiating position with the sole super power. Therefore, India was 
engaged in maintaining closer relations with China because China was emerging as 
strong economic power in the world and India was on the same path and carmot afford 
to have estranged relationship with the China. The strategic partnership that was 
growing between India and the US did not affect much the relations between India 
and China. The strategic thinkers who saw the Indo-US strategic relation to counter 
the China's influence in the Asians subcontinent proved to be wrong. India gave the 
strong message to the world and particularly to the US that it will not be the US ally 
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to counter China rather its foreign policy will be guided by its national interest. India 
Navy and Chinese Navy hold joint Navy exercises in 2006, soon after India, US, 
Japan naval exercises that were held in the Pacific Ocean, which demonstrated the 
India's engagement with the all major powers.^ " The process to strengthen the 
relationship between the two nations particularly in defence field got further impetus 
when defence Minister Pranab Mukerjee, visited China on May, 2006. During his 
visit, the two sides inked down a Memorandum of Understanding on Defence 
Cooperation, which established mechanism to institutionalize, regular interactions 
between the leaders of defense ministries and the armed forces and furthermore, to 
develop an annual calendar for regular military exercises and training programmes. '^ 
The Indo-China relations were growing despite the Indo-US strategic partnership and 
China, India competition in the South Asia. 
The bilateral relations between the nations got further strength when the 
China's President Hu. Jintao visited India in November, 2006. During his visit both 
sides affirm the commitment to sustain the ongoing positive and comprehensive 
development of India- China relations. He also reviewed along with the leadership of 
India the development in bilateral relation and deliberated with the Indian leadership 
on regional and international issues of mutual importance. It was in this context that 
Indian Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh and Chinese President Hu Jintao, in a 
joint statement annoimced the following Ten Point Strategy"^ so as to give further 
strength to the bilateral relations. 
(a) Ensuring Comprehensive Development of Bilateral Relations. 
(b) Strengthening Institutional Linkages and Dialogue Mechanism.. 
(c) Consolidating Commercial and Economic Exchanges. 
(d) Expanding All -Round Mutually Beneficially Cooperation. 
(e) Instilling Mutual Trust and Confidence through Defense Cooperation. 
(f) Seeking early settlement of Outstanding Issues. 
(g) Promoting Trans- border Connectivity and Cooperation. 
(h) Boosting Cooperation in Science and Technology. 
(i) Revitalizing Cultural Ties and Nurturing People to People Exchanges. 
(j) Expanding Cooperation on Regional and International Stage. 
The most important development during the visit of Hu. Jintao was that 
China recognized the importance of civil nuclear energy for the Indian economy and 
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hence saw the Indo-US nuclear deal through economic context. Both sides agreed to 
cooperate in civilian nuclear technology, consistent with their respective international 
commitments.^ ^ The major irritant in the relations between the two countries was 
China's close relationship with Pakistan, including the transfer of nuclear and missile 
technology. President Hu. Jintao also tried to alleviate these concerns by welcoming 
the peace process between India and Pakistan, and argued that China had no selfish 
gains in the South Asia and sincerely wished the peace in the region and would 
constructively help the process. '^' Both sides also agreed to continue forward the 
negotiations on border issues. In order to resolve the border issues through 
negotiations, the ninth round of talks between the Special Representatives was held in 
New Delhi from January 16-18, 2007.''^  The two Special Representatives continued 
their discussion on a framework for the boundary settlement on the basis of the 
Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles. Both sides agreed to 
maintain peace and tranquillity in the border areas in accordance with the agreement 
of 1993,1996 and 2005 till border issues were not solved amicably. 
In order to promote people to people contact and to make the citizens of the 
two nations acquainted to each other's cultural heritage so as to promote good will. 
Both sides agreed to celebrate 2007 as, India-China Year of Friendship through 
Tourism-2007. China's Foreign Minister Mr.Li Zhao Xing visited India on February, 
2007 to participate in the inauguration of the India-China Year of Friendship through 
Tourism-2007.The Chinese Foreign Minister, Li Zhao Xing, said: 
... both the countries were "true friends, cooperative partners committed to long-term 
friendship, productive cooperation and common development...both China and India enjoy 
splendid culture and rich tourism resources, and there is a sound basis and great potential for 
enhancing our cooperation in tourism and other cultural fields.^^ 
Furthermore, Li Zhao Xing, with Pranab Mukerjee held discussion on bilateral 
relations, regional issues and international issues. More importantly, the China's 
Foreign Minster tried to alleviate the Indian concern on China's testing of Anti-
Satellite Test, by conveying to Pranab Mukerjee that the test was not directed against 
any country.^ ^ Despite these confidence building measures the border issues 
continued to the major irritants in the relationship of the two nations. China's claim 
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for Aumachal Pradesh got again manifested in 2007, when China refused to grant visa 
to an Indian official who reside in the Aumachal Pradesh. China claimed that he was 
already citizen of China and there is no need grant him visa.^ ^ Furthermore, there was 
also some small incursion in Aumachal Pradesh and Sikkim areas. But more 
importantly theses incidences were not allowed to go too far and later through 
mechanism of annual defence dialogue held in Beijing on November 12-13, 2007, the 
matter were deliberated.''^  
In order to give further boost to the relationship between the two countries 
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited China on 13-15 January 2008. During his 
visit the two sides issued a joint statement entitled as A Shared Vision for the 21st 
Century of the Republic of India and the People's Republic ofChina.'^^ The document 
outlined common positions on a number of intemational and some bilateral issues. 
Besides this the joint statement included the wide range of issues ranging fi-om trade, 
intemational relations, energy, and climate change and security relations. More 
importantly, the two sides extensively held discussion on the trade relations and both 
sides jointly set a bilateral trade target of US$ 100 billion for 2015. But soon after 
retuming from its China's visit, Prime Minister Maimiohan Singh paid a visit to 
Aumachal Pradesh which was largely criticized by the China. In a strong reply to 
China Pranab Mukerjee eloquently speak in the Lok Sabah on February 20, 2008 that 
Aumachal Pradesh is an integral part of India and the fact was conveyed to the 
Chinese government.'*^ The matter again came into reflection when China opposed the 
use of Asian Development Bank loan by India for the projects in the Aumachal 
Pradesh. Despite these irritants in the bilateral relations, both sides continued the 
cooperation in other areas. In December 2008, China, and India jointly conducted a 
coimter terrorism exercise named that as, Hand-in-Hand, 2008 '*'' so as to boost the 
ties between the armed forces of the two nations. 
Therefore, we can say that during UPA-I the relationship between the two 
nations improved considerably. Both nations extended economic ties, military to 
military contact, people to people contact but it couldn't achieve anything substantial. 
The border issues remained to be solved despite the several round of talks between the 
Special Representatives and it will remain the major irritant in the relations in future 
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also. The UPA-I government tried to construct relations with China on other areas and 
not gave too much emphasis on the border issues. Since boundary issue is one of the 
major irritant in the growing relations between the two nations, it needed to be settled 
as soon as possible because unless and until this issue is settled the distrust in 
relations will remain. 
Indo-Pak relations during UPA-I Government 
The Indo-Pak relations were considerably improved after the terrorist attack 
on the Indian Parliament due the personal efforts by the then Prime Minster Atal 
Bihar Vajpayee. The process of building new trust in the relations started when the 
leaders of two nations met during the SAARC summit at Islamabad on January, 2004. 
Both the leaders affirmed to carry forward the process of normalization and more 
importantly, the leaders agreed to commence the process of the Composite Dialogue. 
Despite the change in the government in India in May, 2004, the Indo-Pak relations 
did not affect too much. In fact, the UPA-I government in its NCMP stated that it will 
strengthen the dialogue process with Pakistan and emphasizes to engage with it in 
systematic and in a sustained way. The new government showed its intent to engage 
with Pakistan and sustain the momentum of peace process started by the NDA 
government. It was on June, 2004 that foreign secretary level talks on Peace and 
Security, and Jammu and Kashmir were held between the two sides. During the talks 
both sides affirmed to continue the momentum of the peace process and exchanged in 
detail views on Jammu and Kashmir and agreed to carry forward meaningful dialogue 
in order to amicably solve all outstanding issues.'*'' Both sides also agreed to give 
further momentum to dialogue process and resumed the Composite Dialogue on June 
2004 .The Composite Dialogue covered eight fields which were agreed by the Prime 
Minister Inder Kumar Gujral and Nawaz Sharif in Male in 1997.^ *^  The eight areas of 
proposed deliberation were Jammu and Kashmir, Siachen, Wullar Barrage/Tulbul 
Navigation Project; Sir-Creek, Terrorism and Drug Trafficking; Economic and 
Commercial Cooperation; Peace and Security; and Promotion of Friendly Exchanges 
in various fields. It was in this context that both sides held deliberation on these areas 
on last week of July and first half of August 2004.'*^  In order to review the overall 
progress of the Composite Dialogue the Foreign Ministers of the two countries met in 
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September 2004. Both sides agreed to initiate talks on other areas particularly, expert 
level meeting on Conventional and Nuclear Confidence Building Measures, meeting 
between the Railv^ay authorities of the two countries, meeting between the Border 
Forces of the two countries, meeting between the Narcotic Authorities of the two 
countries, meeting between the Indian Coastal Guards and Pakistan Maritime Security 
Agency, and more importantly, the meeting related to all issues regarding the 
commencement of Srinagar and Muzafarabad bus service.'*^ 
The bilateral relations between the two sides got further impetus when Prime 
Minster, Dr. Manmohan Singh met Pakistan President Parveez Musharraf in New 
York on the sidelines of UN General Assembly meeting in September, 2004. After 
meeting both released a joint statement in which both sides affirm to make every 
effort to restore normalcy and cooperation, in the spirit of the January 6, 2004 
statement signed by former Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihar Vajpayee and President 
Musharraf In the joint statement it was also agreed that Confidence-Building 
Measures (CBMs) of all categories vmder discussion between the two governments 
should be implemented keeping in mind practical possibilities.'*^ They also addressed 
that the issue of Jammu and Kashmir should be addressed in peaceful enviroimient 
with a sincere spirit and a purposeful manner. Despite the growing confidence in the 
relation the major irritant between the relations historically had been the issue of 
Jammu and Kashmir. The Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visit to Srinagar in 
November 2004, where he announced political and economic package for the people 
of Jammu and Kashmir created friction in the relation between the two nations. The 
Prime Minster eloquently, reiterates India's stand on Jammu and Kashmir and 
emphasized in his Srinagar speech that Jammu and Kashmir was an integral part of 
India. This invites the criticism from the Pakistan side. Pakistan President Parveez 
Musharraf in retaliation to the Manmohan Singh's statement on Jammu and Kashmir 
said, "... it would better for all the parties concerned if both Islamabad and New Delhi 
departed from their stated positions. He further said, "...If India moves halfway, we 
will move halfway."'* 
In order to give further boost to the bilateral relations both sides also agreed to 
facilitate people to people contact. It was in this context that India government 
unilaterally liberalizes the visa for Pakistan nationals like accredited journalists with 
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minimum 3 years accreditation with national or international media of repute; 
academicians and professors like Vice Chancellors and others invited by 
reputed/eminent universities and institutions; medical doctors if accompanying 
patients for treatment at leading/reputed hospitals in India; all Pakistan nationals 
above the age of 65 years.^ ° But more importantly, the things were not allowed to go 
out of hand and both sides in order to sustain the momentum and strengthen the 
process of Confidence Building Measures, the poUtical level contacts were 
maintained. It was in this context that Indian External Affairs Minister, Mr. K. Natwar 
Singh visited Pakistan from 15-17 April, 2005. During his visit an agreement to start 
the bus services from Srinagar to Muzafarabad, Amritsar to Lahore and to religious 
places such as Nankan Sahib was reached. '^ The peace process got frirther strength 
when both sides successftiUy started the bus service between the Srinagar to 
Muzafarabad; it was the landmark achievement in the Indo- Pak peace process. 
Furthermore, in order to keep momentum of friendly relationship between the two 
nations going on Pakistan President Parveez Musharaaf, visited India on April-16-18, 
2005. During his visit a joint statement was signed in which both sides affirmed their 
commitment to peace process and to give further pace to CBM process. Prime 
Minster, Manmohan Singh conveyed to the Pakistan President that it is not possible to 
redrawn the boundary but both countries a can make borders irrelevant by increasing 
the people to people contact, and accelerating the cross border trade. This process will 
help to create an envoirment of trust and paved the way to solve the complex 
problems in future. Both the leaders described the peace process between the two 
countries as "irreversible, and pledged to address the issue of Jammu and Kashmir in 
a "sincere and purposeful and forward-looking manner for a final settlement.^ ^ Both 
sides also reaffirmed their commitments made in the two joint statements that were 
released at Islamabad in January 2004 and other released at New York, on September 
2004. In both the joint statements Pakistan had made commitment to stop cross border 
terrorism. After the visit of President Parveez Musharraf, both sides under the frame 
of Composite Dialogue held deliberation on Sir Creek issue and reflected on the 
possible demarcation of international boundary between the two nations in the Sir 
Creek area. At the end of meeting both sides agreed to continue the dialogue process 
on the issue so as to find an early resolution of the issue which would be mutually 
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beneficial for the sides/^ Both countries also held deliberations on WuUar 
Barrage/Tulbul Navigation Project on 28-29 June, 2005 in New Delhi. Both sides 
reconfirmed their commitment to Indus Water Treaty and agreed to continue the 
discussion on the subject in the next round of dialogue process so as to resolve the 
issue as per the provisions of the treaty.^ "* A major break through with respect to 
military and strategic confidence building measures came when the two sides signed 
two agreements one on Pre-notification of Flight Testing of Ballistic Missiles, and 
Memorandum of Understanding for Communication Link between Coastal Guards of 
India and Pakistan Maritime Security Agency. Furthermore, in order to gave more 
pace to the bilateral relations people to people contact between the two sides were 
strengthened by Munnabao- kokhrabar rail link, the Amritsar to Lahore bus service 
and the Amritsar to Nanakana Sahib bus services were started in 2006. Despite these 
positive breakthroughs the relations between the two sides got halted when Mimibai 
blasts took place in July, 2006 claiming the lives of innocent people. The 
investigation teams found the Pakistan's involvement in the blasts. This resulted in 
the suspension of foreign secretary level talks which was the usual part of the 
Composite Dialogue process. But more importantly; the political contacts between 
the two sides were not halted. It was on the sidelines of NAM Summit on 
September 16, 2006, that Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh met Pakistan 
President Parveez Musharraf Both leaders held discussion on the Mimibai blast and 
announced to resume the Composite Dialogue process. Furthermore, both leaders 
decided to combat terrorism jointly and agreed upon to establish a Joint Coimter 
Terrorism Institutional mechanism (JATM).^ ^ The first ever meeting of the JATM 
took place in March 2007, after the tragic event of Samjhuta Express. This meeting 
laid down the parameters of bilateral anti-terror cooperation.^ ^ Second meeting of the 
JATM took place on October 22, 2007, in which both sides updated the earlier shared 
information and more importantly, both sides affirmed to cooperate with one another 
to identify measures, exchange specific information and assist in the investigations. 
A significant development took place when Pakistan softened its stand on 
Kashmir and put forward new proposal for resolving the Kashmir issue. President 
Musharraf, put forward a new set of proposals (which were called Musharaafs Four 
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Point Formula) which he spelt before A. G. Noorani in an interview to Frontline 
magazine in August 2006.The proposal put forwarded were as following. 
(a) Kashmir will have the same borders but people will be allowed to move freely 
back and forth in the region; 
(b) The region will have Self-governance or Autonomy, but not independence; 
(c) Troops will be withdrawn from the region in a staggered manner; and 
(d) A joint supervision mechanism (institutional Arrangement) will be set up, wdth 
India, Pakistan and Kashmir represented in it. 
However, India reacted conservatively to this proposal and due the domestic 
and political turmoil in Pakistan the proposal could not get any kind of political 
response and was only debated in the media. India did not pay attention to this 
proposal and argued that if any such agreement took place in the fiiture then for that 
both the countries had to prepared way for this agreement and this way can be paved 
by the cessation of terrorist activities in the region. 
The fourth round of Composite Dialogue between the two nations was held in the 
back drop of domestic political turbulence in Pakistan. Both sides resolved to 
continue the peace process and held that the terrorist attack on Samjhuta Express vAW 
not be allowed derail the peace process. However, the political conditions in Pakistan 
worsened during the last quarter of 2007. It started with imposition of emergency in 
Pakistan, followed by the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. Despite the domestic 
Political turmoil in Pakistan, the dialogue process again started with the ministerial 
review of the fourth round of talks of the Composite Dialogue in May 2008. However, 
the terrorist attack on Indian Embassy in Kabul, followed by the terrorist attack in 
Ahmadabad, New Delhi and the more devastating Mumbai attack on 26* November, 
2008 frozen all the Composite Dialogue process. The Mumbai terrorists attack 
brought both the nations on the brink of war and it was due to the restraints exercised 
by the governments of the two countries and the diplomatic maneuver by USA, UK 
and other major powers that war was avoided. Both sides tried to build new trust in 
the relationship after the Mimibai attack, and in context a joint statement was released 
by the two sides after the Sharm el-Sheikh meeting and the UPA-I government had to 
face scathing criticism fi-om the opposition political parties and media on soft stand on 
terrorism and on reinitiating the trust building. But the constant terrorists provocation 
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from the Pakistan led the derailment of the peace process and it never return on the 
same path which was maintained during the UPA-I era. 
Therefore, we can day that during UPA-I government the relation between the 
two nations had improved considerably. The government started Composite Dialogue 
which was the desirable approach to the resolving the complex issues like Jammu 
Kashmir, Siachen, Tulbul, and Sir Creek. But these talks did not achieve anything 
substantial because of the derailment in talks due to constant terrorist provocations 
from Pakistan; the domestic and political conditions in Pakistan also got worsened 
during the last quarter of 2008, and more importantly, the change in political 
leadership in Pakistan also contributed. 
Conclusion 
The UPA-I government's foreign policy did not show any major departure from 
the foreign policy pursued by its predecessor that is National Democratic Alliance 
(NDA). The foreign policy of the UPA-I government was based on realism and 
pragmatic assessment of the emerging global environment. The geo-economic 
dimension of the foreign policy got more importance in it approach. The new 
government like NDA put more emphasis on relations with the US, China and 
Pakistan due to the global and regional imperatives. Although UPA-I government 
maintained the continuity in policies pursued by the NDA but the change can also be 
discerned. The UPA-I govenmient built its partnership with the US on the foundation 
laid down by the NDA government. Nuclear deal was the part of the strategic 
partnership which was evolved during the NDA regime. The UPA-I govenmient 
sustained the process to strengthen the economic ties with China by increasing trade 
and investment and more importantly, resolving the border issues through 
negotiations. Furthermore, UPA-I government also continued the Composite dialogue 
process with Pakistan and affirmed to resolve all bilateral issues through peaceful 
negotiations. However, the difference in approach between the NDA and UPA-I 
government can be discerned also. The UPA-I gave more weight to negotiation, 
diplomacy and was more importantly liberal in its approach on the other hand the 
NDA was more aggressive and muscular in its approach. 
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India is a country of diverse identities. This plural nature of Indian society 
could have been better represented only through the multi-party parliamentary 
democracy. The multi-party parliamentary democracy ensures the representation of all 
the sections of society in the political system. Therefore, the framers of the Indian 
Constitution gave their preference for the multi-party parliamentary form of 
democracy. After India's independence, multi-party system was prevalent but there 
was no such power struggle as is found in the multi-party parliamentary democracies. 
The main reason behind that was the all embracing character of the Congress Party 
which represented almost all the sections of the Indian society. The other political 
parties like Communist Party, Socialist Party, Jana Sangh couldn't play a decisive role 
in the political process. Therefore, the Congress Party overshadowed the importance 
of these parties and maintained the dominance in the electoral process at state level up 
to 1967 and at central level up to 1989. 
The dominance of the Congress Party was first challenged at state level in 
1967 when Congress lost power in the half of the Indian states to the state based 
parties, which united and laid down the coalition government. With the passage of 
time due to change in the socio-economic profile of the country new social groups 
emerged and looked for space in the political process. The Congress Party could not 
accommodate and reconcile with the new groups hence, paved the way for the 
emergence of new political formations (parties) which made the electoral process at 
the state level in the beginning, and then at central level more competitive. Therefore, 
the single dominant party system was replaced by the multi-party system in which no 
particular party claimed absolute majority and the result was that the model of intra-
party coalition was replaced by the inter-party coalition system. This democratic 
transition from the Congress dominated multi-party politics to the multi-party system 
has strengthened and widened the base of representative system in India. Due to the 
emergence of coalition governments the plural nature of the Indian society got also 
reflected in the governing structure, which made the Indian political system more 
inclusive and encompassing. 
India had experienced long periods of coalition governments both at centre 
and also in some states and it has become an inevitable feature of Indian politics. In 
contemporary political process has become competitive and lots of political parties 
are competing for the representation, recognition and share in power. The multi-party 
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coalition governments formed since 1989 in India at central level are regarded as a 
kind of accommodated politics with all varieties of political parties ideologically 
poles apart ranging from regional to national coming together in broad coalitions. The 
emergence of the BJP as a strong alternative to the Congress Party at national level 
gave new orientation to the party system in India and since 1998 party system in India 
at the national level had been loosely bipolar divided between the BJP led NDA and 
the Congress led UP A. In contemporary Indian politics one of the major 
developments was the ability of the BJP led NDA coalition government to complete 
its tenure of five years from 1999 to 2004. This experience was great blow to the 
critiques of coalition government who considered coalition as unstable by nature and 
a transitional phase in Indian politics. Taking lessons from the NDA coalition 
government the Congress Party also struck alliance with the regional forces in 2004 
general elections and formed the government under title of United Progressive 
alliance. An important feature of the Congress led UPA-I government was that it was 
joined by many state based political parties which were historically the arch rivals of 
the Congress Party. Moreover, the government was supported by the CPI (M) led Left 
Front from outside. The constituents of UPA-I government interpreted 2004 election 
results as mandate for secular forces to promote and solidify the secular nature of 
Indian society and strengthen Indian democratic structure by inclusive development. 
The above quoted mandate had been given shape in the National Common Minimum 
Programme which acted as frame work for governance to the new coalition 
government. The completion of frill term by the two coalition governments i.e. NDA 
and UPA-I had made the coalition system appear as the only alternative available to 
Indian democracy. The coalition government at centre had strengthened the federal 
structure of the Indian political system due to the growing importance of the regional 
parties in making of the coalition government at the national level. The successfiil 
completion of tenure by these coalition governments also reflect that there is wide 
acceptance of coalition dharma by the major political parties and a coalition culture is 
emerging both at the centre and in the states. Keeping in view the above discussion 
the study of UPA-I coalition government assumes a lot of importance. 
Major Findings 
In the light of discussion in preceding chapters the major findings of the study can be 
highlighted under the following points. 
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1. The Congress dominated the Indian electoral process at state level till 1967 
and at central level till 1989, due to its all embracing and coalitional nature. 
The Congress Party was the conglomeration of different groups and this 
plurality created high level competition within the Congress Party. This wide 
range of social grouping in the ruling party (Congress Party), make it possible 
for the opposition parties to influence the like minded factions in the Congress 
Party. Thus, inspite of providing alternative to Congress government 
opposition political influenced the factional groups of the Congress, which 
resulted in no alteration of power. The dominance was also largely helped by 
the Congress's organisation which through its broad networking at the 
different levels connected the electorate to Congress Party. More importantly, 
Congress Party as a ruling party in its earlier years had coimnand over 
resources and it was the organisation of the party which efficiently distributes 
these resources among existing and potential clients in exchange for their 
political support. This gives the Congress Party upper hand in bargaining and 
it was able to influence political decisions in the centre and in states. 
Furthermore, the political process was not so much competitive in the initial 
decades and political forces (political parties) till then had not became well 
organised and assertive. Only 50 percent of voting took place in the Lok Sabha 
elections which held in the first two decades and out of which it never won 
majority of votes and its vote share hovered between 45, 48 percent of the 
total. 
However, before the 1967 Lok Sabha election Congress Party witnessed 
numerous problems like the death of Nehru and Shastri; two successive wars 
which drained the resources of the country; two severe droughts that put the 
common man in hardership. Moreover, the Congress Party experienced wide 
range of split at state level in 1966. The Congress Party got splited in Orissa, 
Rajasthan, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Punjab. This all resulted in Congress 
lost power in many states to different political parties. However, the defeat 
created friction within the Congress Party and subsequently Congress got 
splited at national level between the two groups, one led by the Indra Gandhi 
(R) and other led by the Syndicate groups that was named as Congress (O). 
Under Indira Gandhi the nature of Congress Party got changed. There was 
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absence of internal factional competition, which led to monopolistic 
dominance and erosion of openness in the Congress system, decline of 
institutionalised politics and growth of populist style. The consensus politics 
of Congress was ignored, and more importance was given to ideological 
coherence. The party building was ignored and was replaced by populist, 
charismatic, pyramid power structure. The impact of all these developments 
Congress lost its gross root contact which resulted in gradual erosion of its 
social constituencies. 
2. The decline of the Congress as a dominant force resulted in emergence and 
strengthening of multi-party system. Coalition governments were formed at 
the centre in 1977,1989, 1996,1998 but all these coalition governments failed 
to sustain and provide an effective government. The failure of these coalitions 
was due to many reasons such as, ideological differences, personality egos, 
factionalism and defection. Besides these general causes the different coalition 
government like Janta government. National Front government. United Front 
government and the coalition government led by BJP in 1998 had their own 
specific cause for down fall. All these coalition government after defeating 
there common enemy (Congress) could not decide the crucial point i.e. how to 
provide a cohesive and stable government to the people. The Janta government 
failed because Janta Party, which was product of merger of opposition parties 
maintained their earlier ideological positions and this created friction, hence 
resulted in the fall of government. The National Front government failed 
because there was lack of Common Minimum Programme and Conflict 
Managing Mechanisms. Furthermore, the main party of National Front i.e. 
Janta Dal was faction ridden. The internal factional fight within the Janta Dal 
created such conditions which forced the outside supporting party particularly 
BJP to with draw the support fi"om the government. The United Front 
government laid down Common Minimum Programme and put forth Conflict 
Managing Institutions, but it made one mistake that it kept the main outside 
supporting party i.e. the Congress out of the Coordination Committee which 
resulted in breakdown of coordination between the two. Similarly, BJP led 
coalition in 1998 laid down Common Minimum Programme and Conflict 
Managing Institutions but it hardly take them seriously. The conflicts were 
138 
inevitable in coalition government. What is more important for the stability of 
coalition government is that how the conflicts and difference were resolved. 
The decline of the Congress Party created space for the BJP to strengthen 
itself, which in the beginning relied heavily on the Hindutva ideology. BJPs 
realised the changing pattern of Indian politics, softened its ideological stands 
on Uniform Civil Code, Article 370 and Ram Janmbhoomi. This helped the 
BJP to attract more partners to its alliance. The other factor which was 
responsible for the attracting state based parties ad regional forces towards the 
BJP led alliance was that the BJP, right up to the 2004 general election, was 
widely perceived to be electorally successful- an asset as a partner in national 
and state-wise alliances—and this served to maintain existing coalition tie 
against a common enemy (Congress) which ultimately culminated into 
successful completion of tenure by NDA government in 2004. The NDA 
successfully complete its term, hence discarded the long held notion that 
coalition governments are by nature unstable. The BPJ as disciplined party 
anchored the NDA coalition government. Moreover, the BJP took the lessons 
from the failures of the previous coalition governments and thus laid down 
National Agenda for Governance (NAG). The agenda was based on the 
principles accommodating the ideological goals of those within the alliance. In 
order to manage the conflicts within the NDA government different Conflict 
Managing Institutions were devised. A Coordination Committee was 
established to see the policy implementation and resolve conflicts. Besides 
these, inter-ministerial groups called as Group of Minsters (GOM), worked as 
coordination mechanism to minimise the differences of opinion and conflict 
within the cabinet was also established. 
The Congress Party remained indifferent towards forging alliances with the 
regional forces and state based parties and this reluctant attitude of the 
Congress Party towards coalition government kept it out of power for eight 
years. However, before 2004 Lok Sabha election Congress under Sonia 
Gandhi understood the constraints of the party. The Congress Party 
understood that if it had to check the growing clout of the BJP it had to remain 
open for the alliance formation. The party approached DMK and struck pre-
poU alliance with it. Sonia Gandhi also sink her personal differences with NCP 
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and made pre-poll alliance with it along with some minor parties like RPI and 
JD(S).The Congress Party also formed electoral alliance with TRS in Andhra 
Pradesh, JMM in Jharkhand and most significantly it came into electoral 
understanding in Bihar with RJD, LJP and with PDP in Jammu and Kashmir. 
Therefore, the Congress's weak position in these states and presence and 
formation of new political parties helped the Congress to build alliance which 
over the years was not possible because the Congress was main strong 
political opponent to these parties in these states. 
Due to the Congress's preference for the alliance formation a loose bipolar 
contest was witnessed in 2004 Lok Sabha election. Both the national parties 
forge alliances with the different regional forces and state based parties. This 
is what differentiates 2004 Lok Sabha elections from its preceding. 
Furthermore, the 2004 Lok Sabha election reaffirmed the importance of the 
regional and state based parties in the national politics. Both the NDA and 
UPA-I, governments couldn't have been formed without the support of these 
political parties. Therefore, the regionalisation of Indian politics which began 
in 1996 got also manifested in 2004 Lok Sabha election, 
5. The Congress formed coalition government under the barmer of United 
Progressive Alliance which was the conglomeration of the fourteen parties. It 
was the minority government which was supported from the outside by Left 
Front. This very outside support was very important for the survival of the 
UPA-I government and give new orientation to the government policies. The 
Congress which was leading the UPA-I government took the lesson from the 
NDA and laid down a National Common Minimum Programme (NCMP), by 
synchronising the policy stands of internal and external constituents. 
Different conflicts managing institutions were setup — UPA coordination 
committee (UPACC) was set up which acted as a platform of consultation and 
discussion, for not only those who were in the government but also those who 
supported the government from outside. Complementary to it a specific 
Coordination Mechanism, the UPA government-Left Coordination Committee 
(UPALCC) was also set up. the National Advisory Council was established 
which not worked as watch dog of the NCMP but also advised the government 
on implementation of NCMP and also provided inputs to the government in 
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policy formulation. The presence of NAC created dual power centre which in 
fact worked very well in the UPA-I government because it struck a balance 
between the Congress' quest for the liberalisation and the Left Fronts pro-poor 
policies. This was because of the fact that in the UPA-I government. Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh was in favour of a more open, liberalised economy 
and on the other hand, Sonia Gandhi supported pro-poor policies and 
committed to social development in the most inclusive sense. This helped the 
Left Front to influence the policy of government and sustained its support for 
the government for four years. Despite this the conflict arose among the 
constituents of UPA-I government particularly between the UPA-I 
governments and the Left Front on policy issues and even Left front succeeded 
in vetoing some economic policies of the government. In short the conflicts 
were inevitable in coalition government but what is more important for the 
survival of coalition government is how these conflicts are managed and the 
UPA-I government showed enough maturity on this dimension of coalition 
government. 
The NCMP being product of consensus gave the frame work for governance to 
the new government. It enlisted the domestic and foreign policy priorities of 
the government. The policies on Minority Development, Employment 
Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) and the Reservation for OBCs in Higher 
Education that were discussed in the preceding chapter were targeted towards 
the lower sections of the society which were the main core social basis of the 
UPA-I constituents. Framing policies that were targeted toward these groups 
got the safe passage due to consensus. 
The UPA-I government's foreign policy was not different from the foreign 
policy pursued by the NDA. In fact it showed more of continuity than change 
in the policies pursued by the NDA. The foreign policy of the UPA-I 
government was product pragmatic assessment of the emerging global 
envoirment. The economic dimension of the foreign policy got more 
importance in it the UPA-I. Like its predecessor, it gave more importance in 
relations with the US, China and Pakistan, due to the global and regional 
imperatives. The UPA-I government build its partnership wdth the US on the 
foimdation laid down by the NDA government. The main intention to further 
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strengthen relations with the US was to win over the support of US because 
US was dominant world power and close relations with it could have raised 
India's status in the world affairs and no other international alliance or 
network could have match or compensate for the US. However, to get the 
support of US, the hurdle was Non-proliferation. The Indo-US nuclear deal 
removed this irritant also. 
The UPA-I government sustained the process of strengthening the economic 
ties with China by increasing trade and investment with it. More importantly, 
it continued the process to resolve the border issues through negotiations. The 
UPA-I govenmient tried to construct relations with China on other areas and 
got greater success but its effort to resolve the border issues failed. Since 
boundary issue is one of the major irritant in the growing relations between the 
two nations, it needed to be settled as soon as possible because unless and 
until this issue is settled the distrust in relations will remain. 
UPA-I governments also continued the Composite Dialogue process with 
Pakistan in order to resolve the outstanding issues and Composite Dialogue 
process was the best approach. But these talks did not achieve anything 
substantial because of the derailment in talks due to constant terrorist 
provocations from Pakistan; the domestic and political conditions in Pakistan 
also got worsened during the last quarter of 2008 and more importantly, the 
change in political leadership in Pakistan also contributed to this. 
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APPENDIX-I 
*'NATI0NAL C O M M O N MINIMUM PROGRAMME OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, 
May 2004 
Introduction 
th 
The people of India have voted decisively in the 14 Lok Sabha elections for secular, progressive 
forces, for parties wedded to the welfare of farmers, agricultural labour, weavers, workers and weaker 
sections of society, for parties irrevocably committed to the daily well-being of the common man 
across the country. 
In keeping with this mandate, the Congress, its pre-poll allies that include the RJD, DMK, NCP, PMK, 
TRS, JMM, LJP, MDMK, AIMIM, PDP, lUML, RPI (A), RPI (G) and KC(J) have come together to 
form a United Progressive Alliance (UPA). The UPA government supported by the Left Parties will 
have six basic principles for governance. 
• to preserve, protect and promote social harmony and to enforce the law without fear or 
favour to deal with all obscurantist and fundamentalist elements who seek to disturb 
social amity and peace. 
• to ensure that the economy grows at least 7-8% per year in a sustained manner over a 
decade and more and in a manner that generates employment so that each family is 
assured of a safe and viable livelihood. 
• to enhance the welfare and well-being of farmers, farm labour and workers, particularly 
those in the unorganized sector and assure a secure future for their families in every 
respect. 
• to fiilly empower women politically, educationally, economically and legally. 
• 
• to provide for fiill equality of opportunity, particularly in education and employment for 
scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, OBCs and religious minorities. 
• to unleash the creative energies of our entrepreneurs, businessmen, scientists, engineers 
and all other professionals and productive forces of society. 
• The UPA makes a solemn pledge to the people of our country: to provide a government 
that is corruption-free, transparent and accountable at all times, to provide an 
administration that is responsible and responsive at all times. 
Employment 
The UPA government will immediately enact a National Employment Guarantee Act. This will provide 
a legal guarantee for at least 100 days of employment to begin with on asset-creating public works 
*1. Government of India. (2004). National Common Minimum Program.Retrieved from http:// http:// 
www.pibaizawl. nic. in/cmp.pdf 
programmes every year at minimum wages for at least one able-bodied person in every rural, urban 
poor and lower middle-class household. In the interim, a massive food-for-work programme will be 
started. 
The UPA government will establish a National Commission to examine the problems facing enterprises 
in the unorganized, informal sector. The Commission will be asked to make appropriate 
recommendations to provide technical, marketing and credit support to these enterprises. A National 
Fund will be created for this purpose. 
• The UPA administration will revamp the fimctionmg of the Khadi and Village Industries 
Commission (KVIC) and launch new programmes for the modernization of coir, 
handlooms, powerlooms, garments, rubber, cashew, handicrafts, food processing, 
sericulture, wool development, leather, pottery and other cottage industries. 
The UPA government will give the highest investment, credit and technological priority to the 
continued growth of agriculture, horticulture, aquaculture, floriculture, afforestation, dairying and agro-
processing that will significantly add to the creation of new jobs. 
Along with vastly expandmg credit facilities for small-scale industry and self-employment, the UPA 
government will ensure that the services industry will be given all support to fulfill its true growth and 
employment potential. This includes software and all IT-enabled services, trade, distribution, transport, 
telecommunications, fmance and tourism. 
The textile industry will be enabled to meet new challenges imposed by the abolition of quotas under 
the international multi-fibre agreement in January 2005. Given its special ecological importance world-
wide and within the country, the jute industry will receive a fresh impetus in all respects. 
Agriculture 
The UPA government will ensure that public investment in agricultural research and extension, rural 
mfi-astructiu-e and irrigation is stepped up in a significant manner at the very earliest. Irrigation will 
receive the highest investment priority and all on-going projects will be completed according to a strict 
time schedule. 
The rural cooperative credit system will be nursed back to health. The UPA government will ensure 
that the flow of rural credit is doubled in the next three years and that the coverage of small and 
marginal farmers by institutional lending is expanded substantially. The delivery system for rural credit 
will be reviewed. Immediate steps will be taken to ease the burden of debt and high interest rates on 
farm loans. Crop and livestock insurance schemes will be made more effective. 
The UPA government will introduce a special programme for dryland farmmg in the arid and semi-arid 
regions of the country. Watershed and wasteland development programmes will be taken up on a 
massive scale. Water management m all its aspects, both for urigation and drinking purposes, will 
received urgent attention. 
The UPA administration will ensure the fullest implementation of minimum wage laws for farm labour. 
Comprehensive protective legislation will be enacted for all agricultural workers. Revenue 
administration will be thoroughly modernized and clear land titles will be established. 
The UPA government will bring forward a Constitutional Amendment to ensure the democratic, 
autonomous and professional ftinctioning of cooperatives. 
Controls that depress the incomes of farmers will be systematically removed. Farmers will be given 
greater say in the organizations that supply inputs to them. 
The UPA government will ensure that adequate protection is provided to all farmers from imports, 
particularly when international prices fall sharply. 
The UPA government will ensure that government agencies entrusted with the responsibility for 
procurement and marketing will pay special attention to farmers in poor and backward states and 
districts. Farmers all over the country will receive fair and remunerative prices. The terms of trade will 
be maintained in favour of agriculture. 
The UPA government will take steps to ensure that dues to all farmers including sugarcane farmers will 
be cleared at the earliest. 
Education, Health 
The UPA government pledges to raise public spending in education to least 6% of GDP with at least 
half this amount being spent of primary and secondary sectors. This will be done in a phased manner. 
The UPA government will introduce a cess on all central taxes to finance the commitment to 
universalize access to quality basic education. A National Commission on Education will be set up to 
allocate resources and monitor programmes. 
The UPA government will take immediate steps to reverse the trend of communalization of education 
that had set in the past five years. It will also ensure that all institutions of higher learning and 
professional education retain their autonomy. The UPA will ensure that nobody is denied professional 
education because he or she is poor. 
Academic excellence and professional competence will be the sole criteria for all appointments to 
bodies like the Indian Council for Historical Research, Indian Council for Social Science Research, 
University Grants Commission, National Council for Educational Research and Training, etc. Steps 
will be taken to remove the communalization of the school syllabus that has taken place in the past five 
years. A review committee of experts will be set up for this purpose. 
A national cooked nutritious mid-day meal scheme funded mainly by the central government, will be 
introduced in primary and secondary schools. An appropriate mechanism for quality checks will also 
set up. The UPA will also universalize the Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) scheme to 
provide a functional anganwadi in every settlement and ensure full coverage for all children. The UPA 
government will fully back and support all NGO efforts in the area of primary education. 
Proper infrastructure will be created in schools for NCC. NSS, physical development, sports and 
cultural development of all students. 
The UPA government will raise public spending on health to at least 2-3% of GDP over the next five 
years with focus on primary health care. A national scheme for health insurance for poor families will 
be introduced. The UPA will step up public investment in programmes to confrol all communicable 
diseases and also provide leadership to the national AIDS control effort. 
The UPA government will take all steps to ensure availability of life-savings drugs at reasonable prices. 
Special attention will be paid to the poorer sections in the matter of health care. The feasibility of 
reviving public sector units set up for the manufacture of critical bulk drugs will be re-examined so as 
to bring down and keep a check on prices of drugs. 
Women and Children 
The UPA government will take the lead to introduce legislation for one-third reservations for women in 
vidhan sabhas and in the Lok Sabha. Legislation on domestic violence and against gender 
discrimination will be enacted. 
The UPA government will ensure that at least one-third of all funds flowing into panchayats will be 
earmarked for programmes for the development of women and children. Village women and their 
associations will be encouraged to assume responsibility for all development schemes relating to 
drinking water, sanitation, primary education, health and nutrition. 
Complete legal equality for women in all spheres will be made a practical reality, especially by 
removing discriminatory legislation and by enacting new legislation that gives women, for instance, 
equal rights of ownership of assets like houses and land. 
The UPA government will bring about a major expansion in schemes for micro-finance based on self-
help groups, particularly in the backward and ecologically fragile areas of the country. 
The UPA government is committed to replicating all over the country the success that some southern 
and other states have had in family planning. A sharply targeted population control programme will be 
launched in the 150-odd high-fertility districts. The UPA government recognizes that states that 
achieve success in family planning cannot be penalized. 
The UPA government will protect the rights of children, strive for the elimination of child labour, 
ensure facilities for schooling and extend special care to the girl child. 
Food and Nutrition Security 
The UPA will work out, in the next three months, a comprehensive medium-term strategy for food and 
nutrition security. The objective will be to move towards universal food security over time, if found 
feasible. 
The UPA government will strengthen the public distribution system (PDS) particularly in the poorest 
and backward blocks of the country and also involve women's and ex-servicemen's cooperatives in its 
management. Special schemes to reach foodgrains to the most destitute and infirm will be launched. 
Gram banks in chronically food-scarce areas will be established. Antyodaya cards for all households at 
risk of hunger will be introduced. 
The UPA government will bring about major improvements in the functioning of the Food Corporation 
of India (FCI) to control inefficiencies that increase the food subsidy burden. 
Nutrition programmes, particularly for the gM child will be expanded on a significant scale. 
Panchayati Raj 
The UPA government will ensure that all funds given to states for implementation of poverty 
alleviation and rural development schemes by Panchayats are neither delayed nor diverted. Monitoring 
will be strict. In addition, after consultations with states, the UPA government will consider crediting 
elected Panchayats with such funds dkectly. 
Devolution of funds will be accompanied by similar devolution of functions and functionaries as well. 
Regular elections to panchayat bodies will be ensured and the amended Act is respect of the Fifth and 
Sixth Schedule Areas will be implemented. 
The UPA government will ensure that the Gram Sabha is empowered to emerge as the foundation of 
panchayati raj. 
Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes 
The UPA will urge the states to make legislation for conferring ownership rights in respect of minor 
forest produce, mcluding tendu patta, on all those people from the weaker sections who work in the 
forests. 
All reservation quotas, including those relating to promotions, will be fulfilled in a time-bound manner. 
To codify all reservations, a Reservation Act will be enacted. 
The UPA government will launch a comprehensive national programme for minor irrigation of all 
lands owned by dalits and adivasis. Landless families will be endowed with land through 
implementation of land ceiling and land redistribution legislation. No reversal of ceilings legislation 
will be permitted. 
The UPA administration will take all measures to reconcile the objectives of economic growth and 
environmental conservation, particularly as far as tribal communities dependent on forests arc 
concerned. 
The UPA is concerned with the growth of extremist violence and other forms of terrorist activity in 
different states. This is not merely a law-and-order problem, but a far deeper socio-economic issue 
which will be addressed more meaningfiilly than has been the case so far. False encounters will not be 
permitted. 
The UPA government will immediately review the overall strategy and programmes for the 
development of tribal areas to plug loopholes and to work out more viable livelihood strategies. In 
addition, more effective systems of relief and rehabilitation will be put in place for tribal and other 
groups displaced by development projects. Tribal people alienated fi-om land will be rehabilitated. 
The UPA government is very sensitive to the issue of affirmative action, including reservations, in the 
private sector. It will immediately initiate a national dialogue with all political parties, industry and 
other organizations to see how best the private sector can fulfill the aspirations of scheduled caste and 
scheduled tribe youth. 
Eviction of tribal communities and other forest-dwelling communities from forest areas will be 
discontinued. Cooperation of these communities will be sought for protecting forests and for 
undertaking social afforestation. The rights of tribal communities over mineral resources, water 
sources, etc as laid down by law will be fully safeguarded. 
Social Harmony, Welfare of Minorities 
The UPA is committed to tiie implementation of the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1992. 
On Ayodhya, it will await the verdict of the courts, while encouragmg negotiations between parties to 
the dispute for an amicable settlement which must, in turn, receive legal sanction. 
The UPA government will enact a model comprehensive law to deal with communal violence and 
encourage each state to adopt that law to generate faith and confidence in minority communities. 
The UPA government will amend the Constitution to establish a Commission for Minority Educational 
Institutions that will provide direct affiliation for minority professional institutions to central 
universities. 
The UPA will promote modem and technical education among all minority communities. Social and 
economic empowerment of minorities through more systematic attention to education and employment 
will be a priority concern for the UPA. 
The UPA will establish a National Commission to see how best the welfare of socially and 
economically backward sections among religious and linguistic minorities, including reservations in 
education and employment, is enhanced. The Commission will be given six months to submit its 
report. 
Adequate funds will be provided to the National Minorities Development Corporation to ensure its 
effective functioning. The UPA government will examine the question of providing Constitutional 
status to the Minorities Commission and will also strive for recognition and promotion of Urdu 
language under Article 345 and 347 of the Constitution. 
The National Integration Council will be restructured and revived so as to fulfill its original objectives. 
It will meet at least twice a year. 
Infrastructure 
The UPA attaches the highest priority to the development and expansion of physical infrastructure like 
roads, highways, ports, power, railways, water supply, sewage treatment and sanitation. Public 
investment in infrastructure will be enhanced, even as the role of the private sector is expanded. 
Subsidies will be made explicit and provided through the budget. 
The review of the Electricity Act, 2003 will be undertaken in view of the concern expressed by a 
number of states. The mandatory date of June 10, 2004 for unbundling and replacing the state 
electricity boards will be extended. The UPA government also reiterates its commitment to an 
increased role for private generation of power and more importantly power distribution. 
Railways constitute the core of our infrastructure. Public investment for its modernization, track 
renewal and safety will be substantially increased. Railways reforms will be pursued. 
The UPA government commits itself to a comprehensive programme of urban renewal and to a 
massive expansion of social housing in towns and cities, paying particular attention to the needs of 
slum dwellers. Housing for the weaker sections in rural areas will be expanded on a large scale. Forced 
eviction and demolition of slums will be stopped and while undertaking urban renewal, care will be 
taken to see that the urban and semi-urban poor are provided housing near their place of occupation. 
The UPA will pay special attention to augmenting and modernizing rural infrastructure consisting of 
roads, irrigation, electrification, cold-chain and marketing outlets. All existing irrigation projects will 
be completed with three to four years. Household electrification will be completed in five years. 
Water Resources 
The UPA government will make a comprehensive assessment of the feasibility of linking the rivers of 
the country starting with the south-bound rivers. This assessment will be done in a fully consultative 
manner. It will also explore the feasibility of linking sub-basins of rivers in states like Bihar. The UPA 
will take all steps to ensure that long-pending inter-state disputes on rivers and water-sharing like the 
Cauvery Waters dispute are settled amicably at the earliest keeping in mind the interests of all parties to 
the dispute. 
To put an end to the acute drinking water shortage in cities, especially in southern states, desalination 
plants will be installed all along the Coromandel Coast starting with Chennai. Special problems of 
habitations in hilly terrains will be addressed immediately. 
Providing drinking water to all sections in urban and rural areas and augmenting availability of 
drinking water sources is an issue of the topmost priority. Harvesting rain water, desilting existing 
ponds and other innovative mechanisms will be adopted. 
Regional Development, Centre-State Relations 
The UPA government is committed to redressing growing regional imbalances both among states as 
well as within states, through fiscal, administrative, investment and other means. It is a matter of 
concern that regional imbalances have been accentuated by not just historical neglect but also by 
distortions in Plan allocations and central government assistance. Even in the Tenth Five Year Plan , 
states like Bihar, Assam and UP have received per capita allocations that are much below the national 
average. The UPA government will consider the creation of a Backward States Grant Fund that will be 
used to create productive assets in these states. The central government will also take proactive 
measures to speed up the industrialization of the eastern and northeastern region. 
A structured and transparent approach to alleviate the burden of debt on states will be adopted at the 
earliest, so as to enable them to increase social sector investments. Interest rates on loans to states will 
be reduced and the share of states in the single, divisible pool of taxes enhanced. 
All non-statutory resource transfers from the central government will be weighted m favour of poor and 
backward states but with performance parameters as well. A special programme for social and physical 
infrastructure development in the poorest and most backward districts of the country will be taken up 
on a priority basis. 
The UPA government will take special measures to ensure that regions of India like in the east where 
the credit:deposit ratio is lagging, is improved substantially. 
The UPA government will review the issue of payment of royalties to states in the area of minerals. 
From time to time, previous governments have announced special economic packages as, for example, 
for the northeast, for Bihar and for J&K. For Bihar, Shri Rajiv Gandhi had announced a special 
development package in 1989 and subsequently another package was aimoimced at the time of its 
division in 1999 to make up for the loss of revenue. These packages will be implemented 
expeditiously. 
The UPA government will make the National Development Council (NDC) a more effective 
instrument of cooperative federalism. The NDC will meet at least twice a year and in different states. 
Immediately, the NDC will take up the issue of the financial health of states and arrive at a national 
consensus on specific steps to be taken in this regard. The Inter-State Council will also be activated. All 
centrally-sponsored schemes except in national priority areas like family planning will be transferred to 
states. 
The UPA government will consider the demand for the formation of a Telangana state at an appropriate 
time after due consultations and consensus. 
The Sarkaria Commission had last looked at the issue of Centre-State relations over two decades ago. 
The UPA government will set up a new Commission for this purpose keeping in view the sea-changes 
that have taken place in the polity and economy of India since then. 
Long-pending schemes in specific states that have national significance, like the Sethu Samuthuiram 
project, flood control and drainage in North Bihar (that requires cooperation with Nepal as well) and 
Prevention of Erosion in Padma-Ganga and Bhagirithi flood control in West Bengal will be completed 
expeditiously. A Flood-prone Area Development Programme will be started and the central 
government will fully support flood control works in inter-state and international rivers. All existing 
schemes for drought-prone area development will be reviewed and a single major national programme 
launched. 
Jammu and Kashmir, Northeast 
The UPA government is pledged to respectmg the letter and sph-it of Article 370 of the Constitution 
that accords a special status to J&K. Dialogue with all groups and with different shades of opinion in 
J&K will be pursued on a sustained basis, in consultation with the democratically-elected state 
government. The healing touch policy pursued by the state government will be fully supported and an 
economic and humanitarian thrust provided to it. The state will be given every assistance to rebuild its 
infrastructure quickly. New efforts will be launched to brmg investments in areas like power, tourism, 
handicrafts and sericulture. 
The UPA government is determined to tackle terrorism, militancy and insurgency in the northeast as a 
matter of urgent national priority. All northeastern states will be given special assistance to upgrade and 
expand infl^structure. The Northeastern Council will be strengthened and given adequate professional 
support. The territorial integrity of existing states will be maintained. 
Administrative Reforms 
The UPA will set up an Administrative Reforms Commission to prepare a detailed blueprint for 
revamping the public administration system. E-govemance will be promoted on a massive scale. The 
Right to Information Act will be made more progressive, participatory and meaningful. The Lok Pal 
Bill will be enacted mto law. 
The UPA government will take the leadership role to drastically cut delays in High Courts and lower 
levels of the judiciary. Legal aid services will be expanded. Judicial reforms will be given a fresh 
momentum. 
As part of its commitment to electoral reforms, the UPA will initiate steps to introduce state funding of 
elections at the earliest. 
Industry 
The UPA will take all necessary steps to revive industrial growth and put it on a robust footing, through 
a range of policies including deregulation, where necessary Incentives to boost private investment will 
be introduced. FDI will continue to be encouraged and actively sought particularly in areas of 
infrastructure, high-technology and exports and where local assets and employment are created on a 
significant scale. The country needs and can easily absorb at least two to three times the present level 
of FDI inflows. Indian industry will be given every support to become productive and competitive. All 
regulatory institutions will be strengthened to ensure that competition is free and fair. These institutions 
will be run professionally. 
The UPA government will set up a National Manufacturing Competitiveness Council to provide a 
contmuing forum for policy dialogue to energise and sustain the growth of manufacturing industry like 
food processing, textiles and garments, engineering, consumer goods, pharmaceuticals, capital goods, 
leather, and IT hardware. 
Household and artisanal manufacturing will be given greater technological, investment and marketing 
support. In the past few years, the most employment-intensive segment of small-scale industry (SSI) 
has suffered extensively. A major promotional package for the SSI sector will be announced soon. It 
will be freed from the Inspector Raj and given full credit, technological and marketing support. 
Infrastructure upgradation in major indusfrial clusters will receive urgent attention. 
Competition in the financial sector will be expanded. Public sector banks will be given ftill managerial 
autonomy. Interest rates will provide incentives both to investors and savers, particularly pensioners 
and senior citizens. The UPA government will never take decisions on the Employers Provident Fund 
(EPF) without consultations with and approval of the EPF Board. Regulation of urban cooperative 
banks in particular and of banks in general will be made more effective. LIC and GIC will continue to 
be in the public sector and will continue to play their social role. In addition, the social obligations 
imposed by regulatory bodies on private banks and private insurance companies will be monitored and 
enforced strictly. 
Labour 
The UPA government is firmly committed to ensure the welfare and well-being of all workers, 
particularly those in the unorganized sector who constitute 93% of our workforce. Social seciu-ity, 
health insurance and other schemes for such workers like weavers, handloom workers, fishermen and 
fisherwomen, toddy tappers, leather workers, plantation labour, beedi workers, etc will be expanded. 
The UPA rejects the idea of automatic hire and fire. It recognizes that some changes in labour laws 
may be required but such changes must fully protect the interests of workers and families and must take 
place after fiill consultation with trade unions. The UPA will pursue a dialogue with industry and trade 
unions on this issue before coming up with specific proposals. However, labour laws other than the 
Industrial Disputes Act that create an Inspector Raj will be re-examined and procedures harmonized 
and streamlined. 
The UPA govenmient firmly believes that labour-management relations in our country must be marked 
by consultations, cooperation and consensus, not confrontation. Tripartite consultations with trade 
unions and industry on all proposals concerning them will be actively pursued. Rights and benefits 
earned by workers, including the right to strike according to law, will not be taken away or curtailed. 
Public sector 
The UPA government is committed to a strong and effective public sector whose social objectives are 
met by its commercial functioning. But for this, there is need for selectivity and a strategic focus. The 
UPA is pledged to devolve full managerial and commercial autonomy to successful, profit—^making 
companies operating in a competitive environment. Generally profit-making companies will not be 
privatized. 
All privatizations will be considered on a transparent and consultative case-by-case basis. The UPA 
will retain existing "navaratna" companies in the public sector while these companies raise resources 
from the capital market. While every effort will be made to modernize and restructure sick public 
sector companies and revive sick industry, chronically loss-making companies will either be sold-off, 
or closed, after all workers have got their legitimate dues and compensation. The UPA will induct 
private industry to turn-around companies that have potential for revival. 
The UPA government believes that privatization should increase competition, not decrease it. It will 
not support the emergence of any monopoly that only restrict competition. It also believes that there 
must be a direct link between privatization and social needs—like, for example, the use of privatization 
revenues for designated social sector schemes. Public sector companies and nationalized banks will be 
encouraged to enter the capital market to raise resources and offer new investment avenues to retail 
investors. 
Fiscal Policy 
The UPA government commits itself to eliminating the revenue deficit of the centre by 2009, so as to 
release more resources for investments in social and physical infrastructure. All subsidies will be 
targeted sharply at the poor and the truly needy like small and marginal farmers, farm labour and the 
urban poor. A detailed roadmap for accomplishing this will be unveiled in Parliament within 90 days. 
The UPA government will not cut deficits by reducing or curtailing grov^lh of investment and 
development outlays. 
The UPA government is pledged to the early introduction of VAT after all the necessary technical and 
administrative homework has been completed, particularly on issues like the integration of service 
sector taxation and compensation to states. It will initiate measures to increase the tax: GDP ratio by 
undertaking major tax reforms that expand the base of taxpayers, increase tax compliance and make the 
tax administration more efficient. Tax rates will be stable and conducive to growth, compliance and 
investment. Special schemes to unearth black money and assets will be introduced. 
The UPA government will take effective and strong measures to control the price hike of essential 
commodities. Provisions to deal with speculators, hoarders and black- marketeers under the Essential 
Commodities Act will not be diluted in any way. 
Capital Markets 
The UPA government is deeply committed, through tax and other policies, to the orderly development 
and functioning of capital markets that reflect the true fundamentals of the economy. Financial markets 
will be deepened. FIIs will continue to be encouraged while the vulnerability of the financial system to 
the flow of speculative capital will be reduced. Misuse of double taxation agreements will be stopped. 
Interests of small investors will be protected and they will be given new avenues for safe investment of 
their savings. SEBI will be further strengthened. Strictest action will be taken against market 
manipulators and those who try to deliberately engineer market panic. 
Economic Reforms 
The UPA reiterates its abiding commitment to economic reforms with a human face, that stimulates 
growth, investment and employment. Further reforms are needed and will be carried out in agriculture, 
industry and services. The UPA's economic reforms will be oriented primarily to spreading and 
deepening rural prosperity, to significantly improving the quality of public systems and delivery of 
public services, to bringing about a visible and tangible difference in the quality of life of ordinary 
citizens of our country. 
Defence, Internal Security 
The UPA government will ensure that all delays in the modernization of the armed forces are 
eliminated and that all funds earmarked for modernization are spent fully at the earliest. 
The UPA will set up a new Department of Ex-Servicemens' Welfare in the Ministry of Defence. The 
long pending issue of one-rank, one-pension will be re-examined. 
The UPA government will make the National Security Council a professional and effective institution. 
The UPA government is committed to maintaining a credible nuclear weapons programme while at the 
same time it will evolve demonstrable and verifiable confidence-building measures with its nuclear 
neighbours. It will take a leadership role in promoting universal, nuclear disarmament and working for 
a nuclear weapons-free world. 
The UPA has been concerned with the manner in which POTA has been grossly misused ui the past 
two years. There will be no compromise in the fight against terrorism. But given the abuse of POTA 
that has taken place, the UPA government will repeal it, while existing laws are enforced strictly. 
The UPA government will take the strictest possible action, without fear or favour, against all those 
individuals and organizations who spread social discord, disturb social amity, propagate religious 
bigotry and communal hatred. The law of the land will be enforced effectively. 
Science and Technology 
The UPA government will follow policies and introduce programmes that strengthen India's vast 
science and technology infrastructure. Science and technology development and application missions 
will be launched in key areas, covering both global leadership and local transformation. The UPA 
government will mobilize the skills and expertise of Indian scientists, technologists and other 
professionals working abroad for mstitution-building and other projects in the country. 
Energy Security 
The UPA government will immediately put in place policies to enhance the country's energy security 
particularly in the area of oil. Overseas investments in the hydrocarbon industry will be actively 
encouraged. An integrated energy policy linked with sustainable development will be put in place. 
Foreign Policy, International Organisations 
The UPA government will pursue an independent foreign policy keeping in mind its past traditions. 
This policy will seek to promote multi-polarity in world relations and oppose all attempts at 
imilateralism. 
The UPA government will give the highest priority to building closer political, economic and other ties 
with its neighbours in South Asia and to strengthening SAARC. Particular attention will be paid to 
regional projects in the area of water resources, power and ecological conservation. Dialogue with 
Pakistan on all issues will be pursued systematically and on a sustained basis. The UPA will support 
peace talks in Sri Lanka that fulfill the legitimate aspirations of Tamils and religious minorities within 
the territorial integrity and solidarity of Sri Lanka. Outstanding issues with Bangladesh will be 
resolved. Intensive dialogue will be initiate with Nepal for developing water resources to mutual 
advantage. 
Trade and investment with China will be expanded fiirther and talks on the border issue pursued 
seriously. Relationships with East Asian countries will be intensified. Traditional ties with West Asia 
will be given a fresh thrust. The UPA government reiterates India's decades-old connmitment to the 
cause of the Palestinian people for a homeland of their ovra. Steps will be taken to withdraw Indian 
mercenaries from Iraq while further recruitment for this purpose will be banned. 
Even as it pursues closer engagement and relations with the USA, the UPA government will maintain 
the independence of India's foreign policy position on all regional and global issues. The UPA is 
committed to deepening ties with Russia and Europe as well. 
In keeping with the stance adopted by the late Shri Murasoli Maran at Doha, the UPA government will 
folly protect the national interest, particularly of farmers, in all WTO negotiations. Commitments made 
earlier will be adhered to, even as efforts are mounted to ensure that all agreements reflect our concerns 
folly particularly in the area of intellectual property and agriculture. The UPA government will use the 
flexibility afforded in existing WTO agreements to folly protect Indian agriculture and industry. The 
UPA government will play a proactive role in strengthening the emerging solidarity of developing 
countries in the shape of G-20 in the WTO. 
Offlcial Language 
The UPA government will set up a committee to examine the question of declaring all languages in the 
Eighth Schedule of the Constitution as official languages. In addition, Tamil will be declared as a 
classical language. 
A Final Word 
This is a common minimum programme (CMP) for the UPA government. It is, by no means, a 
comprehensive agenda. It is a starting point that highlights the mam priorities, policies and 
programmes. The UPA is committed to the implementation of the CMP. This CMP is the foundation 
for another CMP—collective maximum performance. 
